A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 by NU. CEPAL





A decade of social 
development in 












Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC) 
 
Santiago, Chile, April 2004 
  
Libros de la CEPAL 
The work of the editorial staff for this book was coordinated by José Antonio 
Ocampo, former Executive Secretary of ECLAC; Rolando Franco, Director of the 
Social Development Division; and Pedro Sáinz, former Director of the Statistics and 
Economic Projections Division. Also on the editorial staff were Arturo León, Juan 
Carlos Feres, Adolfo Gurrieri and Ernesto Espíndola. The data were processed by 
the Statistics and Economic Projections Division and the Social Development 
Division.  
This book takes up some of the issues analysed in various annual editions of the 
Social Panorama of Latin America published in the 1990s. The people who contributed 
to these analyses are, in alphabetical order: Irma Arriagada, Mariluz Avendaño, 
Rosa Bravo, Mabel Bullemore, Carlos Daroch, Hubert Escaith, Ernesto Espíndola, 
Vicente Espinoza, Juan Carlos Feres, Rolando Franco, Alvaro Fuentes, Pascual 
Gerstenfeld, Adolfo Gurrieri, Martín Hopenhayn, Carlos Howe, Rubén Kaztman, 
Arturo León, Xavier Mancero, Fernando Medina, José Antonio Ocampo, Enrique 








Cover design: Mariana Babarovic 
 




Sales No. E.03.II.G.143 
Copyright © United Nations, April 2004. All rights reserved 
Printed in United Nations, Santiago, Chile 
 
Requests for authorization to reproduce this work in whole or in part should be addressed 
to the Secretary of the Publications Board, United Nations Headquarters, New York, N.Y. 
10017, United States of America. Member States and their government institutions may 
reproduce this work without prior authorization, but are requested to mention the source 
and to inform the United Nations of such reproduction. 
77 




Summary ........................................................................................................... 15 




 1. Magnitude and profile of poverty.............................................. 33 
 2. Factors related to poverty reduction.......................................... 42 
 3. The nature of rural poverty......................................................... 54 
 4. Vulnerability and poverty ........................................................... 65 
 Methodological annex .......................................................................... 72 
 
Chapter II 
Income distribution.......................................................................................... 79 
 1. Income concentration in the late 1990s...................................... 79 
 2. Trends over the decade................................................................ 86 
 3. Factors influencing income distribution.................................... 95 




 1. The labour supply ...................................................................... 109 
 2. Productive employment of the labour force ........................... 115 




 4. Modernization and informalization of the 
  labour force.................................................................................. 127 
 5. Increased precariousness of labour conditions ...................... 132 
 6. Open unemployment ................................................................. 133 
 
Chapter IV 
Occupational stratification............................................................................ 141 
 1. The basic structure of occupational stratification .................. 141 
 2. Basic structure and national situations.................................... 150 
 3. Inequality in occupational stratification ................................. 156 
 4. Occupational income of the lower strata................................. 162 
 5. Occupational income and educational level ........................... 165 
 6. Stratification of occupations and of households .................... 169 
 Methodological annex ........................................................................ 178 
 
Chapter V 
Intergenerational transmission of opportunities for attaining 
well-being........................................................................................................ 181 
 1. Transmission of opportunities for well-being ........................ 181 
 2. The transmission of educational capital .................................. 186 
 3. Educational capital and employment opportunities ............. 192 
 4. Influence of family contacts ...................................................... 198 
 5. The prospects with regard to inequality ................................. 201 
 Methodological annex ........................................................................ 205 
 
Chapter VI 
Social expenditure in Latin America ........................................................... 213 
 1. Trends in public social spending during the 1990s................ 213 
 2. Impact of the crisis on social expenditure ............................... 219 
 3. Sectoral trends in social expenditure and their 
  impact on income distribution.................................................. 225 
 Methodological annex ........................................................................ 232 
 
Chapter VII 
Concluding observations .............................................................................. 239 
 
Bibliography ................................................................................................. 249 
 
Statistical annex .............................................................................................. 255 
 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 7 
 
Index of tables and figures 
Tables 
I.1 Latin America: poor and indigent households and 
 individuals, 1980-1999.......................................................................... 35 
I.2 Latin America (18 countries): poverty and indigence 
 indicators, 1990-1999............................................................................. 36 
I.3 Latin America: selected features of the poverty profile, 1999.............. 40 
I.4 Latin America (14 countries): per capita GDP and 
 percentage of the population living in poverty and 
 indigence, 1990-1999............................................................................. 44 
I.5 Latin America (12 countries): employment density in 
 selected strata of the population, 1990-1999...................................... 47 
I.6 Latin America: employed poor by employment category 
 and distribution of total poor, urban areas, 1999.............................. 49 
I.7 Latin America: relative variation in consumer food 
 prices with respect to other goods and services, 1990-1999 ............ 52 
I.8 Latin America: magnitude and relative share of rural 
 poverty, around 1999............................................................................ 55 
I.9 Latin America: poverty and average income in rural 
 areas, 1990s ............................................................................................ 56 
I.10 Latin America (16 countries): distribution of economically 
 active population by type of employment, rural areas, 
 1990-2000 ................................................................................................ 59 
I.11 Latin America (15 countries): poverty in selected 
 occupational groups, rural areas, 1990-2000 ..................................... 60 
I.12 Latin America: population employed in non-agricultural 
 activities as a percentage of the employed population in 
 rural areas, 1990-1999 ........................................................................... 61 
I.13 Latin America and the Caribbean (16 countries): Gini 
 indices of land concentration, 1970-1994 ........................................... 64 
I.14 Latin America: estimates based on national and 
 international poverty lines................................................................... 76 
I.15 Latin America (18 countries): indigence lines (IL) and 
 poverty lines (PL).................................................................................. 77 
II.1 Latin America (17 countries): household income 
 distribution, 1990-1999 ......................................................................... 80 
II.2 Latin America (17 countries): indicators of income 
 concentration, 1990-1999 ...................................................................... 84 
II.3 Latin America (17 countries): per capita income and 




II.4 Latin America (18 countries): changes in income 
 distribution in urban areas, 1990-1999 ............................................... 94 
II.5 Latin America (7 countries): average number of years 
 of schooling of heads of household and of employed 
 household members, by income deciles in urban areas ................ 102 
II.6 Latin America (17 countries): percentage distribution of 
 persons having incomes of less than half the median 
 income levels ....................................................................................... 108 
III.1 Latin America: main labour market aggregates, 
 1990-1999 .............................................................................................. 111 
III.2 Latin America: rates of participation, employment 
 and unemployment, by sex and place of residence 
 (urban or rural), 1990-1999................................................................. 112 
III.3 Latin America: labour force, by stage of demographic 
 transition in the countries, 1990-1999............................................... 114 
III.4 Latin America: urban output, employment and 
 productivity, 1990-1999...................................................................... 119 
III.5 Latin America: selected features of the employed 
 population, 1990-1999......................................................................... 121 
III.6 Latin America: gross domestic product (GDP) 
 in the 1990s........................................................................................... 124 
III.7 Latin America (16 countries): total and wage 
 employment, 1990-1999...................................................................... 125 
III.8 Latin America: distribution of the employed population 
 in urban areas, by labour market segment and 
 labour status, 1990-1999 ..................................................................... 128 
III.9 Latin America: income disparities in urban 
 areas, 1990-1999................................................................................... 130 
III.10 Latin America (10 countries): employees without 
 social security coverage...................................................................... 133 
III.11 Latin America: level and composition of unemployment, 
 1990-1999 .............................................................................................. 135 
III.12 Latin America and the Caribbean: urban unemployment, 
 1990-2000 .............................................................................................. 136 
III.13 Latin America: rate of urban unemployment in 17 countries 
 and in 8 countries with a steep rise in unemployment, 
 1994-1999 .............................................................................................. 137 
IV.1 Latin America (11 countries): some characteristics of the 
 different occupational strata, 1999.................................................... 143 
IV.2 Latin America (11 countries): employed workforce by 
 occupational stratum, 1999 ................................................................ 152 
IV.3 Latin America (8 countries): some features of the 
 prevailing occupational strata, 1990 and 1999 ................................ 157 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 9 
 
IV.4 Latin America (11 countries): employed workforce,  
 by occupational stratum, 1999........................................................... 159 
IV.5 Latin America (11 countries): employed workforce,  
 by occupational stratum, 1999........................................................... 167 
IV.6 Latin America (11 countries): per capita labour income 
 of households, by occupational stratum of the main 
 breadwinner, 1999............................................................................... 170 
IV.7 Latin America (11 countries): distribution of households 
 by number of employed persons, type of head and 
 poverty status, 1999 ............................................................................ 172 
IV.8 Latin America (11 countries): number of employed 
 persons and occupational density of households, by 
 occupational stratum or group of the main 
 breadwinner, 1999............................................................................... 174 
V.1 Latin America (groups of countries): intergenerational 
 educational betterment of children aged from 20 to 24 
 years, by sex, urban and rural areas, 2000 ....................................... 183 
V.2 Latin America (groups of countries): children aged from 
 20 to 24 years who did not surpass the education of their 
 parents and who completed less than 12 years of schooling, 
 by sex and educational level of their parents, urban and 
 rural areas, 2000 .................................................................................. 184 
V.3 Latin America (groups of countries): young people aged 20 
 to 24 years with a minimum of 9, 12 and 14 years of schooling, 
 by educational level of their parents, urban areas.......................... 187 
V.4 Latin America (groups of countries): young people aged 20 
 to 24 years with a minimum of 9 and 12 years of schooling, 
 by educational level of their parents, rural areas ........................... 189 
V.5 Latin America (groups of countries): percentage distribution 
 of young people aged 20 to 29 years who work 20 or more 
 hours per week, by occupation and educational level, 
 urban and rural areas, 1999 ............................................................... 193 
V.6 Latin America (groups of countries): average income of 
 young people aged 20 to 29 years who work 20 or more 
 hours per week, by occupation and educational level, 
 urban and rural areas, 1999 ............................................................... 194 
V.7 Latin America (18 countries): average income and average 
 years of schooling of young people aged 20 to 29 years 
 who work for 20 or more hours per week and have 
 completed 12 or more years of schooling, by 





V.8 Latin America (18 countries): employment and income 
 of persons aged 20 to 59 years employed in the most 
 frequent occupations in the four lowest deciles and in 
 the highest decile of the household income distribution, 
 urban areas, 1999................................................................................. 202 
V.9 Latin America (18 countries): employment and income of 
 individuals and heads of household aged 20 to 59 years 
 employed in the most frequent occupations in the four 
 lowest deciles and in the highest decile of the household 
 income distribution, urban areas, 1999 ............................................ 204 
V.10 Latin America: number of years of schooling required to 
 have a probability of avoiding poverty equal to or greater 
 than the average in each country among employed persons 
 aged 20 to 29 years .............................................................................. 206 
V.11 Latin America: distribution of households with children 
 aged 20 to 24, by average years of schooling of the parents 
 and household income quartiles, by groups of countries ............. 208 
V.12 Latin America (18 countries): young people who live in the 
 paternal home and young people who study, urban areas........... 210 
V.13 Latin America: young people aged 20 to 24 years who are 
 studying and their average number of years of schooling............ 210 
Figures 
I.1 Latin America: annual growth rates of gross domestic 
 product (GDP) and of the poor population, 1980-1999.................... 34 
I.2 Latin America: growth rate of GDP and of the poor 
 population, urban areas, 1980-1999 .................................................... 38 
I.3 Latin America: growth rate of GDP and of the poor 
 population, rural areas, 1980-1999...................................................... 38 
I.4 Latin America (14 countries): average annual variation 
 in per capita GDP and poverty coefficient, 1990-1999 ..................... 45 
I.5 Latin America: poverty among the population employed 
 in agricultural and non-agricultural activities in rural 
 areas, 1997-1998..................................................................................... 63 
II.1 Latin America (13 countries): changes in income 
 concentration, national total, 1990-1999............................................. 89 
II.2 Latin America (14 countries): changes in the Gini 
 coefficient of income distribution, 1990-1999.................................... 91 
II.3 Latin America (12 countries): indicators for income, 
 years of schooling and income from assets by deciles 
 of income, urban areas ......................................................................... 97 
 
 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 11 
 
II.4 Latin America (12 countries): ratio between the number 
 of employed persons and the total number of household 
 members in urban areas ..................................................................... 100 
III.1 Latin America: evolution of some general labour 
 market variables, 1990-1999............................................................... 117 
III.2 Latin America: total gross domestic product (GDP) 
 and employment, 1990-1999 .............................................................. 118 
III.3 Latin America: trends in economic growth and 
 urban open unemployment, 1980-2000............................................ 135 
III.4 Latin America (11 countries): time spent seeking 
 employment by laid-off workers, 1994-1999 ................................... 138 
V.1 Latin America: educational attainment of young 
 people aged 20 to 24 years compared with that of 
 their parents, 2000............................................................................... 182 
V.2 Latin America: average years of schooling of young 
 people aged 20 to 24 and of their parents, 1999 .............................. 185 
V.3 Latin America: young people aged 20 to 24 years with a 
 minimum of 9, 12 and 14 years of schooling, according to 
 the educational level of their parents, urban areas, 1990-2000 ..... 188 
V.4 Latin America: average labour income and percentage of 
 poor people among employed persons aged 20 to 29 years, 
 urban areas, 1999................................................................................. 191 
V.5 Latin America: occupational structure and average income 
 of young people aged from 20 to 29 years by country 
 groups, urban areas, 1999 .................................................................. 196 
V.6 Latin America: occupational structure and average income 
 of young people aged from 20 to 29 years by country 
 groups, rural areas, 1999 .................................................................... 197 
V.7 Latin America: educational level and labour income of 
 young people aged 20 to 29 years with 12 or more years 
 of schooling, by type of occupation and years of schooling 
 of parents, urban areas, 1999 ............................................................. 201 
VI.1 Latin America (17 countries): public social expenditure 
 per capita in the two-year periods 1990-1991 and 1998-1999........ 214 
VI.2 Latin America (17 countries): public social expenditure, 
 as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), in the 
 two-year periods 1990-1991 and 1998-1999 ..................................... 215 
VI.3a Latin America: social expenditure on social security, 
 (as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)), 
 as a function of per capita GDP ........................................................ 217 
VI.3b Latin America: social expenditure (as a percentage 
 of gross domestic product (GDP)), as a function of 
 per capita GDP .................................................................................... 217 
12 ECLAC 
 
VI.4 Latin America: factors in growth of public social 
 expenditure per capita, 1990-1999 .................................................... 219 
VI.5a Latin America (17 countries): percentage variations in 
 total public expenditure and the gross domestic product 
 over the 1990-1999 period .................................................................. 221 
VI.5b Latin America (17 countries): percentage variations in 
 public social expenditure and total public expenditure 
 over the 1990-1999 period .................................................................. 221 
VI.5c Latin America (17 countries): percentage variations in 
 public social expenditure (excluding social security) and 
 total public expenditure over the 1990-1999 period....................... 222 
VI.5d Latin America (17 countries): percentage variations in 
 public social expenditure and the gross domestic 
 product over the 1990-1999 period ................................................... 222 
VI.6 Latin America: evolution of the gross domestic product, 
 total public expenditure, public social expenditure, and 
 public social expenditure excluding social security 
 over the 1996-2000 period .................................................................. 224 
VI.7 Latin America: distribution of primary income and of 
 expenditure on primary, secondary and tertiary 
 education, by household quintiles.................................................... 227 
VI.8 Latin America: distribution of primary income, total 
 income and social expenditure, by household quintiles ............... 228 
VI.9 Latin America (8 countries): redistributive impact of 
 social expenditure (excluding social security) and of 
 social security on household income................................................ 230 
VI.10 Latin America: variations in public social expenditure 
 and the gross domestic product (GDP)............................................ 235 
 
 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 13 
 
Preface 
One of the basic functions of ECLAC is to monitor the economic 
and social situation of the countries of the region and to analyse changes 
in the public policies they implement in these areas. These studies take 
the form of institutional publications of various kinds, including 
conference documents and annual reports. 
The social aspects of the countries’ development and their 
interrelationship with the economic aspects have been analysed in the 
various editions of the Social Panorama of Latin America prepared by the 
Social Development Division and the Statistics and Economic Projections 
Division.  
This book takes up some of the issues dealt with most often in the 
Social Panorama, revisiting them on the basis of updated, systematized 
statistical information that provides an overview of the trends that 
characterized the 1990s. Most of the statistics come from the 
Commission’s databases, which consist of information from household 
surveys conducted in the Latin American countries and made available to 
ECLAC by those countries’ governments.  
The data used in preparing the chapter on social spending are 
based on official information provided by 17
 countries of the region on the 
functional classification of public expenditure. This information is 




It should be mentioned that input for the preparation of the Social 
Panorama was provided on a number of occasions by the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA) and the World Food Programme (WFP). 
 
 
 José Luis Machinea 
       Executive Secretary 
 Economic Commission for  
 Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
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Summary 
The final decade of the twentieth century was a momentous one for 
Latin America, as it witnessed sweeping changes that represented a 
turning point with regard to previous trends in the region. The most 
important of these changes were the revival of economic growth and the 
reduction of poverty in the initial years of that period. Another significant 
phenomenon was the impact of international crises on the Latin American 
countries, especially in the second half of the decade. 
This book analyses what happened in the countries between 1990 
and 1999 and revisits issues of interest to ECLAC, using the same 
approach that has characterized the Social Panorama of Latin America.  
The analysis begins with a look at a number of “objective” 
dimensions —poverty, income distribution, employment, occupational 
stratification, the role of education, the intergenerational transmission of 
opportunities for achieving well-being and the contribution of social 
spending to the improvement of the population’s standard of living— 
and at the interrelationships between these dimensions and economic 
growth. It also uses the findings of opinion polls carried out in many of 
the countries to describe the Latin American population’s subjective 
reactions to the changes that took place in the 1990s.  
This interplay between objective dimensions and subjective 
individual responses is particularly relevant today, given the need to take 
all these factors into account in tackling the challenges of the social 
development agenda in the coming years, with a view to building a new 
16 ECLAC 
commitment to that agenda among the citizenry and rallying support for 
the public policies implemented to foster growth and increase equity.
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Introduction 
The final decade of the twentieth century was a momentous one for 
Latin America. In the first seven years of the decade the region’s economy 
grew at a relatively brisk pace, ending a lengthy stretch of recession and 
stagnation. The region’s vulnerability to sudden changes in the 
international economy was revealed, however, by the impact of the Asian 
crisis, which destabilized its economy and dragged down growth in the 
final years of the decade. The effects of this retreat were felt in many of 
the Latin American countries, and the persistence of this situation has 
prompted analysts to assert that the period from 1997 to 2002 represented 
another lost half-decade for the region. 
This book attempts to present a balanced view of what happened in 
the 1990s in terms of social development, understood as the changes that 
occur in the social structure and in the processes of social mobility that 
take place within that structure. 
Specifically, the analysis seeks to answer the following questions: 
How did levels of well-being change, especially in population sectors that 
are hard put to meet their basic needs? How wide are the inequalities 
between individuals and groups, especially in terms of income 
distribution? What has happened with respect to employment, which has 
traditionally been regarded as a key point of linkage between the 
economic and social structures? What changes have occurred in labour-
market participation, which is a determinant of social stratification? And 
lastly, to what extent has the State fostered social integration, as measured 
by the amount of resources allocated to social policies and programmes? 
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Below is a summary of the analyses presented in this book. The 
concluding section reviews how Latin Americans perceive the economic 
and social changes that took place in the region in the 1990s and, finally, 
enumerates some of the pending tasks on the regional agenda. 
1.  Poverty 
While the proportion of poor people out of the total population 
went down in most of the countries in the 1990s, the size of the poor 
population swelled from 200 million to 211 million. Changes in poverty 
rates were largely determined by fluctuations in economic growth. There 
was, however, a sharp disparity between the effects of boom and bust 
periods, in that the increase in poverty that resulted from episodes of 
recession was not completely offset during subsequent growth spurts. 
Poverty rates fell in 11 countries —which are home to most of the 
region’s poor population—, rose sharply in one country and stayed more 
or less the same in three countries.  
In terms of the spatial distribution of poverty, the relative share of 
urban poverty continued to expand. Rural poverty is more extreme, 
however, as most of the rural poor are indigent (46 million people), 
whereas most of the urban poor are not (91 million). The rural poverty 
rate is still very high, as 64% of rural residents are poor, compared to 37% 
of urban residents. 
In the first half of the decade most of the countries saw their 
economies pick up, with the notable exceptions of Argentina, Mexico and 
Uruguay, owing to the crisis of 1994-1995. The South American countries 
posted feeble growth (or contraction, in some cases) for several years after 
1997. Conversely, the Mexican and Central American economies expanded 
considerably between 1996 and 2000. Owing in part to these disparities, 
progress in reducing poverty was very uneven in the different countries, 
with some of them even experiencing setbacks towards the end of the 
decade. 
Throughout the decade, upturns or downturns in per capita income 
were closely correlated with decreases or increases in poverty. This 
pattern was especially evident in extreme cases, notably those of Chile 
and Venezuela. At the same time, there were significant departures from 
this general trend, as countries with similar growth rates made very 
disparate degrees of progress in reducing poverty. In Chile, for example, 
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) surged by 55% between 1990 
and 2000, resulting in a 50% decline (16 percentage points) in poverty, 
while in Uruguay poverty showed a steeper relative decrease (53%, or 
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6 percentage points) over the same period, even though the rise in per 
capita GDP was much smaller (28%). 
The growth of labour productivity was uneven across different 
sectors, segments and firms. Among firms, growth in labour productivity 
tended to be confined mainly to very big companies linked to the 
international economy, although these companies generated few new 
jobs.1 At the same time, low-productivity employment, mostly in the 
informal sector, expanded in nearly all the countries. Because of this 
phenomenon, the open unemployment rate, although it remained high 
throughout the decade, cannot provide a complete picture of the labour 
market’s effects on poverty. 
Labour market conditions differed sharply from one country to 
another. In Brazil and Mexico, for example, open unemployment was 
relatively low and employment density was high. In Argentina, 
meanwhile, unemployment was high and employment density was low 
among low-income households, but earned income was higher in this 
country than in Brazil or Mexico. 
Since earned income accounts for the bulk of household resources,2 
low earned income is a major determinant of poverty. Be that as it may, 
changes in relative prices over the course of the decade tended to boost 
the purchasing power of low-income groups, as the cost of the minimum 
consumption basket, and particularly of food, went down in most of the 
countries.3 
Public transfers played a vital role in reducing the incidence or 
intensity of poverty. Transfers exceeded 20% of total urban household 
income in Argentina, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay, and represented 
about 10% in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. 
The level and distribution of urban and rural poverty were also 
affected by rural-to-urban migration. As might be expected, the fact that 
most migrants from the countryside to the cities were young people 
meant that the proportion of the population represented by this age group 
shrank in rural areas and expanded in urban areas, changing the 
population pyramid in both places. In Brazil, for example, 67.5% of the 
                                                 
1  Most new jobs in big companies went to highly qualified workers, who, as a result, earn 
relatively high wages. 
2  Urban households in all economic strata obtain almost 70% of their income from the 
labour market. In turn, 66% of household income from work consists of wages and 
salaries. 
3  In some countries the favourable effect of this trend was partly offset by a jump in utility 
rates (water, electricity, urban transport), which rose faster than the average consumer 
price index in those countries.  
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urban population is between the ages of 15 and 64, whereas the 
proportion drops to 60.4% in rural areas. In Bolivia only 3.4% of the urban 
population is 65 or over, as against 5.1% in rural areas.  
In short, the region’s sluggish economic growth and the trends 
observed in its labour market were generally not conducive to poverty 
reduction. 
2.  Income distribution 
The highly unequal income distribution that has long been typical 
of Latin America stayed the same or worsened in most of the countries in 
the 1990s. It should be noted that some 75% of the region’s households 
have below-average income levels. In the 1990s the proportion of national 
income that went to households in the top income decile increased in 
eight countries, decreased in five —although the decrease was significant 
in only two (Honduras and Uruguay)— and remained unchanged in one 
(Mexico). This increase in the share of the richest households was 
observed even in countries that have historically had better income 
distribution, such as Argentina, Costa Rica and Venezuela. In Uruguay 
the share of the top decile was smaller in 1999 than it had been in 1990, 
but expanded from 26% to 27% between 1997 and 1999. 
Various situations were observed with respect to the share of total 
income that went to households in the bottom 40% of the income 
distribution: this share contracted in five countries, expanded in eight and 
held steady in one (Nicaragua). The most dramatic downturns were seen 
in Ecuador and Venezuela, and coincided in both cases with acute crises, 
but Costa Rica, El Salvador and Mexico also experienced setbacks. What 
improvements there were did not amount to significant changes; only in 
Colombia, between 1994 and 1997, did the improvement exceed two 
percentage points, although it was followed by a slight deterioration 
between 1997 and 1999. 
Among the 50% of the region’s households that fell somewhere 
between the poorest 40% and the richest 10%, the changes observed were 
different from the ones that took place in the groups at either end of the 
spectrum. In at least seven countries this group’s share did not increase or 
decrease by more than two percentage points. Only in El Salvador 
(between 1995 and 1999), Honduras and Uruguay did the amount of 
income that went to these households grow appreciably. In Brazil and 
Ecuador these middle strata lost over three percentage points, to the 
benefit of households in the high-income bracket, while the loss in 
Argentina amounted to 2.6 percentage points. Despite these fluctuations, 
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the trends observed in the middle strata’s relative income show that in a 
number of countries, these groups have ways of defending their share of 
total income.  
The countries with the biggest increases in their Gini coefficients 
were Costa Rica and Venezuela. Argentina (greater Buenos Aires) and 
Ecuador (urban areas) also suffered setbacks, while the opposite occurred 
in Colombia (between 1994 and 1999), Honduras and urban areas of 
Uruguay.  
There is no clear correlation between development level and 
income distribution. This is apparent from the cases of Argentina and 
Uruguay, both of which have high income levels compared to the rest of 
the region and historically similar patterns of income distribution. Despite 
these common features, by the end of the decade there were striking 
differences between these countries in terms of the structure and trends of 
income distribution. In some countries income distribution remained 
largely the same throughout the 1980s and 1990s, while in others it 
changed substantially. In the 1960s Argentina and Chile had had 
remarkably well balanced income distribution, but by the late 1990s their 
distribution patterns were no better than the regional average. In contrast, 
Costa Rica and Uruguay continue to exhibit more egalitarian income 
distribution, notwithstanding the economic upheavals of the past few 
years. In Venezuela, too, inequality is still below the regional average, 
despite the crisis that broke out in the second half of the 1990s.  
The primary factors affecting income distribution include 
education, property ownership, demographic characteristics and 
employment density. With respect to the first factor, it may be said in 
general that the higher the level of education, the higher the income, 
although the two variables are not directly proportional to one another. It 
should be borne in mind that education, measured by the number of years 
of schooling, is highly concentrated in the region and that this 
concentration has had a negative impact on income distribution. 
The distribution of the second factor —property ownership— is 
also highly concentrated, to the point where the average income derived 
from it coincides with the observed value in the seventh, eighth or ninth 
income decile, depending on the country. The concentration of property 
ownership could become a determining factor in reproducing inequalities 
and affording different people unequal opportunities for achieving well-
being.  
With respect to the third factor, demographic characteristics have 
an enormous impact on income distribution. On average, poor 
households have more members than non-poor households, as well as 
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low earned income and high demographic dependency ratios owing to 
the large number of members, with the result that such households’ per 
capita income is low. 
Lastly, with respect to employment density, a comparison between 
the top and bottom deciles of the income distribution in terms of the ratio 
of income earners to the total number of household members shows that 
the top decile’s capacity to generate earned income is at least twice that of 
the bottom decile.  
3.  Employment 
In the 1990s wide disparities were observed between rural and 
urban areas in terms of the growth of the economically active population 
(EAP). These differences were largely due to migration: the rural EAP 
grew by only 0.8%, while the urban EAP expanded by 3.3%. 
Demographic trends were also influenced by international 
emigration, whose impact was especially strong in Mexico and the 
Central American countries. Were it not for this outflow of workers, the 
EAP of the countries concerned might have expanded substantially, at 
least in those countries where large-scale emigration dates back 20 years 
or more. 
The annual growth of the region’s economy was 3.2% in the 1990s, 
while that of the EAP was 2.6% and that of employment, 2.2%. At the 
same time, average labour productivity increased over the previous 
decade’s level. Some negative developments were also observed, 
however; for example, despite the slower growth of the EAP, employment 
expanded at a rate 0.4% lower than the one recorded in the 1980s. 
Towards the end of the decade employment showed a renewed tendency 
to grow faster than GDP (1.6% versus 1.3%, respectively), with the result 
that average labour productivity showed negative growth and spurious 
labour absorption increased. This was compounded by a widening of the 
gap between the EAP and the employed EAP (0.8%), even though EAP 
growth slowed to 2.4%. The upshot was that the region’s economic 
performance in the 1990s did not significantly offset the negative trends of 
the 1980s.  
The labour market’s difficulty in adequately absorbing the EAP 
was particularly evident in urban areas, where the EAP increased by an 
average of 3.3% a year. 
Another notable feature of employment was the increased weight 
of the tertiary and informal sectors. Slow economic growth was 
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accompanied by sweeping changes in the employment structure. The 
relative share of employment in the primary and secondary sectors 
continued to shrink, while employment in commerce and services 
continued to expand. Productivity increased markedly in a handful of 
segments and sectors, but rose slowly or stayed the same in all the rest. In 
other words, the modernization of a few occupations was accompanied 
by an increase in the proportion of the workforce engaged in informal 
economic activities.  
In fact, two thirds of the new jobs generated in urban areas were in 
the informal sector. This included an increase in the share of unskilled 
own-account workers in commerce and services (24.2%), followed by 
increases in the shares of workers (employers and employees) in 
microenterprises (18.2%), domestic workers (9.4%), unskilled own-
account workers in industry and construction (8.1%) and workers 
engaged in primary occupations (6%).4 This pattern was seen in most of 
the 17 countries studied, especially the most populous ones, such as 
Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. In Argentina and Chile, however, most new 
jobs were in the formal sector, although Argentina suffered a sharp rise in 
open unemployment. 
Informal-sector employment in urban areas, which had represented 
41% of total urban employment in 1990, accounted for 46.3% in 1999. Over 
the same period, the proportion of formal private-sector employees other 
than professionals and technicians fell from 35.9% to 29.1%, while that of 
public-sector employees dropped from 16% to 12.9%.  
The wage gap between the formal and informal sectors widened in 
all the countries for which information is available. The same was true of 
the gap in average income between workers in these two sectors, except 
in Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama. Within each sector, income 
disparities between workers in higher-skilled and lower-skilled jobs also 
increased in all the countries except Argentina, although that country’s 
situation is not fully comparable to those of the other countries owing to 
the upsurge in its open unemployment rate. 
In the 1990s labour conditions underwent a number of changes, 
many of which were detrimental to workers, such as the decline in formal 
employment contracts; the proliferation of temporary and part-time jobs; 
the lack of social security coverage; the expansion of permissible grounds 
                                                 
4  In the formal sector, which generated 34.1% of all new jobs, the biggest increases in 
employment were for wage- or salary-earning professionals and technicians (20.1%), 
entrepreneurs and independent professionals and technicians (6.5%), wage or salary 
earners other than professionals and technicians (5.4%) and public-sector employees 
(2.1%). 
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for dismissal; the reduction of severance pay; and restrictions on the right 
to strike, collective bargaining and union membership. The increased 
precariousness of employment could also be seen in the lack of social 
protection and health insurance, primarily among workers in 
microenterprises, although there were significant differences between 
countries in this respect. 
A fourth major trend was the expansion of unemployment, mainly 
in the South American countries. Unemployment climbed steadily in 
Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, although in Brazil it reached levels 
equivalent to only half the rates recorded in the other two countries. 
Unemployment also worsened in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. In Chile it did not begin to rise until 1998, after 
having gone down systematically since the beginning of the decade. In 
contrast, unemployment subsided in Mexico and most of the Central 
American and Caribbean countries. 
4.  Occupational stratification 
Latin America’s employed population carries out a broad range of 
activities that vary widely in terms of hierarchy, social prestige and, 
particularly, the amount of income they generate. Access to these 
activities depends primarily on the degree to which a given worker 
possesses or controls productive assets and on his or her professional 
qualifications. These attributes, together with factors such as the degree of 
authority in the firm, the size of the firm and the branch of production to 
which it belongs, determine where people fit into the occupational 
structure and, accordingly, have a decisive impact on their living 
conditions and the opportunities available to them. On the basis of these 
criteria, occupations can be grouped into a nine-layer hierarchy, which 
can be split into three levels. The top level includes 10.3% of the employed 
workforce, and the corresponding income levels are considerably higher 
than those of the other occupations. The middle level encompasses 14.5% 
of the employed workforce, and the bottom level, the remaining 75% of 
employed workers, many of whom do not earn enough to keep a typical 
Latin American family of four above the poverty line. 
The top level includes jobs involving non-manual labour that can 
be performed only by workers with productive assets (employers), high-
level professional qualifications (professionals) or a high degree of 
authority in the workplace (managers). Average income from these jobs is 
equivalent to 12.5 times the poverty line, and the median number of years 
of schooling completed by workers in this category is 11.6. The middle 
level consists of non-manual labour requiring an intermediate degree of 
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professional qualification or authority. These workers are supervisors, 
mid-level professionals, technicians or administrative workers whose 
average labour income is equivalent to 4.9 times the poverty line and 
whose median level of schooling is 11.2 years. The bottom level 
encompasses a variety of manual and non-manual jobs, and the workers 
concerned have neither productive assets nor positions of authority nor a 
very high level of professional qualification. As noted above, these 
workers make up 75% of the labour force. Their average labour income is 
2.4 times the poverty line and the median number of years of schooling is 
5.5. This level, in turn, can be divided into two subgroups of about the 
same size, which are differentiated by their income and educational 
levels. One group consists of workers in the commerce sector, manual 
workers, artisans and drivers, who have average income of 3 times the 
poverty line and a median of 6.5 years of schooling. The other group 
consists of workers in the areas of personal services and agriculture, 
whose average income is 1.8 times the poverty line and whose median 
number of years of schooling is 4.3. 
The first notable feature of trends in occupational stratification in 
the 1990s is that the relative share of the different occupational strata 
remained almost unchanged, indicating that there was very little upward 
mobility. In countries where average labour income rose, the proportion 
of the workforce at the top and middle levels increased, whereas the 
opposite occurred in countries where average labour income fell. 
The basic occupational structure described above predominates, 
with very few variations, in most of the Latin American countries. There 
is a fairly close relationship between the countries’ level of economic 
development and the distribution of the three levels of occupational 
stratification. However, there are also some disparities. Chile, for 
example, which has the highest median labour income (7.3 times the 
poverty line), also has the occupational structure with the smallest bottom 
level, equivalent to 65.5% of its workforce. In Brazil and Mexico the 
proportion of the workforce at the top level —9.3% and 10%, 
respectively— is similar to the proportion in Guatemala and just under 
half the proportion in Chile. Conversely, the proportion represented by 
the middle level in Brazil and Mexico is similar to the equivalent 
proportion in Chile and more than double the proportion in Guatemala. 
At the bottom level, the proportion of own-account or unpaid subsistence 
farmers is still as high as 16% in Brazil and nearly 10% in Mexico, or three 
times as high as the equivalent proportion in Chile. 
A second observation is that the distribution of labour income is 
much more unequal in Latin America than in developed countries. It is 
also important to note, however, that some countries in the region have 
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similar average income levels but different degrees of inequality, while 
others have very different average income levels but similar degrees of 
inequality. One way to gauge these disparities is to look at the ratio of the 
income of medium-sized and large non-agricultural employers to the 
national average: this ratio is 2 to 1 in Costa Rica and 16 to 1 in 
Guatemala, as against 6 to 1 in Brazil and 11 to 1 in Mexico. 
A comparison between Chile and Costa Rica, which have the 
highest labour income, is also illustrative. The distribution of labour 
income is significantly unequal in Chile, in contrast to the considerably 
more even distribution in Costa Rica. Levels of labour income in different 
sectors in Costa Rica do not depart dramatically from the national 
average: for example, agricultural workers in that country receive 74% of 
the average income, while their counterparts in Chile receive only 48%. 
Likewise, employers in large and medium-sized firms receive 2.2 times 
the average income in Costa Rica, compared to 6.8 times in Chile. 
With respect to levels of education, in 1999 the combined workforce 
of 10 countries had a weighted average of 6.9 years of schooling. The 
average among professionals was 14.6 years, followed by that of directors 
and managers (11.7), technicians (11.5), administrative workers (10.9), 
employers (8.9), workers in the commerce sector (7.1), manual workers, 
artisans, machine operators and drivers (6.2), workers in personal and 
security services (5.9) and agricultural workers (3.1).  
Lastly, when households are classified according to the primary 
breadwinner’s occupation, their average per capita income reflects fairly 
accurately the median incomes of the different occupational strata. This 
indicates the importance of the main breadwinner’s occupation in 
determining the stratification of households. However, the fact that nearly 
half of Latin America’s households have more than one income earner 
influences those households’ per capita income by helping to reduce, 
especially in the case of relatively low-paying occupations, either the 
intensity or the percentage of poverty, depending on the country’s 
average income and the size of the households concerned. At the top 
level, the presence of more than one income earner in the household has 
less of an impact than it does at lower levels, since the primary 
breadwinner’s income is usually quite high. This factor has the strongest 
influence at the middle level and at the upper end of the bottom level, 
where the average income of households with more than one income 
earner is usually significantly higher than that of households with a single 
income earner. 
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5.  The intergenerational transmission of opportunities 
for achieving well-being 
Despite the efforts made in the region to provide universal access to 
the formal educational system, the acquisition of educational capital is 
still conditioned by intergenerational dynamics. The fact that educational 
opportunities and, consequently, access to more stable, better-paying jobs 
are to a large extent inherited is a key reason why current socio-economic 
inequalities are reproduced indefinitely in successive generations. 
An individual’s likelihood of receiving at least an adequate 
minimum level of education is largely determined by the level of 
education of his or her parents and by the economic capacity of his or her 
household of origin. Towards the end of the 1990s, some 75% of young 
people in urban areas came from households in which the parents had 
insufficient education —fewer than 10 years of schooling— and, on 
average, more than 45% had not finished secondary school (equivalent to 
12 years of schooling in most of the countries), which today is regarded as 
the minimum level of education needed to achieve well-being in urban 
areas. 
Opportunities are even more limited for young people in rural 
areas, since about 80% of them fail to reach what is regarded as the 
minimum educational level needed in rural areas: completion of primary 
school. Here, too, differences between households in terms of the 
educational environment they offer mean that young people in rural areas 
have unequal chances of completing primary school, although their 
chances of completing secondary school are even more strongly affected 
by this factor and, as a result, more unequal.  
Differences with respect to the number of years of schooling are not 
the only source of inequality in the acquisition of educational capital. 
There is a significant gap between public and private schools in terms of 
the quality of the education they provide. This gap reinforces the 
inequalities among young people in different social strata, since the ones 
who complete more years of schooling are also likely to receive a higher-
quality education. 
Most young people with insufficient educational capital will have 
trouble finding a job and will have access only to low-paying jobs which, 
in turn, will not enable them to create the conditions needed to give their 
own children the minimum required level of educational capital. 
Young people who are currently employed and who have 
completed post-secondary studies (that is, more than 12 years of 
schooling) can be divided into two groups. The first, which accounts for 
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about 45% of the total, consists of professionals, technicians or managers 
whose median monthly income is equivalent to 6.5 times the poverty line 
in the case of professionals and technicians and 10 times the poverty line 
in the case of managers. The second group, which accounts for the other 
55%, consists mainly of individuals who have completed fewer years of 
post-secondary schooling than the individuals in the first group. People in 
the second group are more likely to work as administrative employees, 
accountants, salespeople and dependent employees, with an average 
monthly income ranging from 3.5 to 5.5 times the poverty line. 
In contrast, nearly 80% of urban workers with eight or fewer years 
of schooling are manual workers, security guards, waiters or domestic 
workers, whose average monthly income, at two to three times the 
poverty line, is not enough to guarantee family well-being. This 
percentage rises as countries broaden their secondary-education coverage 
because when the supply of qualified workers expands, less qualified 
workers tend to become concentrated in jobs with lower prestige, quality 
and pay, which generally involve manual labour. Moreover, the growing 
predominance, among workers who have not completed secondary 
school, of jobs that provide an insufficient level of well-being reflects the 
process of educational devaluation to which younger generations are also 
exposed, as the coverage and completion of more basic levels of education 
increase.  
The intergenerational transmission of opportunities for achieving 
well-being is also affected by the social contacts derived from the 
household of origin. The vast network of contacts enjoyed by some 
households, along with their greater cultural capital, increase by an 
average of 40% the income received by young people from these 
households over the income of young people who lack such advantages, 
even when they work in the same occupational category and have a 
similar level of education. 
Lastly, the close link between the occupational structure and 
income distribution, which explains the latter’s resistance to change, is 
evident from the fact that about half of the employed members of 
households in the top income decile are professionals, technicians or 
managers whose monthly income is equivalent to about 17 times the 
poverty line. These workers, who account for some 5% of total 
employment, receive almost 21% of total income. Among workers from 
households in the bottom 40% of the income distribution, just under 75% 
are machine operators, manual workers, security guards, waiters or 
domestic employees. Workers in this group account for 25% of total 
employment but receive only 11% of total income. The occupational 
profile of the workforce that will continue to shape the pay structure in 
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the future, as well as its relationship to income distribution, have already 
been largely defined in advance by the characteristics of workers’ 
households of origin. This means, for example, that for the next 10 years 
the occupational distribution of the workforce will look much the same as 
it does today. 
These circumstances lend weight to the argument that educational 
reform and social policy in general should be aimed essentially at giving 
children and young people in low-resource social strata more equitable 
access to quality education through measures such as large-scale 
scholarship programmes, since this is the only kind of capital they inherit. 
The recent upturn in the number of jobs for employees with two, three or 
four years of post-secondary education implies that employment 
opportunities for individuals with this level of education could well be on 
the rise. Reducing inequality in education also appears to be feasible 
because as individuals in the low- and middle-income strata increase their 
level of education, those in the high-income strata are less likely to stand 
out because of the number of years of schooling they have completed.  
At the same time, a strategy for reducing social inequity cannot rely 
on education policy alone, since experience has shown that efforts in this 
area have been insufficient in themselves to stop the intergenerational 
transmission of unequal opportunity. First, changes in education policy 
should be closely and strategically coordinated with improvements in 
housing, nutrition, health and other areas that affect school performance. 
Second, the reduction of inequity in the short and medium terms depends 
on income policies, the operation of various public services and the 
creation of human and social capital outside the formal educational 
system, since it is through this channel that various kinds of productive 
assets are redistributed. Third, income gaps —the key factor in the 
reproduction of unequal opportunity— can be narrowed through 
measures such as minimum wages and legal reforms that safeguard 
employees’ collective bargaining rights. 
6.  Social expenditure in Latin America 
The allocation of public resources to social sectors —defined, in the 
framework of public expenditure, as health, social assistance, social 
security, housing and other areas— increased considerably in the 1990s. 
Social spending, measured as the percentage of total public expenditure 
allocated to social sectors, rose from an average of US$ 360 to US$ 540 a 
year per capita between the beginning and the end of the decade. This 
represents a 50% increase. 
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This expansion, which took place in most of the countries, was 
made possible by the recovery of economic growth and by the higher 
fiscal priority given to social spending. Thus, social spending rose from 
10.4% to 13.1% of GDP over the period, although most of the increase 
took place in the first half of the decade. 
The 17 countries considered differ widely in terms of the 
percentages of GDP they have historically allocated to social sectors. 
Although some of the countries that boosted social spending in the 1990s 
had previously kept their expenditure low in this area, most of the 
countries’ historical patterns in this regard stayed virtually the same over 
the course of the decade. In the countries that had traditionally had the 
highest levels of per capita social spending (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Panama and Uruguay), the proportion of GDP allocated to social sectors 
continued to be higher than expected in view of their levels of per capita 
income, while in countries with a history of low or very low levels of per 
capita social spending (such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru), the percentage of GDP allocated to social 
sectors remained far below the regional average.   
Notwithstanding this pronounced upturn in social spending, 
current levels are still too low to meet the needs of large sectors of the 
population. Covering these unmet needs is not an impossible goal, since 
most of the countries have considerable room to expand the government 
income base and raise expenditure on social programmes. 
Although GDP fell more or less dramatically in 1999 in a number of 
countries, such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, the resources earmarked for social sectors were not affected by 
this slump, thanks in part to the inertia that characterizes many items of 
current expenditure. In 1998-1999 total public expenditure grew in nearly 
all the countries except Venezuela, and even in that country expenditure 
rebounded between 1999 and 2000, growing at nearly the same rates 
observed before the crisis. 
It has been said that the countries of the region should better target 
their social spending so that it provides more direct benefits to vulnerable 
or poor groups. The sectors with the most progressive patterns of social 
spending —that is, where such spending benefits the poorest households 
most— are primary and secondary education, followed by health and 
nutrition and, in third place, housing and basic services (water and 
sanitation).  
Overall, social spending was redistributive in all the countries, 
especially if social security is excluded. Not counting social security, the 
poorest 20% of households received 28% of public resources, while the 
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richest 20% received 12%. This means that the poorest households 
received a proportion of social spending —excluding social security— 
which, on average, was six times their share of primary income (28.2% of 
social spending, compared to 4.8% of total primary income). This ratio 
was reversed for the richest 20% of households, with the share of social 
spending representing only one fourth of the share of income (12.4% of 
social spending versus 50.7% of total primary income).  
The net redistributive effect of public social spending resulted from 
the relative weight of transfers of money and of free or subsidized goods 
and services as a share of total household income. This share was biggest 
by far in the poorest groups, where it accounted for 43% of household 
income. In the richest and second-richest income quintiles, on the other 
hand, it represented 7% and 13%, respectively. However, the percentage 
of social spending received by the richest households, though small, 
represented a considerable volume of resources which, in some countries, 
exceeded or even doubled the volume allocated to the poorest 
households, owing to the amount of social security transfers. 
Higher social spending had the most pronounced redistributive 
effect in the countries with the lowest per capita income, owing to the 
sharp rise in public spending on education and health care. In countries 
with higher per capita income the redistributive effect was less significant 
because nearly 50% of the increase in public social spending went to 
social security, its least progressive component. 
7.  Concluding observations 
This section presents an analysis of the findings of opinion polls 
describing the Latin American population’s reactions to developments in 
the 1990s. These findings reveal disappointment with the results achieved 
by the end of the period; dissatisfaction with the persistence of inequality, 
which seems to have become the population’s main concern, even 
overtaking poverty; and displeasure with many key institutions of 
society, especially politics, political parties and politicians themselves. 
These attitudes must be taken into account in identifying the challenges of 
the social development agenda in the coming years. Another priority, and 
perhaps the most important one —because otherwise it will be hard to set 
these societies on the course they need to take— is to induce the citizenry 
to make a new commitment to political participation, since it is this 
participation that will steer decisions on public policies to achieve the 
objectives of growth with greater equity. 
32 ECLAC 
Other pending tasks, apart from those of further reducing poverty 
and eliminating indigence, include the consolidation of consumer 
societies and the opening of channels for social mobility. 
This is clearly a very broad spectrum of challenges that must be 
tackled simultaneously, since they are closely intertwined. 
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Chapter I 
Poverty 
This chapter describes a number of aspects of poverty in Latin 
America in the 1990s. It looks at poverty trends, the asymmetrical effects 
of economic growth on poverty in boom and bust periods, the factors that 
had the most bearing on poverty, the vulnerability that poverty often 
entails and the particular features of rural poverty. 
1. Magnitude and profile of poverty 
(a) Poverty trends in the 1990s 
The processes of economic recession, expansion and stagnation that 
the Latin American countries experienced in the 1980s and 1990s had a 
significant impact on the levels of poverty and indigence they recorded. 
Although, as the next section will show, economic performance is not the 
only factor that impinges on poverty and how it evolves, there is a clear 
link between general economic trends and the signs of this phenomenon. 
Figure I.1 shows how poverty levels changed in the 1980s and 
1990s, in keeping with variations in economic growth. In particular, in the 
1990s the growth experienced between 1990 and 1997 and the 
corresponding reduction in poverty contrast with the biennium 1998-
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The link between economic growth and changes in poverty 
percentages was patently asymmetrical from one decade to the next. In 
the 1980s per capita output declined by an annual average rate of just 
under 1%, while poverty moved upward. This increase in poverty was 
not completely offset in the 1990s, even though output expanded at close 
to 2%. In fact, the poor population represented 40.5% of the total in 1980, 
48.3% in 1990 and 43.5% in 1997, then moved to 43.8% in 1999. Bearing in 
mind that per capita output at 1995 values dropped from US$ 3,654 in 
1980 to US$ 3,342 in 1990, then rose to US$ 3,807 in 1999, the ground lost 
in the 1980s was only partially made up in the 1990s (see figure I.1 and 
table I.1). 
Despite the developments of the biennium 1998-1999, the balance of 
the 1990s overall was positive, since poverty declined in at least 11 
countries, where the majority of the region’s poor live (see table I.2). For 
further information see tables A.1 and A.2 in the statistical appendix. 
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Table I.1 
LATIN AMERICA: POOR AND INDIGENT HOUSEHOLDS AND INDIVIDUALS, a 1980-1999 
(Millions of households and individuals and percentages) 
  Poor b   Indigent c   
  Total Urban Rural Total Urban Rural 
  Millions % Millions % Millions % Millions % Millions % Millions % 
 Households 
1980 24.2 34.7 11.8 25.3 12.4 53.9 10.4 15.0 4.1   8.8 6.3 27.5 
1990 39.1 41.0 24.7 35.0 14.4 58.2 16.9 17.7 8.5 12.0 8.4 34.1 
1994 38.5 37.5 25.0 31.8 13.5 56.1 16.4 15.9 8.3 10.5 8.1 33.5 
1997 39.4 35.5 25.1 29.7 14.3 54.0 16.0 14.4 8.0   9.5 8.0 30.3 
1999 41.3 35.3 27.1 29.8 14.2 54.3 16.3 13.9 8.3   9.1 8.0 30.7 
 Individuals 
1980 135.9 40.5 62.9 29.8 73.0 59.9 62.4 18.6 22.5 10.6 39.9 32.7 
1990 200.2 48.3 121.7 41.4 78.5 65.4 93.4 22.5 45.0 15.3 48.4 40.4 
1994 201.5 45.7 125.9 38.7 75.6 65.1 91.6 20.8 44.3 13.6 47.4 40.8 
1997 203.8 43.5 125.7 36.5 78.2 63.0 88.8 19.0 42.2 12.3 46.6 37.6 
1999 211.4 43.8 134.2 37.1 77.2 63.7 89.4 18.5 43.0 11.9 46.4 38.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a
 Estimates corresponding to 19 countries of the region. 
b
 Households and population living in poverty. Includes indigent households (population). 
c
 Indigent households and population. 
Brazil, Chile and Panama made considerable headway, with 
reductions of over 10 percentage points in poverty levels. Significantly, in 
the period 1991-2000, those countries’ per capita GDP grew at average 
annual rates of 1.2%, 5% and 2.6%, respectively. Poverty also decreased in 
Costa Rica, Guatemala and Uruguay, by between 5 and 10 percentage 
points. 
By contrast, in Venezuela the percentage of poor households 
increased from 22% in 1981 to 34% in 1990. Ecuador, Colombia and 








Households and population 
below the poverty line a 
Households and population 
below the indigence line 
Country Year Households Population Households Population 
Argentina b 1990 16.2 21.2 16.2 21.2 
  1999 13.1 19.7 13.1 19.7 
Bolivia 1989 c 49.4 53.1 49.4 53.1 
  1999 54.7 60.6 54.7 60.6 
Brazil 1990 41.4 48.0 41.4 48.0 
  1999 29.9 37.5 29.9 37.5 
Chile 1990 33.3 38.6 33.3 38.6 
  2000 16.6 20.6 16.6 20.6 
Colombia 1991 50.5 56.1 50.5 56.1 
  1999 48.7 54.9 48.7 54.9 
Costa Rica 1990 23.7 26.2 23.7 26.2 
  1999 18.2 20.3 18.2 20.3 
Ecuador d 1990 55.8 62.1 55.8 62.1 
  1999 58.0 63.6 58.0 63.6 
El Salvador 1999 43.5 49.8 43.5 49.8 
Guatemala 1989 63.0 69.1 63.0 69.1 
  1998 53.5 60.5 53.5 60.5 
Honduras 1990 75.2 80.5 75.2 80.5 
  1999 74.3 79.7 74.3 79.7 
Mexico 1989 39.0 47.8 39.0 47.8 
  2000 33.3 41.1 33.3 41.1 
Nicaragua 1993 68.1 73.6 68.1 73.6 
  1998 65.1 69.9 65.1 69.9 
Panama 1991 36.3 42.8 36.3 42.8 
  1999 24.2 30.2 24.2 30.2 
Paraguay 1990 e 36.8 42.2 36.8 42.2 
  1999 51.7 60.6 51.7 60.6 
Peru 1999 42.3 48.6 42.3 48.6 
Dominican Republic 1998 25.7 30.2 25.7 30.2 
Uruguay d 1990 11.8 17.8 11.8 17.8 
  1999 5.6 9.4 5.6 9.4 
Venezuela 1990 34.2 40.0 34.2 40.0 
  1999 44.0 49.4 44.0 49.4 
Latin America f 1990 41.0 48.3 41.0 48.3 
  1999 35.3 43.8 35.3 43.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. For a definition of each indicator, see ECLAC, Social panorama of Latin America, 
2000-2001 (LC/G.2138-P), Santiago, Chile, October 2001. United Nations publication, Sales No. 
E.01.II.G.141, box I.1. 
a
 Includes households (individuals) living in indigence or extreme poverty. 
b
 Greater Buenos Aires. 
c
 Eight departmental capitals plus the city of El Alto. 
d
 Urban areas. 
e
 Asunción metropolitan area. 
f
 Estimates for 19 countries of the region. 
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(b) Spatial distribution of poverty 
A major change has taken place in the spatial distribution of the 
population, with the result that poverty today is largely an urban 
phenomenon. Of the region’s 211 million poor people in 1999, 134 million 
lived in urban areas and 77 million in rural areas. The incidence of 
poverty is much higher in rural areas than in cities, however (64% as 
against 37%). In addition, as shown in table I.2, poverty is more extreme 
in rural areas, since most of the rural poor are indigent (46 million), while 
the urban poor are mainly non-indigent (91 million). 
Migration from the country to the city brought about an increase in 
the urban poor as a proportion of the region’s total poor population. As a 
result of migration, the urban economy faced the challenge of absorbing a 
larger proportion of the working-age population and of meeting the 
increased demand for social services. Despite this, the urban economy 
proved able to absorb rural migrants into jobs that were of higher 
productivity than those in their places of origin. 
Trends in urban poverty have followed trends in total poverty 
fairly closely. Figure I.2 shows that in the 1980s and 1990s urban poverty, 
like total poverty, evolved in consonance with the cycles of recession 
(1980-1989), expansion (1990-1997) and stagnation (1998-1999) described 
previously. Nevertheless, changes in urban poverty and non-agricultural 
output were sharper than changes in total poverty and total output. In 
fact, the coefficient of urban poverty increased by 10 points in the 1980s 
and dropped by 5 points in the 1990s (see table I.1), which indicates that 
economic growth affected urban poverty more asymmetrically than total 
poverty. 
The situation in rural areas differed from the one in urban areas. 
Agricultural output did not follow the same cycle as total output. In fact, 
agricultural GDP grew in all three periods examined, expanding 
particularly vigorously in the biennium 1998-1999. In turn, rural poverty 
rates increased in the period 1980-1990, dropped in 1990-1997 and rose 
again in 1998-1999 (see figure I.3). This shows that rural poverty patterns 
were more closely linked to the growth of the economy at large than to 
variations in agricultural output. A subsequent section of this chapter will 
analyse in greater detail the particular features of rural poverty and the 
migration phenomenon, which has helped to accentuate the differences in 
productivity between different strata in the rural environment. 
38 ECLAC 
Figure I.2 
LATIN AMERICA: GROWTH RATE OF GDP AND OF THE POOR POPULATION, 











Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
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(c) The profile of poor households 
Of the 211 million Latin Americans living in poverty in 1999, about 
22 million lived in households whose per capita income was not less than 
90% of the minimum monetary threshold needed to meet their basic 
needs. This means that close to 10% of the poor were relatively well 
placed to rise above the poverty line, since their current income was only 
just below the level needed to satisfy their minimum consumption needs. 
Presumably the better position of this subgroup with respect to the rest of 
the poor population gave them a greater capacity to respond to economic 
and social policies for poverty reduction. On the other hand, 45 million 
people were categorized as the non-poor population most at risk of 
becoming poor, since their income was not more than 25% above the 
poverty line income level. This population group is highly vulnerable to 
economic fluctuations, since the slightest negative impact on their income 
can lead to a significant decline in their living standards (see table I.3). 
The vulnerability of poor households is exacerbated by certain 
features that go hand in hand with the phenomenon of poverty. These 
tend to occur in contexts of low income and offer a more complete picture 
of the living standards of the region’s poor. An overcrowded dwelling, an 
unemployed head of household and a poor educational climate in the 
household are traits that entail a high probability of poverty. 
In effect, about 77 million Latin Americans live in overcrowded 
dwellings (defined as three or more people to a room). Of the features 
selected for the analysis, this is the characteristic that most clearly 
differentiates the poor from the non-poor, insofar as overcrowding is a 
powerful indication that the individuals in question do not receive 
enough income to cover their basic needs. Of Latin America’s poor, 29% 
live in overcrowded dwellings, while only 6% of the non-poor live in such 
conditions. 
Another dwelling-related indicator that points to a shortage of 
resources, although it is less likely to indicate poverty, is the lack of access 
to drinking water, which affects 165 million people, of whom over 109 
million are poor (66.7%). While problems of access to  drinking water 
affect 52% of the poor population, they are not unique to this group, since 
20% of the region’s non-poor share this difficulty. 
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Table I.3 
LATIN AMERICA: SELECTED FEATURES OF THE POVERTY PROFILE, 1999 
Probability of b Population in private households Number of 
individuals 
(thousands) 
Proportion of total 
population a 
(%) Poverty Indigence 
Total 482 727 100.0  43.1 18.4 
Urban 361 619 74.9  36.6 11.9 
Rural 121 108 25.1  62.7 37.8 
Poor 211 392 100.0  - - 
Urban 134 229 63.5  - - 
Rural 77 163 36.5  - - 
Indigent 89 368 100.0  - - 
Urban 43 033 48.2  - - 
Rural 46 334 51.8   - - 
With income of 0.9-1.0 poverty lines per capita 21 668 4.5  100.0 - 
With income of 1.0-1.25 poverty lines per capita 44 897 9.3  - - 
With less than US$ 1 per capita per day c 76 415 15.8  100.0 88.1 
With less than US$ 2 per capita per day c 175 189 36.3  95.1 50.0 
In overcrowded households d 76 605 15.9  79.6 46.4 
In households without access to drinking water e 164 506 34.1  66.7 34.9 
In households with a high demographic 
dependency ratio f 68 381 14.2  68.1 41.2 
In households with low employment density g 109 995 22.8  65.1 35.9 
In households where the head of households is:          
Female 90 677 18.8  43.1 17.5 
With a low level of education         
   - Fewer than 3 years of schooling 130 465 27.0  63.3 31.8 
   - Fewer than 10 years of schooling 375 636 77.8  51.7 22.3 
Unemployed 15 825 3.3  71.2 43.6 
Employed in low-productivity sectors h 152 615 31.6  48.7 23.4 
Employed in agriculture i 100 696 20.9  65.1 36.8 
Employed in establishments of:          
   - Up to 5 workers 37 879 7.8 (17.8) 39.0 12.2 
   - Between 6 and 10 workers 12 575 2.6 (5.9) 29.1 8.2 
Employed without professional or technical skills 165 443 34.3 (86.4) 38.5 14.1 
Children not attending school j 5 972 1.2 (7.9) 76.5 48.2 
Children in households with poor educational 
climate k 83 661 17.3 (56.0) 74.0 39.2 
Young people aged 15 to 19 who work 18 655 3.9 (36.6) 46.9 18.6 
Young people aged 15 to 24 who neither study 
nor work 21 823 4.5 (23.2) 58.1 24.7 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective 
countries. 
a
 Figures in brackets refer to the percentage of individuals with the attribute in question out of the total group (for 
example, children aged 6 to 12 who do not attend school as a proportion of all children in that age group). 
b
 Poor and indigent as percentages of all the individuals in each category. 
c
 Calculated on the basis of the current exchange rate in each country. 
d
 Households are considered overcrowded when they house three or more individuals per room (excluding kitchen 
and bathroom). 
e
 Households without piped drinking water inside the dwelling. 
f
 Households in which the proportion of individuals under the age of 15 and over the age of 64 to those between 
15 and 64 is higher than 0.75. 
g
 Households in which the proportion of employed to total household members is less than 0.25. 
h
 Employers and wage earners in establishments of up to 5 individuals, domestic employees and own-account and 
unpaid family workers with no professional or technical skills. 
i
 Includes those employed in agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing. 
j
 Refers to children between the ages of 6 and 12. 
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k
 Children under the age of 15 in households whose adult members (aged 25 and over) have an average of 0 to 
5.99 years of schooling. 
A number of demographic features also display a close correlation 
with poverty, especially since they are strongly linked to the capacity to 
generate income. One of these is a high rate of demographic dependency, 
since the lower the ratio of individuals of working age to the number of 
children and elderly people in the household, the harder it is for those 
individuals to obtain enough resources to sustain the whole household. 
Another relevant feature is low employment density, defined as the 
existence of not more than one employed person per four members of the 
household. This is also associated with an above-average probability of 
poverty. Although both factors are representative of poverty —with a 
probability of 68.1% and 65.1%, respectively— the second is more 
extensive in the region, as it affects one third of all poor people. 
The likelihood of being poor also depends, among other factors, on 
the employment and educational status of the head of household, who is 
usually the main breadwinner. The unemployment of the head of 
household is therefore one of the most likely indicators of poverty (71%) 
for the members of the household in question. However, the proportion of 
poor people in this situation is very low (5.3%), which means that this 
feature is not particularly significant, quantitatively speaking, in the 
overall picture of poverty. It can therefore be inferred that job creation 
programmes, however well targeted at poor population groups, have 
only a limited capacity to significantly alter overall poverty figures. 
Instead, the objective of reducing poverty requires measures to help 
increase wages, be it through wage policies or through training and skills 
programmes. This last point is further supported by the fact that close to 
39% of poor people live in households headed by an individual with 
fewer than three years of schooling, even though this is also true of 18% of 
non-poor individuals. 
Two other important features with regard to heads of household 
warrant discussion. One of these is that the probability of poverty among 
the almost 91 million people who live in households headed by women is 
similar to the average probability, indicating that this feature is not in 
itself a conditioning factor of poverty. It has also been observed that the 
probability of poverty among members of households headed by 
agricultural workers, whose income is typically precarious, is no greater 
than the probability deriving from the simple fact of living in a rural area. 
Often, poverty seriously affects the preparation of children and 
young people to join the labour market by increasing rates of school non-
attendance and dropping out. Indeed, according to the data considered, 
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children who do not attend school have a high probability of being poor 
(76.5%). Nevertheless, non-attendance at school is becoming less common 
among poor and non-poor population groups alike, accounting today for 
only 1.2% of the population and 7.9% of children between the ages of 6 
and 12. By contrast, children under 15 who live in households with a poor 
educational environment —that is, households whose adult members 
have fewer than six years of schooling on average— number over 83 
million in Latin America (56% of the children in this age group), of whom 
74% are poor. The educational environment in the household is a key 
determinant of the continuity of schooling and the achievement of higher 
levels of education on the part of children and young people. In addition, 
the presence in the household of young people who work and young 
people who neither work nor study is also associated with above-average 
probabilities of poverty. In the region there are just over 18 million young 
people between the ages of 15 and 19 who work, and almost 22 million 
young people between the ages of 15 and 24 who neither work nor study. 
Together these two segments represent about a quarter of all the 
individuals in this age group (see table I.3). 
In summary, and in very general terms, a review of the living 
conditions of Latin America’s poor reveals that these people often live in 
dwellings without access to drinking water and, to a lesser extent, in 
dwellings that are overcrowded (i.e., with more than three people per 
room); that the households to which they belong have a high ratio of 
demographic dependency and low employment density; and that the 
head of household often has fewer than three years of schooling and, in 
some cases, is unemployed. Among children under the age of 15, low 
levels of education among the adults in the household is also associated 
with poverty. 
2. Factors related to poverty reduction 
Poverty levels are affected by both economic factors and 
demographic and social factors. The economic factors include economic 
growth, public transfers and relative prices. Demographic and social 
factors include the size, composition and geographical location of the 
household, as well as the level of education of its members. The labour 
market forms the bridge between economic growth and the features of the 
households that supply the labour force. 
It should be pointed out, first, that the impact of these factors varies 
from one country to another within Latin America. This is indicative of 
structural differences among the countries and of their varying degrees of 
freedom to implement the relevant public policies in the framework of 
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similar development patterns. Moreover, urban and rural areas are 
affected differently by these factors. As noted earlier, aggregate economic 
growth does not have the same impact on urban poverty as it has on rural 
poverty. Migration also affects the two areas unevenly. The consideration 
of the labour market in this section refers basically to urban areas, since 
the specific features of rural Latin America are dealt with in another 
section. By the same token, the effects of poverty on education will be 
examined in greater detail in chapter V. 
(a) Economic growth 
In general, economic growth in Latin America proceeded at a 
moderate pace, without recessions, until 1997, except in Argentina, 
Mexico and Uruguay, which were hit by the crisis of 1994-1995. After 1997 
the South American countries moved into a period of slow growth and, in 
some cases, recession. By contrast, Mexico, the Central American 
countries and some Caribbean nations enjoyed strong economic 
expansion in the five-year period 1996-2000. This shows that poverty 
reduction did not follow the same pattern over time in the different 
countries and that in some of them the process reversed itself towards the 
end of the 1990s, as shown in table I.2. 
An examination of developments over the whole of the 1990s 
shows more clearly than ever the strong relationship that exists between 
poverty reduction and growth. As shown in figure I.4, the largest upturns 
and downturns in per capita income were associated with reductions and 
increases, respectively, in poverty levels. This was particularly obvious in 
the extreme cases —Chile and Venezuela— but there were also significant 
departures from this linear relationship. 
Similar growth rates had different impacts on poverty levels. In 
Chile, for example, per capita GDP expanded by 55% between 1990 and 
2000, which translated into a 50% drop in poverty (16 percentage points). 
In Uruguay a much smaller increase in per capita GDP (28%) brought 
about a larger relative decrease in poverty (53%, or 6 percentage points) 
within a similar period of time. In Bolivia and Panama per capita GDP 
grew at similar cumulative rates of around 16% and 20% over the period, 
but the decline in urban poverty was very different in the two countries: 
14% and 25%, respectively. By contrast, the 9% expansion of per capita 
GDP in Brazil brought poverty levels down by 28% (see table I.4 and 
figure I.4). To a large extent, these differences in poverty reduction rates 
reflect the varying degrees to which low-income groups were able to 
benefit from the fruits of economic growth. This ability, in turn, depends 
not only on the magnitude of economic growth, but also on its quality and 
on the particular characteristics of economic, social and demographic 
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changes in each country, which are themselves a reflection of the factors 
discussed below. 
Table I.4 
LATIN AMERICA (14 COUNTRIES): PER CAPITA GDP AND PERCENTAGE OF THE 
POPULATION LIVING IN POVERTY AND INDIGENCE, 1990-1999 
Country Year Percentage of the 
population 
Variation over the period 
(annual average) 
Coefficient of elasticity 
     Poor  Indigent GDPa Coefficient of  




   Poverty (P)  Indigence (I) (P)/GDPa (I)/GDPa 
Argentina b 1990 5 545 21.2 5.2           
  1999 7 435 19.7 4.8 3.3 -0.8 -0.9 -0.21 -0.23 
Brazil 1990 3 859 48.0 23.4           
  1999 4 204 37.5 12.9 1.0 -2.7 -6.4 -2.45 -5.03 
Chile 1990 3 425 38.6 12.9           
  2000 5 309 20.6 5.7 4.5 -6.1 -7.8 -0.85 -1.01 
Colombia 1991 2 158 56.1 26.1           
  1999 2 271 54.9 26.8 0.6 -0.3 0.3 -0.41 0.51 
Costa Rica 1990 2 994 26.2 9.8           
  1999 3 693 20.4 7.8 2.4 -2.7 -2.5 -0.95 -0.87 
Ecuador c 1990 1 472 62.1 26.2           
  1999 1 404 63.5 31.3 -0.5 0.2 2.0 -0.49 -4.27 
El Salvador 1995 1 675 54.2 21.7           
  1999 1 750 49.8 21.9 1.1 -2.1 0.2 -1.81 0.21 
Guatemala 1989 1 347 69.1 41.8           
  1998 1 534 60.5 34.1 1.5 -1.5 -2.2 -0.90 -1.33 
Honduras 1990 686 80.5 60.6           
  1999 694 79.7 56.8 0.1 -0.1 -0.7 - - 
Mexico 1989 3 925 47.8 18.8           
  1998 4 489 46.9 18.5 1.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.13 -0.11 
Nicaragua 1993 416 73.6 48.4           
  1998 453 69.9 44.6 1.7 -1.0 -1.6 -0.57 -0.89 
Panama 1991 2 700 42.8 19.2           
  1999 3 264 30.2 10.7 2.4 -4.3 -7.0 -1.41 -2.12 
Uruguay c 1990 4 707 17.8 3.4           
  1999 5 982 9.4 1.8 2.7 -6.8 -6.8 -1.74 -1.74 
Venezuela 1990 3 030 40.0 14.6           
  1999 3 037 49.4 21.7 0.0 2.4 4.5 - - 
Latin America 1990 3 349 48.3 22.5           
  1999 3 804 43.8 18.5 1.4 -1.1 -2.2 -0.69 -1.31 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and special tabulations of data from household surveys 
conducted in the respective countries. 
a
 c/p: at constant 1995 prices. 
b
 Greater Buenos Aires. 
c
 Total for urban areas. 
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(b) Employment and wages 
In the 1990s economic growth was accompanied by significant 
changes in the labour market. In general, the higher rates of economic 
growth were achieved through uneven increases in labour productivity 
among sectors, segments and firms of different sizes and through the 
integration of firms, also to differing degrees, into the international 
economy. Rises in productivity, especially in urban areas, were 
concentrated in more highly skilled, better paying types of employment. 
The effect of economic growth on poverty through the channel of 
employment was therefore not as strong as might have been expected. 
The countries also varied in terms of their economic capacity to increase 
low-productivity employment and in terms of the associated social 
patterns. Since most low-productivity jobs are in the informal sector, the 
open unemployment rate, though important, cannot provide a complete 
picture of the labour market’s effects on poverty. 
A given household’s total number of members, number of 
employed and unemployed members and level of labour income  
—measured in multiples of the poverty line— clearly help determine how 
likely it is to be poor. An important observation in this regard is that the 
nature of the labour market is very uneven across the Latin American 
countries. Open unemployment and the employment density of 
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households vary considerably from one country to another. For example, 
Brazil and Mexico have relatively low rates of open unemployment and 
high employment density. By contrast, in Argentina rates of 
unemployment are high and employment density is low in low-income 
households, but labour income is higher. The combination of these 
dimensions gives rise to very different profiles with respect to earned 
income in poor households. 
In 1999 employment density in the decile in which the poverty line 
is situated ranged from 0.24 in Argentina to between 0.27 and 0.28 in 
Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay to just over 0.4 in Brazil and Colombia and 
0.48 in Honduras. In the 1990s employment density in this decile 
increased in most of the countries, with Brazil, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Mexico, Panama and Venezuela posting the biggest upturns (see table I.5). 
In Chile, where economic growth was much stronger, average 
employment density in households close to the poverty line increased 
from 0.24 to 0.27, while in Brazil it rose from 0.38 to 0.43. Real income, 
however, rose faster in Chile than in Brazil. The regional overview shows 
that, in most countries, rates of poverty reduction were determined not so 
much by increases in real income as by increases in average employment 
density, which rose by between 0.02 and 0.06 in almost all the countries 
except Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay, where it virtually stood still. In 
most of the countries poor households dealt with the situation by sending 
more of their members to work in low-productivity jobs. 
As will be discussed in greater detail in chapter III, open 
unemployment rose in the 1990s and adversely affected poverty trends. 
Owing to a decrease in urban unemployment —for just a few years of the 
decade— in Bolivia, Chile and Costa Rica, urban poverty fell slightly 
more in those countries than in the rest of the region. In those three 
countries the number of employed persons in low-income households 
increased and open unemployment declined among the active population 
in the poorest quintile. This trend was especially pronounced in urban 
areas of Bolivia and Costa Rica. 
Households obtain a very high proportion of their resources from 
the earned income of their economically active members.1 Low earned 
income accounts for a substantial proportion of cases of poverty. It is 
therefore useful to examine the kinds of employment in which low pay 
levels are most common. 
 
                                                          
1  Almost 70% of the income of urban households in all strata is generated in the labour 
market. In turn, two thirds of household income from work consists of wages and 
salaries (see chapter IV). 
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Table I.5 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYMENT DENSITY IN SELECTED STRATA 
OF THE POPULATION, a 1990-1999 
  Employment density 
Country/Year   Total Decile 1 Decile 10 Households close to 
the poverty line b 
Argentina (Greater Buenos Aires)        
  1990 0.40 0.13 0.71 0.23 
  1999 0.42 0.19 0.72 0.24 
Brazil           
  1990 0.45 0.27 0.59 0.38 
  1999 0.47 0.33 0.55 0.43 
Chile           
  1990 0.36 0.17 0.52 0.24 
  2000 0.39 0.20 0.58 0.27 
Colombia           
  1990 c 0.41 0.25 0.59 0.41 
  1999 0.41 0.24 0.56 0.41 
Costa Rica           
  1990 0.38 0.16 0.59 0.26 
  1999 0.41 0.15 0.63 0.27 
Ecuador (urban areas)           
  1990 0.41 0.21 0.61 0.42 
  1999 0.43 0.21 0.60 0.46 
EL Salvador           
  1995 0.39 0.23 0.59 0.37 
  1999 0.41 0.24 0.60 0.38 
Honduras           
  1990 0.35 0.27 0.53 0.43 
  1999 0.41 0.25 0.59 0.48 
Mexico           
  1989 0.37 0.25 0.52 0.33 
  2000 0.44 0.32 0.59 0.39 
Panama           
  1991 0.36 0.15 0.54 0.29 
  1999 0.42 0.20 0.62 0.33 
Uruguay (urban areas)           
  1990 0.40 0.25 0.52 0.25 
  1999 0.41 0.28 0.53 0.28 
Venezuela           
  1990 0.36 0.12 0.63 0.29 
  1999 0.41 0.14 0.65 0.39 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a
 Employment density: number of employed persons as a proportion of the total number of household 
members. Decile 1 and decile 10 refer to the bottom and top 10% of households, respectively, in terms of 
per capita income. 
b
 According to the definition of the poverty line in the country in the final year. 
c
 Eight major cities. 
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It is well known, and confirmed by the figures for the 1990s, that 
the likelihood of poverty is lower among professionals and technicians 
than among other workers; among public-sector wage earners than 
among private-sector wage earners; and among formal-sector workers 
than among informal-sector workers. As will be discussed in the chapter 
on employment, in the 1980s and 1990s both private and informal 
employment increased as a proportion of total employment. Bearing 
wage differences in mind, this phenomenon alone tended to increase 
poverty levels. In effect, in the late 1990s in urban areas, poverty levels 
were lower among public-sector workers than among workers in private 
firms with over five employees. In turn, the incidence of poverty was 
higher among those employed in establishments with fewer than five 
employees than among those employed in firms with more than five. The 
highest rates were observed among wage earners in small establishments 
and among individuals employed in domestic service (see table I.6). In 
most of the countries poverty levels were a little lower among own-
account workers. 
Poverty levels among wage earners in formal-sector establishments 
with five or more employees call for some discussion. In most of the 
countries these levels were very similar to the average for the employed 
poor population considered in table I.6 (the table does not include 
employers, professionals or technicians), and the difference in poverty 
rates between formal- and informal-sector workers was smaller than 
many qualitative studies have suggested. Furthermore, formal-sector 
employees living in poor households represent over 25% of the total poor 
population, on average, and over 50% in Chile, for example. 
This explains the fact that, in some countries, a high proportion of 
the employed poor are formal-sector wage earners. In Brazil, Chile, the 
Dominican Republic, Mexico and Venezuela, and in representative 
(though not all) urban areas of Argentina and Colombia, this proportion 
is over 35%. By the same token, in 10 of the 16 countries considered, 
between 30% and 60% of private-sector wage earners live in poor 
households. Patterns vary greatly in this respect, however: the proportion 
ranges from less than 10% in Uruguay to over 50% in Ecuador, Honduras 
and Nicaragua. In Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Panama it is between 
10% and 20%, while in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Paraguay and Venezuela it ranges from 30% to 50%2 (see table I.6). 
                                                          
2  This study of the relationship between employment and poverty does not take into 
account groups in which poverty levels are higher than among the employed 
population, i.e. inactive groups receiving income (retirees and pensioners) and the 
unemployed. This explains the fact that the percentage of poverty among the employed 
is lower than among the population at large. 
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Table I.6 
LATIN AMERICA: EMPLOYED POOR BY EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY AND 
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Argentina 10 6 9 17 22 9 
(Greater Buenos Aires) 100 7 36 25 12 21 
Bolivia 41 23 41 53 27 50 
  90 6 15 15 2 52 
Brazil  24 14 26 32 39 28 
  85 7 28 11 14 25 
Chile 14 6 16 22 17 13 
  98 7 52 15 9 15 
Colombiad 38 12 38 … 35 55 
(8 major cities) 95 3 38 … 5 49 
Costa Rica 10 3 9 14 27 16 
  94 6 28 17 15 28 
Ecuador 53 30 55 70 61 63 
  87 6 23 18 6 34 
El Salvador 29 9 26 44 41 37 
  88 4 23 21 6 34 
Guatemala 40 19 41 53 46 48 
  77 4 19 24 8 23 
Honduras 64 41 64 81 58 74 
  85 6 27 14 4 34 
Mexico 25 11 26 44 38 26 
  94 6 36 27 5 20 
Nicaraguad 54 … 54 68 74 53 
  83 … 25 18 9 30 
Panama 15 5 12 24 20 25 
  82 6 26 11 8 31 
Paraguay 26 11 27 40 27 33 
(Asunción) 91 6 26 21 10 28 
Peru 28 14 21 32 23 38 
  84 5 12 15 5 47 
Dominican Republic 21 21 18 25 26 24 
  88 12 27 10 6 32 
Uruguay 5 2 5 9 12 10 
  98 5 26 15 17 35 
Venezuela  35 28 37 52 50 34 
  90 12 26 18 3 30 
Source: ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2001-2002 (LC/G.2183-P), Santiago, Chile, October 
2002. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.02.II.G.65. 
a
 The upper line of each entry shows the percentage of employed poor in each category who live in 
households that receive income below the poverty line. 
b
 The lower line of each entry shows the percentage of employed poor with respect to the total employed 
in the respective category. 
c
 The total does not add up to 100 because employers and professionals and technicians are not included. 
d
 In Nicaragua public-sector wage earners are included with wage earners in establishments employing 
more than 5 workers. In Colombia wage earners in microenterprises are also included in this category. 
Although poverty among State employees is relatively low, it 
reaches significant levels in a number of countries. In Bolivia, the 
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Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Venezuela over 20% of public-sector 
workers are poor, while in most of the countries the poor employed in the 
public sector represent between 3% and 7% of the total.  
Wage earners in microenterprises and domestic service workers 
together account for between 20% and 35% of the employed poor. In 
countries with a high proportion of low-skilled own-account workers (see 
table I.6), poor wage earners in that group represent between 17% and 
27% of the total. Clearly, this profile of poverty among the urban 
employed is closely linked to their low occupational earnings. Non-
professional, non-technical wage earners employed in firms with five or 
more workers received, on average, an income of between 2.5 and 3.6 
times the poverty line per capita, which in most of the countries was 
about 20% lower than the average income of the employed population, 
and not always higher than the earnings of non-professional, non-
technical own-account workers (see ECLAC, 2001a). 
Workers in microenterprises received an average monthly income 
of between 1.6 and 2.7 times the poverty line. In many countries this was 
below the threshold needed to give them a good chance of remaining 
above the poverty line. Domestic employees, who accounted for 4% to 7% 
of urban employment, earned an average income of 1.4 to 2.2 times the 
poverty line. 
From these findings it can be surmised that, for a large proportion 
of private-sector workers, employment offers no assurance that they will 
stay above the poverty threshold, even if they work in medium-sized or 
large firms. Similarly, in a number of the countries, the fact that a 
significant proportion of public-sector employees are poor constitutes an 
obstacle to the process of State reform and modernization. 
(c) Reduced inflation 
The decline in the rate of inflation also helped to reduce poverty 
levels, particularly in those countries where it dropped rapidly from very 
high levels, such as Argentina, Peru, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Chile, 
Mexico and Uruguay. Greater consumer price stability lessened or 
eliminated the erosion of average real wages, especially lower wages, 
whose purchasing power falls faster in conditions of high inflation or 
hyperinflation. The slowdown in inflation was accompanied in many 
cases by a rise in the real minimum wage. Later in the decade the impact 
of lower inflation on poverty declined, especially when the objective of 
keeping inflation very low was adopted as part of economic policy. 
(d) Variations in relative prices 
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In most of the countries changes in the relative prices of goods and 
services effectively made the basic consumption basket of lower-income 
sectors cheaper. For a number of reasons, such as changes in the 
production and trade structure, trade liberalization, exchange-rate 
policies and the characteristics of the agricultural sector, in some countries 
the average variation in the retail prices of products that are used to 
estimate inflation differed appreciably from that of products that make up 
the consumption basket of poor population groups. In general, the prices 
of mass consumer products, particularly food, rose more slowly than the 
prices of other domestically consumed goods and services, which boosted 
the purchasing power of low-income strata.3 
This development is evident from a comparison between trends in 
food prices, which have a stronger impact on the budgets of low-income 
households, and the variation in the prices of other goods used to 
estimate the consumer price index. As shown in table I.7, between 1990 
and 1999 the price of food rose by a smaller percentage than the prices of 
other goods in 10 of the 13 countries considered. In five of those countries 
(Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) this percentage 
was about 80% or even lower. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican 
Republic and Mexico exhibited a similar (albeit smaller) price gap. Only 
in Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama did food prices rise faster than the 
prices of other goods. 
(e) Increased transfers 
Public and private transfers, predominantly retirement and other 
pensions, played a key role in reducing poverty in the 1990s. Although 
they are usually poorly distributed, these transfers often represent a 
significant financial contribution to poor households. The relative 
importance of transfers in household income varied considerably from 
one country to another within the region. The degree to which they 
targeted poor households also varied. In a number of countries, including 
Argentina, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay, transfers accounted for over 
20% of the total income of urban households, while in Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, this percentage hovered around 10%. 
Brazil is a particularly interesting case in this regard, since its policy 
of massive transfers to low-income sectors in urban and rural areas 
between  1990 and  1993 made a major  contribution to  poverty reduction. 
Table I.7 
LATIN AMERICA: RELATIVE VARIATION IN CONSUMER FOOD PRICES  
                                                          
3  In some countries the positive impact of this trend was partially offset by a steep rise in 
utility rates (water, electricity and urban transport), which rose faster than the average 
consumer price index in those countries. 
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WITH RESPECT TO OTHER GOODS AND SERVICES, 1990-1999 
(Percentages) 
Country Reference datea Food CPIb Other goods and 
services CPIb 
Ratio food  
CPIb/CPIb other 
Argentina September 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
September 1999 270.5 304.5 0.89 
  
        
Bolivia August 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
October-November 1999 225.6 233.9 0.96 
  
        
Colombia August 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
August 1999 475.8 587.2 0.81 
  
        
Costa Rica June 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
June 1999 404.7 392.5 1.03 
  
        
Chile November 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
November 2000 207.3 233.2 0.89 
  
        
Ecuador October 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
October 1999 1 506.3 1 901.6 0.79 
  
        
Honduras August 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
August 1999 489.3 461.2 1.06 
  
        
Mexico Third quarter 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
Third quarter 2000 503.4 551.7 0.91 
  
        
Panama August 1989 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
July 1999 114.1 111.7 1.02 
  
        
Paraguay June- August 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
July-December 1999 265.9 335.4 0.79 
  
        
Dominican 
Republic 
March 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
March 1997 256.7 282.6 0.91 
  
        
Uruguay Second semester 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
1999 1 222.5 1 837.2 0.67 
  
        
Venezuela Second semester 1990 100.0 100.0 1.00 
  
Second semester 1999 2 559.9 4 164.3 0.61 
Source: ECLAC, Statistics and Economic Projections Division. 
a
 Corresponds to the reference month for income measurement in the household surveys used to estimate 
poverty in each country. 
b
 Consumer price index. 
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In Uruguay further reductions in poverty levels were achieved partly 
through the maintenance of a high rate of transfers and a steep rise in 
pensions in the early part of the decade. Transfers also rose in Chile, albeit 
to a lesser degree, in the form of monetary subsidies —welfare pensions 
and family allowances— and non-monetary assistance provided to low-
income households, which helped to reduce poverty from 1990 onward. 
(f) Migration 
The findings on rural and urban poverty set out above illustrate the 
importance of migration in the distribution of poverty between the two 
sectors and in total poverty. 
The effects of migration on nationwide poverty levels are also 
related to the age structure and educational status of both migrants and 
those they leave behind. Migration has a major impact on the age and 
gender structure of the urban and rural population. In urban areas the 
pyramid is broader in the productive age groups, while the opposite 
occurs in rural areas. In Brazil, for example, 67.5% of the urban 
population is between the ages of 15 and 64, while only 60.4% of the rural 
population is in this age group. In addition, the rural population has a 
higher proportion of older adults than its fertility and mortality rates 
would suggest. In Bolivia only 3.4% of the urban population is aged 65 or 
over, while this age group accounts for 5.1% of the rural population.4 Both 
the bulking out of the urban pyramid in the middle age groups and the 
ageing of the rural population are largely the result of the selective 
migration —and its cumulative effects over time— of young people 
moving from the country to the city. 
These observations are consistent with the net rural-to-urban 
migration rate, which is higher in the 15-19 and 20-24 age groups. In 
addition, in many countries the migration rate for women is higher than 
the one for men (ECLAC, 2001a). In Brazil the average annual rate of net 
rural-to-urban migration in the 1990s was 13 per 1,000 for men aged 20 to 
24 and 14 per 1,000 for women in the same age group. This means that 
almost 50% of the expansion of the urban population between the ages of 
20 and 24 was due to migration. In the age groups between 40 and 60 the 
rate was 5 per 1,000 and represented less than 20% of the growth of the 
urban population in this age group. This reveals two phenomena: first, 
that the individuals who migrate are usually the ones who are better 
placed to position themselves in the urban environment and, second, that 
the rural environment retains the relatively less educated part of its 
original population. 
                                                          
4  See www.eclac.cl/celade/proyecciones. 
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Moreover, processes of international migration are becoming 
increasingly important. When migration is increased by economic 
recession, a particular kind of relationship develops between growth and 
poverty —a relationship that is even more particular when migrants send 
monetary remittances back to their country of origin. As noted earlier, the 
age, family and educational composition of households plays a key role in 
determining the magnitude and frequency of transfers and the variation 
in the household income of those who remain in their place of origin. 
In summary, a number of the determining factors of poverty are 
difficult to alter in the short term. Basically, economic growth affects 
poverty through the labour market, the source from which households 
obtain the bulk of their autonomous income. In this regard, all the 
findings indicate that the region’s employment structure fails to generate 
enough sufficiently productive and adequately paid jobs, forcing vast 
sectors of the Latin American population to seek employment in low-
productivity, low-paying activities in order to avoid poverty. 
In these circumstances, the role of other poverty-reducing 
instruments is also important. These instruments include public transfers 
—properly targeted— and policies for reducing inflation or altering 
relative prices to make them more favourable for lower-income strata. 
3. The nature of rural poverty 
(a) The magnitude of rural poverty and recent trends 
Although the majority of the poor live in cities, the incidence of 
poverty continues to be higher in rural areas. In Brazil, Colombia, Mexico 
and Venezuela, about half of the rural population is poor, while in 
Honduras the figure is 80%. 
Furthermore, in Bolivia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru poverty remains 
predominantly a rural phenomenon, while in Colombia, Mexico and the 
Dominican Republic almost 45% of the poor reside in rural areas (see 
table I.8). Similarly, about half of the indigent population lives in rural 
sectors.5 
                                                          
5  In the Latin American countries with the lowest per capita output, where indigence is 
more widespread, rural indigence is more than twice the level of urban indigence (see 
tables A.1 and A.2 of the statistical appendix). 
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Table I.8 
LATIN AMERICA: MAGNITUDE AND RELATIVE SHARE OF RURAL POVERTY, 
AROUND 1999 
(Percentages) 
Poor rural households in relation to total poor households Rural households 
below the poverty line 
Less than 35% Between 35% and 49% 50% or more 
















Dominican Republic  
Up to 30% Argentina 
Chile 
Uruguay 
 Costa Rica 
Source: Prepared on the basis of ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 1998 (LC/G.2050-P), 
Santiago, Chile, May 1999. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.99.II.G.4, table 16 of the statistical 
appendix. 
Even where poverty is predominantly urban and progress has been 
made in reducing it, rural poverty still persists. In most of region, rural 
poverty declined only very slightly or even increased, although some 
countries —Brazil, Chile and Panama— made substantial headway in 
reducing it. Rural poverty is therefore structural in nature: it is deeper 
than urban poverty and less directly linked to economic growth in the 
agricultural sector.6 These features are associated with the low 
productivity of the population employed in agricultural activities and 
with the high rate of population growth typical of areas that are still in the 
early stages of demographic transition. 
Rural-to-urban migration is partly responsible for the continued 
low productivity of the rural poor, since, as already noted, young people 
with a higher level of education are generally the ones who migrate, while 
adults with less schooling remain in the rural environment. 
In countries where the bulk of the rural population still lives in 
poverty —Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras and Mexico— most of this 
population is indigent. By contrast, where rural poverty is less widespread 
                                                          
6  In the first half of the 1990s the decline in urban poverty followed the growth of per 
capita GDP more closely than rural poverty. Of course, rural poverty also fluctuates in 
response to business cycles, natural phenomena and public policies on issues such as 
agricultural prices and income transfers. 
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—Chile, Costa Rica and Panama— the non-indigent poor outnumber the 
indigent poor. These differences between countries appear to reflect trends 
in structural mobility associated with rural economic development. 
Where rural poverty has declined, the decrease in levels of indigence 
has been proportionally higher. This shows that the improvements were no 
less beneficial for the indigent poor than for the non-indigent poor. In other 
words, economic growth and policies to combat rural poverty helped much 
of the population living in hard-core poverty, not only those households 
whose income was closest to the indigence threshold. This is also supported 
by the fact that, as shown in table I.9, the average income of indigent 
households rose between 1990 and 1997. 
Table I.9 
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AND AVERAGE INCOME a IN RURAL AREAS, 1990s 
(Percentages) 
Percentages Percentages Average household income: 































Bolivia 1997-1999 53.8 18.2 72.0 59.6 16.0 75.6 0.24 0.75 0.2 0.76 
Brazil 1990-1999 37.9 26.0 63.9 20.5 24.7 45.2 0.34 0.74 0.29 0.71 
Chile 1990-2000 12.1 21.4 33.5 6.7 12.6 19.3 0.37 0.79 0.37 0.81 
Colombia 1991-1999 30.6 24.8 55.4 31.1 24.7 55.8 0.34 0.77 0.32 0.77 
Costa Rica 1990-1999 12.3 12.6 24.9 9.4 11.1 20.5 0.31 0.79 0.31 0.79 
El Salvador 1995-1999 26.5 31.7 58.2 29.3 29.7 59.0 0.32 0.75 0.27 0.73 
Guatemala 1989-1998 45.2 26.9 72.1 39.6 25.1 64.7 0.32 0.76 0.37 0.76 
Honduras 1990-1999 66.4 17.1 83.5 63.2 19.1 82.3 0.26 0.75 0.27 0.74 
Mexico 1989-1998 22.6 26.1 48.7 23.0 26.0 49.0 0.39 0.78 0.4 0.75 
Nicaragua 1993-1998 58.3 20.4 78.7 52.6 20.1 72.7 0.27 0.77 0.26 0.76 
Panama 1989-1999 21.1 21.4 42.5 12.6 20.0 32.6 0.35 0.76 0.39 0.78 
Venezuela 1990-1994 16.5 21.9 38.4 22.9 24.8 47.7 0.39 0.78 0.38 0.77 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a
 In multiples of the per capita poverty line. 
Overall, in the 1990s rural poverty declined in six of the eight 
countries for which information is available, namely Brazil, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. Some households managed to 
cross the poverty threshold, while others shed their indigent status to 
become non-indigent poor households. This indicates that hard-core 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 57 
poverty was also eased by the upturn in income and the other factors 
mentioned, such as policies to combat rural poverty. 
The increase in rural income benefited all income strata, albeit in 
differing proportions, as a result of the general expansion of agricultural 
output and the intensification of non-agricultural rural activities 
(commerce and services). In almost all the cases examined declines in 
indigence and poverty levels were associated with increases in average 
real income.7 
In Chile both the average labour income and the average 
autonomous income of rural households fell between 1990 and 1998. The 
maintenance of these households’ monetary income and the resulting 
decline in rural poverty are therefore attributable to income from the 
monetary subsidies extended by the State (see MIDEPLAN, 1999). 
(b) Factors affecting rural poverty 
The persistence of rural poverty is attributable to factors which are 
comparatively more rigid than the factors affecting urban poverty. Rural 
areas’ demographic and educational profiles are characteristic of stages 
through which urban areas have already passed, while their geographical 
features, such as isolation, lack of access to communications and 
difficulties in obtaining basic services, also leave the rural population at a 
clear disadvantage with respect to city-dwellers. As well, there are a 
number of difficulties related to agricultural activity —the mainstay of 
most rural workers— such as technological backwardness, high risk and 
low productive potential. In addition, the soils worked by the poor often 
show the effects of environmental degradation. Another problem is 
insufficient access to water, credit and, in particular, land, which is a key 
cause of rural poverty in many countries because of its impact on income 
generation and the effect of the structure of land ownership on the 
productive potential of agriculture. 
In countries where poverty is mainly a rural phenomenon and 
where more than half the rural population is poor, the rate of natural 
population growth is also a key problem. These countries are at an 
incipient or moderate stage of demographic transition and have high 
fertility rates. This means that they are caught in a kind of demographic 
trap: the division of the land among numerous heirs contributes to soil 
exhaustion and the proliferation of smallholdings, and this, in turn, is 
associated with an increase in the number of landless poor families and 
                                                          
7  Had this not been the case, and had the decline in the percentage of indigent households 
been accompanied by a downturn in their average income, this would have meant that 
hard-core rural poverty did not benefit from the expansion of output in rural areas. 
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with the growing need to resort to survival strategies based on family 
labour. 
However, according to projections prepared by the Population 
Division of ECLAC - Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre 
(CELADE), the number of Latin American countries in which the rural 
population is growing in absolute terms will have fallen from 14 in the 
period 1990-1995 to 10 by 2010, owing to the universal phenomenon of 
gradually declining fertility rates and persistent rural-to-urban migration.8 
(c) Rural poverty and the structure of production and employment 
Seasonality, multiple employment, production for home 
consumption and unpaid family work —which characterize agricultural 
activities in many parts of the region— make trends in rural employment 
hard to identify. Nevertheless, a number of general features can be noted. 
First, according to estimates, wage employment varied little as a 
proportion of total rural employment in the 1990s, since it held steady or 
declined only slightly in several countries, including Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Honduras and Mexico. It dropped sharply, however, in the 
Dominican Republic and increased in Guatemala, Panama and Venezuela. 
In turn, the campesino population9 remained unchanged or shrank 
slightly in Chile and Venezuela, expanded in Brazil, Colombia and the 
Dominican Republic and declined in the other countries. In most of the 
countries own-account non-agricultural work tended to increase, and 
trends in the proportion of employers were uneven (see table I.10). 
In addition, the data available suggest that the incidence of poverty 
is higher among campesinos than among other occupational groups, 
although, as shown in table I.10, there are large differences between 
countries in this respect: poverty among campesinos ranges from 20% in 
Chile to 89% in Bolivia. 
 
 
                                                          
8  According to estimates, rural population growth will change course by 2010, causing the 
rural population to shrink in absolute terms in Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador and Mexico. These countries will thus join the eight other countries in which 
this phenomenon has already begun (see ECLAC, 1999a). 
9  In household survey terminology, “campesinos” are own-account workers and unpaid 
family members employed in agricultural activities. 
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Table I.10 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE 
POPULATION BY TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT, RURAL AREAS, 1990-2000 
(Percentages) 
Wage earners Own-account and unpaid 
family workers 






 Bolivia 2000 100.0 0.5 8.6 2.8 5.8 90.9 83.0 
 Brazil 1990 100.0 3.0 44.3 - 44.3 52.7 44.3 
  1999 100.0 2.0 34.3 5.2 29.1 63.7 56.4 
 Chile b 1990 100.0 2.8 64.9 - 64.9 32.3 25.0 
  2000 100.0 2.5 65.1 4.9 60.2 32.5 24.3 
 Colombia 1991 100.0 6.3 48.6 - 48.6 45.0 25.5 
  1999 100.0 3.7 47.2 3.7 43.5 49.2 27.9 
 Costa Rica 1990 100.0 5.1 66.2 10.5 55.7 28.7 16.8 
  2000 100.0 5.8 66.9 9.6 57.3 27.3 12.3 
 Ecuador 2000 100.0 3.2 42.4 3.9 38.5 54.3 40.7 
 El Salvador 2000 99.8 4.6 47.2 3.9 43.3 48.1 26.7 
 Guatemala 1989 100.0 0.6 38.7 2.9 35.8 60.7 47.5 
  1998 100.0 2.0 42.9 1.7 41.2 55.1 34.8 
 Honduras 1990 100.0 0.6 34.9 4.0 30.9 64.6 47.6 
  1999 100.0 3.1 33.4 3.7 29.7 63.5 41.3 
 Mexico c 1989 100.0 2.5 50.2 - 50.2 47.3 34.6 
  2000 100.0 5.0 51.0 6.6 44.4 44.0 25.1 
 Nicaragua 1993 100.0 0.2 38.4 6.6 31.8 61.3 45.8 
  1998 100.0 3.3 43.7 - 43.7 53.0 39.7 
 Panama 1991 100.0 2.9 39.1 12.5 26.6 58.0 45.5 
  1999 100.0 3.2 44.9 10.1 34.8 51.9 31.6 
 Paraguay 1999 100.0 3.4 27.0 3.4 23.6 69.7 54.0 
 Peru 1999 100.0 6.3 19.9 2.3 17.6 73.9 61.9 
 Dominican 
 Republic 
1992 100.0 4.0 52.4 13.2 39.2 43.7 21.6 
  2000 100.0 1.8 40.3 8.1 32.2 57.8 32.6 
 Venezuela 1990 100.0 6.9 46.6 8.3 38.3 46.5 33.3 
  1997 100.0 5.4 49.6 5.4 44.2 44.9 33.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a
 Includes domestic employees. In Brazil (1990), Chile (1990), Mexico (1989) and Nicaragua (1998), 
includes public-sector wage earners. 
b
 Data from national socio-economic surveys (CASEN). 
c
 Data from national surveys of household income and expenditure (ENIGH). 
An increase in wage employment in both agricultural and non-
agricultural activities has helped to reduce poverty. In a few cases, 
however, these changes have raised poverty among workers engaged in 
wage-earning activities, even in private firms with more than five 
employees (see table I.11). 
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Table I.11 
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): POVERTY IN SELECTED OCCUPATIONAL 
GROUPS, a RURAL AREAS, 1990-2000 
(Percentages) 
Non-professional, non-technical 

















employing up to 







Bolivia 1999 81 80 14 25 58 37 86 88 
Brazil c 1990 71 64 - 45 72 61 70 74 
  1999 55 49 39 47 40 41 54 55 
Chile 1990 40 27 - 28 36 23 22 24 
  2000 24 16 9 16 20 10 16 21 
Colombia 1991 60 53 - 42d e - 54 67 73 
  1999 62 50 12 41e - 45 64 66 
Costa Rica 1990 27 17 - 13 23 22 24 27 
 1999 22 12 3 7 21 22 17 21 
El Salvador 1995 64 53 24 43 56 50 63 72 
  1999 65 55 16 42 56 47 71 80 
Guatemala 1989 78 70 42 72 76 61 71 76 
  1998 70 66 40 63 77 60 69 69 
Honduras 1990 88 83 - 71 90 72 88 90 
  1999 86 81 38 79 89 75 85 89 
Mexico 1989 57 49 - 53f - 50 47 54 
  1998 55 46 16 44 59 64 49 61 
Nicaragua 1993 83 75 71 64 77 59 82 89 
  1998 77 70 - 61 69 49 80 87 
Panama 1991 51 40 10 25 43 43 52 57 
  1999 42 29 5 19 39 30 37 42 
Paraguay 1999 74 65 10 47 57 43 75 79 
Peru 1999 73 66 33 42 54 38 73 78 
Dominican 
Republic 1997 39 25 17 14 26 40 30 42 
Venezuela 1990 47 31 22 35 36 44 31 36 
  1994 56 42 27 50 50 53 42 44 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a
 Refers to the percentage of employed in each category residing in households that have an income 
below the poverty line. 
b
 In Bolivia (1999), Chile (1996), El Salvador, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, includes 
establishments employing up to 4 workers only. 
c
 The 1990 figures for establishments employing over 5 workers refer to workers with a contract of 
employment (“carteira”), and the 1990 figures for establishments employing up to 5 workers refer to 
workers without such a contract. 
d
 Includes public-sector wage earners. 
e
 Includes wage earners in establishments employing up to 5 workers. 
f
 Includes wage earners in the public sector and in establishments employing up to 5 workers. 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 61 
Agriculture is the sector of the economy with the largest proportion 
of precarious employment. The highest proportion of workers without a 
contract or social security coverage is to be found among agricultural 
wage earners. In addition, the practice of subcontracting is becoming 
more and more widespread.  
Male non-agricultural rural employment increased in seven of the 
eight Latin American countries for which recent information is available 
(see table I.12). In those seven countries the proportion of the male rural 
population whose main activity was non-agricultural work ranged from 
22% to 57%, while the corresponding rate for employed rural women was 
over 65% in eight of 10 countries. In short, about a quarter of the decline 
in agricultural employment was absorbed by displacement into non-
agricultural activities. 
Table I.12 
LATIN AMERICA: POPULATION EMPLOYED IN NON-AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES 





1990 1994 1997 1999 1990 1994 1997 1999 
Bolivia … … 18.2 16.5 … … 15.6 16.8 
Brazil 26 21.3 23.7 25.8 47.1 28 30.1 31.6 
Chile 19.2 26.6 25.9 27.6 67.2 70.7 65.1 63.3 
Colombia 30.9 35.7 32.9 31.2 71.4 77.4 78.4 77.4 
Costa Rica 47.8 55.4 57.3 57.4 86.8 89.2 88.3 90.3 
El Salvador … … 32.7 36.1 … … 81.4 86.5 
Guatemala 21.4 … … 27.2 69.2 … … 67.7 
Honduras 18.6 24.7 21.5 23.4 88 87 83.7 87.9 
Mexico 34.7 42 44.9 46.8 69.1 64.7 67.4 74.8 
Nicaragua … 25.9 … 24.5 … 80 … 73.6 
Panama 25 36.6 39.3 40.3 86.1 91.5 90.3 91.9 
Paraguay … … … 29.9 … … … 57.8 
Peru … … 18.9 18.7 … … 32.7 27.9 
Dominican Republic … … 54.8 … … … 92.4 … 
Venezuela 33.9 35.4 … … 78.2 87.2 … … 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
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The growing importance of non-agricultural employment derives 
from a combination of factors, such as technological advances in 
agricultural production; investments in road infrastructure, which have 
enabled rural residents to commute to urban areas; constraints on the 
rental and purchase of agricultural land; and deficiencies in the credit and 
crop insurance markets. In addition, families themselves tend to seek 
means of diversifying their production in order to mitigate the risks 
inherent in agricultural activity (see ECLAC/FAO/IDB/RIMISP, 2003 
and ECLAC/GTZ, 2003). 
This increase in the proportion of non-agricultural rural 
employment is very uneven, however: in the poorest areas, for example, 
non-agricultural rural employment first emerges in the form of small-
scale goods production on the landholding itself, using traditional, 
labour-intensive technologies. There follows a second phase, still in the 
poorest areas, in which other agriculture-based activities are added, 
particularly the processing, distribution and marketing of agricultural 
products. These activities are aided by increases in agricultural and urban 
incomes. The better-off rural areas then move into a third phase, which 
involves some elements of manufacturing and generates a rural-urban 
interpenetration. In this third phase, manufacturing firms move into small 
and medium-sized towns, rural workers are subcontracted to produce 
durable intermediate goods and rural services related to increases in 
urban income, such as services related to tourism and country homes, are 
expanded. In addition, this phase leads to a rise in non-agricultural 
employment in health and education services and in other social services 
for the rural population, such as construction and transport. 
For many members of poor rural households, entry into non-
agricultural activities is a survival strategy. What is more, a large 
proportion of the rural population employed in non-agricultural activities 
remains poor or extremely poor, depending on how far the respective 
country has progressed in terms of non-agricultural rural development 
(Reardon, Cruz and Berdegué, 1999). In most of the countries, as figure I.5 
shows, poverty levels are much lower (50%) among workers employed in 
non-agricultural activities than among those employed in agricultural 
activities. 
(d) Access to land 
In 2000 Latin America was still one of the regions with the highest 
concentration of land ownership. Three groups of countries may be 
distinguished in this regard. The countries in the first group (Chile, 
Mexico and Paraguay) have Gini indices of over 0.90; those in the second 
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Panama and 
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Venezuela) have Gini indices of between 0.79 and 0.85; and those in the 
third (Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, Puerto Rico and 
Uruguay) have indices of about 0.75. 
Figure I.5 
LATIN AMERICA: POVERTY AMONG THE POPULATION EMPLOYED IN 
AGRICULTURAL AND NON-AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES 














Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
Among the countries for which information is available, only 
Honduras (in the third group) had an even lower Gini index, which in the 
mid-1990s dropped from 0.71 to close to 0.65 (see table I.13).10 
These levels of concentration, in combination with other factors, 
explain the many conflicts that arose in the 1990s over land ownership.11 
                                                          
10  Gini indices take into account only the size of the landholding, not its quality. They 
therefore fail to consider, among other things, the landholding’s distance from markets, 
weather conditions, access to irrigation systems and, in general, the crop yields 
permitted by the soil quality. In some countries the consideration of these factors could 
reveal trends that are at variance from those indicated with regard to the distribution of 
agricultural potential. 
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In Brazil, for example, the number of families involved in land 
occupations rose from 8,000 in 1990 to 63,000 in 1997. In the Dominican 
Republic, between 15% and 17% of the land, whether private or State-
owned, is occupied on a de facto basis by poor campesinos. In Chile 
indigenous communities have made increasing claims on the land. 
Over time, governments have taken a variety of measures to deal 
with the land distribution problem. In the 1960s and 1970s there were a 
number of attempts at agrarian reform, but these policies later gave way 
to other distribution arrangements. In the 1990s efforts to formalize rural 
land ownership through land title and registration programmes began to 
figure more prominently on the political agenda. 
Table I.13 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (16 COUNTRIES): GINI INDICES OF LAND 
CONCENTRATION, 1970-1994 
(Percentages) 
Gini index Group of countries a 
Circa 1970 Circa 1985 Circa 1994 
Chile 0.92 ... 0.92 
Mexico 0.93 ... ... 
Paraguay ... 0.93 0.93 
Brazil 0.84 0.85 0.81 
Colombia 0.86 0.79 0.79 
Costa Rica 0.81 0.80 ... 
Ecuador  0.81 ... ... 
El Salvador 0.80 0.83 ... 
Panama 0.77 ... 0.85 
Peru 0.88 0.83 0.86 
Venezuela 0.90 0.89 ... 
Honduras  0.71 ... 0.66 
Jamaica  0.79 ... ... 
Puerto Rico 0.76 0.77 ... 
Dominican Republic 0.78 0.73 ... 
Uruguay 0.81 0.80 0.76 
Source: ECLAC, Agricultural Development Unit, on the basis of agricultural censuses conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a
 The countries are divided into three groups by their Gini index values. 
                                                                                                                                    
11  In Paraguay, for example, there were over 200 land occupations between 1989 and 1996, 
involving more than 600,000 hectares and almost 40,000 campesino families. Between 
1989 and 1991 over 3,000 arrests were made in relation to land occupations, and armed 
groups were set up to dissuade the campesinos involved (see Molinas, 1999). 
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Recent studies12 show that transactions on the agricultural land 
market tend to take place within the same stratum of producers, and 
therefore do not modify the unequal structure of land ownership. Also, 
the most dynamic markets are located close to cities and in newly settled 
areas —not, in other words, where the poorest campesinos usually live. 
Changes in the structure of land ownership have therefore been limited 
and have not benefited the most marginalized households. 
Moreover, it is acknowledged that credit markets have certain 
shortcomings and that the poorest campesinos lack the resources to buy 
land. This has led to the creation of special credit access programmes, 
which are up to 75% subsidized in some cases. However, in Latin 
America the formal land market exists alongside another market in which 
informal title is the prevalent form of ownership. This limits access to 
credit for working and investment capital. 
As a fixed asset and a factor of production, land has particular 
features —as a geographically dispersed immovable asset whose financial 
value is heavily dependent on weather conditions, location, access to 
water and other factors— that make markets for agricultural land 
significantly different from markets for mass-produced goods. By their 
very nature, land markets are extremely imperfect and segmented, and 
involve high and largely fixed transaction costs (Muñoz, 1999). 
In addition, most of the region’s countries lack one of the most 
important tools for the development of a rural land market: an efficient, 
reliable and workable registry system that gives users the legal and 
financial information they need to participate in the market (Tejada and 
Peralta, 1999). All this has helped to perpetuate the high concentration of 
land markets and the shortcomings of credit markets, which impact 
negatively on small-scale producers and campesino families. 
4. Vulnerability and poverty 
(a) The concept of social vulnerability 
The terms “vulnerability” and “vulnerable groups” have been used 
to refer to a social phenomenon of multiple dimensions which is 
manifested in the feelings of risk, insecurity and helplessness expressed 
by the population in public opinion polls. How vulnerable individuals 
and households are is directly related to their degree of control over 
                                                          
12  Joint ECLAC/GTZ project on policies to develop rural land markets in Latin America, 
1999. 
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different kinds of resources and assets, the mobilization of which enables 
them to make use of the existing opportunity structures at a given point 
in time, either to enhance their well-being or to prevent it from declining 
when it comes under threat (Kaztman, 1999). 
The resources available to individuals and households include all 
the tangible and intangible assets they control, such as labour capacity, 
human capital, productive resources and social and family relationships. 
Labour, which is the most important resource of middle- and low-income 
groups, has been affected by external liberalization, the demands of 
competitiveness and the increased flexibility of the labour market.13 In this 
framework, the abiding trend towards structural unemployment and 
informal employment has worsened, leading to more precarious 
employment, the weakening of trade unions and a decline in their 
bargaining power. With regard to human capital, there are still obstacles 
that hinder the process of giving new generations the capital they need 
for an era in which knowledge is an essential factor of production. In 
addition, human capital is devalued in cases where former employees of 
firms that have become uncompetitive and failed cannot find new jobs in 
firms that have stayed afloat by using new technologies and new methods 
of labour organization to deal with changes in their environment. Social 
vulnerability is also associated with a lack of access to productive 
resources on the part of low-productivity sectors, which have to deal with 
external trade liberalization and the loss of traditional markets as their 
outputs are displaced by newly introduced goods and services, and which 
moreover do not usually have the benefit of suitable protection and 
development policies. Vulnerability is also worsened when social 
relations, which form an important part of the social capital of individuals 
and families, are weak. These links and networks are crucial in affording 
access to jobs, information and positions of power. Contemporary 
transformations have affected traditional forms of organization, social 
participation and political representation, and this has even weakened 
social cohesiveness in many countries. Family relations, which provide 
individuals with support and assistance, have also been damaged by the 
increase in the number of failed marriages and the emergence of new, less 
stable types of unions. 
                                                          
13  As stated in UNDP (2002, p. 29), it is possible to distinguish various sectors of employers 
and workers who have successfully withstood this trend towards greater flexibility. 
Also, there is a category of low-skilled workers who have always worked in flexible 
conditions; the discussion of increased flexibility thus refers only to other workers. This 
means that the problem is asymmetrical flexibility, which implies that the costs of the 
adjustment are unequally distributed among the population. 
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(b) Measuring vulnerability 
The rotation of households into or out of poverty can be a good 
indicator with respect to the population that can be considered 
vulnerable. Owing to fluctuations in household income from one year to 
the next, it is not unusual for the number of families below the poverty 
line to increase, or indeed decrease. Although longitudinal surveys that 
could systemically monitor this phenomenon are not conducted in Latin 
America, it is possible to identify households whose per capita income is 
between 1 and 1.25 times the poverty line or between 1.25 and 2 times the 
poverty line. Between 7% and 11% of the region’s households —in 
different countries and at different times— are in the first group, and an 
average of about 20% are in the second. Given that national income in the 
different countries fluctuated widely in the 1980s and 1990s and that a 
significant proportion of the population experienced job loss at least once 
during those periods, it can reasonably be deduced that there was a more 
frequent rotation of households moving into or out of poverty. These 
figures therefore lead to the conclusion that around 30% of households 
may be considered vulnerable. 
(c) Policies to address vulnerability 
As government policy gradually incorporates the objective of 
reducing vulnerability as a complement to combating poverty, new tasks 
begin to figure on the economic and social policy agenda. The objective of 
reducing vulnerability is yet another reason to develop economic policies 
aimed at achieving faster, steadier growth. It also calls for efforts to 
substantially raise the productivity of micro- and small enterprises, 
which, it is now clear, are no passing phenomenon. Meanwhile, it is 
necessary to increase the coverage, priority and efficiency of social policy. 
Among other things, this means targeting the low- and middle-income 
groups that are least able to cope with frequent economic recessions. 
The variability of household income has worsened the situation of 
many families by forcing them to liquidate assets or to resort to extremely 
costly loans. This is particularly true of low- and middle-income 
households which, while not actually becoming poor, experience a 
decline in well-being and a feeling of insecurity. What is more, drops in 
household income can hamper families’ access to social services, thereby 
exacerbating the downturn in their living standards and their loss of 
stability.  
Efforts to reduce social vulnerability and continue to combat 
poverty are particularly hard to pursue in a context of fierce international 
competition that calls for macroeconomic discipline, trade liberalization 
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and labour flexibility. It is therefore essential to develop a new social 
policy that is closely linked and coordinated with, rather than separate 
from, economic policy (ECLAC, 2000a). 
In the framework of this convergence between social and economic 
policy, labour market-related measures must be adopted to reduce 
vulnerability. The fundamental measures required include the promotion 
and protection of employment, which, in macroeconomic terms, means 
maintaining relative prices that do not hurt employment; ongoing 
training of the labour force to prepare people to work with new 
technologies and thus to cope better with the restructuring of production; 
and the improvement of labour legislation to safeguard workers’ rights 
and promote harmonious and equitable relations within firms. It is also 
necessary to provide formal education for young people to prevent them 
from joining the labour force prematurely; to promote women’s access to 
the labour market in non-discriminatory conditions; and, lastly, to 
develop financing formulas for the implementation of unemployment 
insurance, in order to provide workers with effective protection during 
times of economic recession and productive readjustment. Labour 
adaptability can thus help to boost systemic competitiveness while 
making workers less vulnerable and enhancing their technical and 
professional skills. 
In addition, the vast majority of low-productivity sectors consist of 
low-technology micro- and small enterprises whose workers lack 
professional or technical skills, and of equally unskilled own-account 
workers. In almost all the Latin American countries these sectors account 
for at least half of all jobs. Policies such as guaranteeing these enterprises 
and own-account workers ready access to credit, technology and markets, 
and supporting them in the areas of information, product development, 
marketing channels and business management, are indispensable if these 
productive units are to be viable concerns. At the same time, such policies 
should help to increase the productivity and stability of those sectors’ 
activities in order to increase the amount of income they generate and 
reduce poverty and vulnerability. 
Clearly, it is no easy matter to put such policies in place. First of all, 
microenterprises are hard to locate, both because many of them are not 
properly registered and because they often change addresses or cease to 
exist. In addition, they often fail to comply with institutional 
requirements, especially in the financial area. Accordingly, unless the 
sector can be helped to achieve at least some degree of organization of its 
own, measures for its benefit could be very costly. 
Second, with regard to access to social services, specific measures to 
reduce poverty, particularly extreme poverty, should be complemented 
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with other measures to assist low- and middle-income strata whose 
income is more variable and prone to decline. This means providing 
access to high-quality services such as education and health care. It has 
already been noted that vulnerable groups find their access to these 
services constrained in times of economic crisis because they can no 
longer afford health-care premiums or education costs, which are 
increasingly managed by the private sector. Even in boom periods, the 
quality of the services available to the most vulnerable sectors is far from 
ideal, and it worsens in times of recession. Clearly, no policy that is 
supposed to maintain certain minimum social standards can exclude the 
possibility of requiring individuals with more resources to pay for their 
own consumption of these services so that the benefits of public policies 
can be concentrated in vulnerable groups.  
In particular, continuous access to quality education must be a 
central component of any policy for reducing vulnerability. In this 
respect, the gaps in the education of vast sectors of the population became 
apparent in the 1980s and 1990s, when education proved to be 
increasingly ill-adapted to productive processes based on new 
technologies. Education and vocational training, especially for those who 
are neither professionals nor technicians, are not very compatible with the 
demands of the new forms of production. This is particularly evident 
when individuals who lose their jobs try unsuccessfully to find 
employment in other occupations. Efforts to reintegrate such individuals 
into the labour market have had little success. Thus, the insufficient 
qualifications of a considerable proportion of the population can easily 
become a source of vulnerability. This should be a wake-up call for the 
education system and has prompted a number of reforms in this regard. 
Such reforms should ensure, among other things, that students have 
opportunities to update their knowledge on an ongoing basis.  
It is also important to guarantee that retirement and other pensions, 
particularly those involving the lowest amounts, at least maintain their 
value, since their purchasing power tends to decline in times of inflation or 
budget cuts.  
Third, the countries should design social policies that can meet the 
basic needs of the whole population by combining the resources, 
initiatives and capacities that exist in civil society and within the State. 
Monetary income, mainly from labour, is not the only means of enabling 
individuals to achieve their aspirations in terms of well-being. Factors 
such as housing, the surrounding environment, social infrastructure  
—drinking water, electricity, telephone, sewerage systems, paved roads, 
sports complexes, etc.— health and education, organizational networks, 
the instruments and tools developed by households and their initiatives 
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are also important in this regard. These are resources which can be used 
by public or private initiatives to protect or further social development. 
Fourth, in the 1990s the governments embarked on major efforts to 
increase social spending, even though economic growth was limited in 
most of the countries. At the same time, increasingly deregulated markets 
and the need to be highly competitive in economies that were becoming 
more and more open revealed major areas of inefficiency in the public 
and private sectors. For this reason, social policy must be viewed in a 
wider context in which more efficient use of resources is essential. In 
particular, it is necessary to reform social public institutions and train 
their staff better if social spending is to continue to expand.  
In turn, efficiency improvements are closely associated with more 
extensive civic participation. That is to say, in addition to the proper use 
of fiscal resources and the implementation of operational methods that 
combine these resources with others from socially-oriented non-
governmental organizations, it is necessary to develop a public policy that 
encourages the direct involvement of the citizenry. In this regard, social 
networks and the non-governmental organizations that support them are 
beginning to gain importance in some areas. The State should forge an 
alliance with these new organizations, in order to deal with the wide 
range of social problems that jeopardize public safety and social well-
being. 
Fifth, a number of proposals have been put forward to deal with 
increases in vulnerability as a result of international financial crises, 
through the creation of special funds or safety nets which would enable 
State assistance to reach the groups worst affected by the domestic 
recessionary impact of such crises. These funds could be financed from 
State savings set aside in boom periods or from international cooperation. 
Although such cooperation is not easy to secure, it is generally agreed 
that this type of measure needs some kind of permanent institutional 
structure that can respond quickly and effectively when crisis breaks out.  
Sixth, it is necessary to create an appropriate institutional structure 
to implement social policy, in keeping with the conditions and 
requirements imposed by the new development model adopted by the 
Latin American countries. In this regard, it is necessary to afford social 
affairs the same degree of importance as economic and political affairs 
and to achieve a convergence between sectoral policies and programmes 
in the areas of health, education, housing and social security, on the one 
hand, and measures that target specific vulnerable groups and 
geographical areas, on the other. By the same token, there is a need to 
combine the efforts of different actors and institutions to eradicate 
poverty and reduce vulnerability. 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 71 
In summary, the figures for the 1990s show that in many of the 
region’s countries, a huge volume of resources could be needed to 
significantly reduce poverty and social vulnerability. It is therefore vital to 
speed up and stabilize economic growth, in view of both its direct impact 
on poverty and the additional leeway it affords to public revenue and 
spending. At the same time, economic expansion must be built, at least in 
part, on an improvement in low-productivity jobs, to avoid a situation in 
which social policy alone must compensate for slack growth and unstable 
income levels. Likewise, a medium-term vision for the social policy 
budget, together with the creation of reserve funds, would help to prevent 




(a) Method used to measure poverty 
The estimated poverty rates used in this chapter were calculated 
using the cost of basic needs method, which is based on the calculation of 
poverty lines. The poverty line is the minimum income the members of a 
household must have in order to satisfy their basic needs. Where the 
necessary information was available, the poverty line for each country 
and geographical area was estimated on the basis of the cost of a basic 
food basket covering the population’s nutritional needs, taking into 
account their consumption habits, the effective availability of food items 
and their relative prices. To the value of this basket was then added an 
estimate of the resources households need to satisfy their basic non-
nutritional needs.14 
The indigence line corresponds to the cost of the food basket, and 
indigents, or the extremely poor, are defined as individuals living in 
households whose income is so low that even if all of it were used to buy 
food, such households would still not be able to properly meet the 
nutritional needs of all their members. The value of the poverty line was 
obtained by multiplying the value of the indigence line by a constant 
factor that accounts for basic non-food costs, which was 2 for urban areas 
and about 1.75 for rural areas (see ECLAC, 1999c, box I.2).15 
The differences in food prices between metropolitan areas and 
other urban and rural areas were taken into account in the calculation of 
indigence lines. In general, prices in other urban areas and in rural areas 
were 5% and 25% lower, respectively, than the prices registered in 
metropolitan areas.  
With regard to sources of information, household income data were 
taken from household surveys conducted in the respective countries. In 
line with usual practice, both missing answers to certain questions on 
income —in the case of wage-earners, own-account workers and 
retirees— and probable biases arising from underreporting were 
                                                          
14  Information on the structure of household consumption of both food and other goods 
and services was obtained from surveys on household budgets conducted in the 
respective countries. Where no data from a recent survey of this type were available, 
other relevant information on household consumption was used. 
15  The only country for which this general approach was not used was Brazil. In this case, 
the study used new indigence lines estimated for different geographical areas within the 
country, in the framework of a joint project conducted by the Brazilian Geographical and 
Statistical Institute (IBGE), the Brazilian Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) 
and ECLAC. 
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corrected. In the latter case, the survey entries for income were compared 
with equivalent figures from an estimate of the household income and 
expenditure account from each country’s system of national accounts. 
Income was understood to include compensation for wage labour (in cash 
and in kind) and own-account labour (including self-supply and the 
consumption value of home-made products), income from property, 
retirement and other pensions and other transfers received by 
households. For most of the countries the imputed rental value of owner-
occupied dwellings was added to the income of households living in such 
dwellings. 
To calculate the percentages of poor and indigent households and 
individuals, the monthly per capita value of the respective lines was 
compared with the total income of each household, also expressed in per 
capita terms. In turn, nationwide poverty and indigence indices were 
calculated as a weighted average of the figures corresponding to each 
geographical area, which means that they reflect not only the incidence of 
poverty in each area, but also the percentage of poverty and indigence 
with respect to the total population of each country. 
(b) Indicators for measuring poverty 
Poverty is considered to be an eminently normative concept 
associated with individual well-being. Consequently, there is neither a 
single definition of the phenomenon nor a universal method for 
measuring it. There is a consensus, however, that poverty must be 
measured in at least two stages: the poor population must be identified, 
and poverty must be aggregated using a synthetic measurement. 
In the first stage, a threshold known as the poverty line (z) is 
defined as a means of identifying the population whose per capita income 
(ypc) is lower than the cost of a basket of items that satisfy basic needs 
(ypc < z). 
In the second stage —aggregation— an indicator is selected to 
reflect individuals’ income shortfall in relation to the poverty line. A 
“good” poverty indicator should meet certain criteria, the most important 
of which are the following three axioms: 
• Monotonicity: a reduction in the income of a poor household 
—ceteris paribus— should increase the poverty indicator. 
• Transfer: a transfer of income from a poor household to a 
wealthier one —ceteris paribus— should increase the poverty 
indicator. 
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• Decomposability: it should be possible to calculate a given 
population’s poverty indicator as the weighted sum of the 
indices of the different subgroups of which it is composed. 
The most commonly used poverty measurements may be 
summarized on the basis of a parametric index family proposed by Foster, 
















α  (1) 
where   > 0 and q is the number of individuals with income lower than z. 
When   = 0, the expression (1) corresponds to what is known as the 
poverty incidence index (H), which represents the proportion of 
individuals whose income is lower than the poverty line (z). 
nqH =    (2) 
Because it is easy to calculate and interpret, this indicator is the 
most commonly used of all. However, although it is decomposable, it 
does not satisfy the first two axioms listed above, so that its usefulness for 
poverty analysis is in some ways limited. 
When   = 1, however, an indicator measuring the relative shortfall 
in the income of poor individuals with respect to the value of z can be 


















The poverty gap (PG) satisfies the axiom of monotonicity, but not 
the axiom of transfers, which means that this indicator does not reflect 
unequal income distribution among the poor. 
Lastly, an index reflecting both the poverty gap and income 



















Although it is less intuitive than the previous indicators, this one is 
particularly useful for policy design and evaluation. Since it satisfies all 
three axioms, it serves to generate conclusive classifications of countries, 
geographical units or social groups in order to pinpoint the worst pockets 
of poverty. 
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(c) Methodological considerations with respect to alternative 
poverty estimates 
Poverty can be measured using a number of different 
methodologies, whose results vary widely and may even contradict one 
another. It is therefore important to be aware of the existence of 
measurements that differ from those used by ECLAC in the Social 
Panorama of Latin America and to take due precautions in interpreting 
and comparing their results. Specifically, the procedure used by the 
World Bank to draw up international comparisons of poverty is described 
below as an example of an alternative methodology for calculating 
poverty lines. 
The World Bank uses a single poverty line to compare poverty in 
different countries or over time. This threshold, which reflects poverty 
levels in the lowest-income countries, is calculated as the median value of 
the world’s 10 lowest national per capita poverty lines. In 2000 this value 
was US$ 32.74 per month in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), or 
US$ 1.08 per day. Thus the threshold known as “a dollar a day” reflects a 
level of income low enough for the person who receives it to be 
considered poor anywhere in the world. The World Bank also usually 
includes a higher poverty line in its tables, obtained by multiplying the 
above value by two to reflect slightly higher standards of poverty. 
When a single poverty line is used for all countries, problems of 
comparability inevitably arise because price levels are different in each 
country. This problem may be solved, at least partially, by using different 
exchange rates to reflect purchasing power parity (PPP). In other words, 
exchange rates are corrected so that a dollar has the same buying power 
anywhere in the world. In World Bank (2001) the poverty line is 
expressed in “PPP dollars” valued at 1993 prices.16 The final step in the 
poverty calculation procedure is to adjust the survey data to the reference 
year of the poverty line by deflating those values in accordance with the 
consumer price index (CPI) over the period. 
It is important to clarify that the purpose of the poverty line 
described here is to establish a common basis on which to make 
international comparisons. Consequently, when the objective is to 
evaluate or formulate policies or to analyse the characteristics of poverty 
in depth, the World Bank itself recommends using poverty lines that 
                                                          
16  The PPP exchange rates used today are estimated by the World Bank using International 
Comparison Programme (ICP) data from 1993, which cover a total of 110 countries. 
These estimates are not comparable to the PPP values used in previous years, which 
come from the Penn-World tables, since they can vary considerably owing to the 
methodology used. 
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reflect the specific situation in each country. The poverty lines calculated 
by ECLAC are of precisely this type, since they take into account each 
country’s current energy requirements and demographic features. 
Table I.14 compares ECLAC poverty estimates for the Latin 
American countries based on national poverty lines to World Bank 
poverty estimates based on international poverty lines, equivalent to 
US$ 32.74 (indigence) and US$ 65.48 (poverty) per month (1993 PPP). As 
the table shows, the World Bank’s poverty and indigence estimates are 
almost always lower than the estimates calculated by ECLAC. 
Table I.14 
LATIN AMERICA: ESTIMATES BASED ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
POVERTY LINES 




(World Bank) Country Year 
Indigence Poverty 
Year 
Less than US$ 1 
per day a 
Less than US$ 2 per 
day b 
Bolivia 1989 c 23.3 53.2 1990 11.3 38.6 
Brazil 1996 13.9 35.8 1997 5.1 17.4 
Chile 1994 8.0 28.6 1994 4.2 20.3 
Colombia 1997 23.5 50.9 1996 11.0 28.7 
Costa Rica 1997 7.8 22.5 1996 9.6 26.3 
Ecuador 1994 d 25.5 57.9 1995 20.2 52.3 
El Salvador 1997 23.3 55.5 1996 25.3 51.9 
Guatemala 1989 41.8 69.1 1989 39.8 64.3 
Honduras 1997 54.4 79.1 1996 40.5 68.8 
Mexico 1996 21.3 52.1 1995 17.9 42.5 
Panama 1997 13.0 33.2 1997 10.3 25.1 
Paraguay 1994 d 18.8 49.9 1995 19.4 38.5 
Dominican Republic 1997 14.4 37.2 1996 3.2 16.0 
Uruguay 1990 d 3.4 17.8 1989 <2.0 6.6 
Venezuela 1996 20.5 48.1 1996 14.7 36.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries, and World Bank, World Development Report 2000-2001: Attacking Poverty, New 
York, Oxford University Press, September 2001. 
a
 Equivalent to US$ 32.74 per person per month. 
b
 Equivalent to US$ 65.48 per person per month. 
c
 Eight departmental capitals plus the city of El Alto. 
d
 Urban areas. 
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(d) Value of the indigence and poverty lines used to calculate the 
estimates 
Table I.15 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INDIGENCE LINES (IL) AND POVERTY LINES (PL) 
(Monthly values per person) 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 





rate b US dollars 
Argentina 1990 c September A 255 928 511 856 … … 5 791.0 44.2 88.4 … … 
  1994 September $ 72 144 … … 1.0 72.0 143.9 … … 
  1997 c September $ 76 151 … … 1.0 75.5 151.0 … … 
  1999 September $ 72 143 … … 1.0 71.6 143.3 … … 
Bolivia 1989 October Bs 68 137 … … 2.9 23.8 47.5 … … 
  1994 June-November Bs 120 240 … … 4.7 25.7 51.4 … … 
  1997 May Bs 155 309 125 219 5.3 29.4 58.8 23.9 41.8 
  1999 October-November Bs 167 333 130 228 5.9 28.0 56.1 21.9 38.3 
Brazil 1990 September Cr$ 3 109 6 572 2 634 4 967 75.5 41.2 87.0 34.9 65.7 
  1993 September Cr$ 3 400 7 391 2 864 5 466 111.2 30.6 66.5 25.8 49.2 
  1996 September R$ 44 104 38 76 1.0 43.6 102.3 37.2 74.9 
  1999 September R$ 51 126 43 91 1.9 26.7 66.2 22.7 48.1 
Chile 1990 November Ch$ 9 297 18 594 7 164 12 538 327.4 28.4 56.8 21.9 38.3 
  1994 November Ch$ 15 050 30 100 11 597 20 295 413.1 36.4 72.9 28.1 49.1 
  1996 November Ch$ 17 136 34 272 13 204 23 108 420.0 40.8 81.6 31.4 55.0 
  1998 November Ch$ 18 944 37 889 14 598 25 546 463.3 40.9 81.8 31.5 55.1 
  2000 November Ch$ 20 281 40 562 15 628 27 349 525.1 38.6 77.2 29.8 52.1 
Colombia 1991 August Col$ 18 093 36 186 14 915 26 102 645.6 28.0 56.1 23.1 40.4 
  1994 August Col$ 31 624 63 249 26 074 45 629 814.8 38.8 77.6 32.0 56.0 
  1997 August Col$ 53 721 107 471 44 333 77 583 1 141.0 47.1 94.2 38.9 68.0 
  1999 August Col$ 69 838 139 716 57 629 100 851 1 873.7 37.3 74.6 30.8 53.8 
Costa Rica 1990 June ¢ 2 639 5 278 2 081 3 642 89.7 29.4 58.9 23.2 40.6 
  1994 June ¢ 5 264 10 528 4 153 7 268 155.6 33.8 67.7 26.7 46.7 
  1997 June ¢ 8 604 17 208 6 778 11 862 232.6 37.0 74.0 29.1 51.0 
  1999 June ¢ 10 708 21 415 8 463 14 811 285.3 37.5 75.1 29.7 51.9 
Ecuador 1990 November S/. 18 465 36 930 … … 854.8 21.6 43.2 … … 
  1994 November S/. 69 364 138 729 … … 2 301.2 30.1 60.3 … … 
  1997 October S/. 142 233 284 465 … … 4 194.6 33.9 67.8 … … 
  1999 October S/. 301 716 603 432 … … 15 656.8 19.3 38.5 … … 
El Salvador 1995 January-December ¢ 254 508 158 315 8.8 29.0 58.1 18.0 35.9 
  1997 January-December ¢ 290 580 187 374 8.8 33.1 66.2 21.4 42.8 
  1999 January-December ¢ 293 586 189 378 8.8 33.5 66.9 21.6 43.2 
Guatemala 1989 April Q 64 127 50 88 2.7 23.6 47.1 18.7 32.7 
  1998 Dec.97 - Dec.98 Q 260 520 197 344 6.4 40.7 81.5 30.8 54.0 
Honduras 1990 August L 115 229 81 141 4.3 26.5 52.9 18.6 32.6 
  1994 September L 257 513 181 316 9.0 28.6 57.1 20.1 35.2 
  1997 August L 481 963 339 593 13.1 36.8 73.6 25.9 45.3 
  1999 August L 561 1 122 395 691 14.3 39.3 78.6 27.7 48.4 
Mexico 1989 Third quarter $ 86 400 172 800 68 810 120 418 2 510.0 34.4 68.8 27.4 48.0 
  1994 Third quarter MN$ 213 425 151 265 3.3 63.6 127.2 45.3 79.3 
  1996 Third quarter MN$ 405 810 300 525 7.6 53.6 107.2 39.7 69.5 
  1998 Third quarter MN$ 537 1 074 385 674 9.5 56.8 113.6 40.7 71.3 
  2000 Third quarter MN$ 665 1 330 475 831 9.4 71.0 142.1 50.7 88.8 
Nicaragua 1993 21 Feb.- 12 June C$ 167 334 129 225 4.6 36.6 73.3 28.2 49.4 
  1997 October C$ 247 493 … … 9.8 25.3 50.5 … … 
  1998 15 April - 31 Aug. C$ 275 550 212 370 10.4 26.3 52.7 20.3 35.5 
Panama 1991 August B 35 70 27 47 1.0 35.0 70.1 27.1 47.5 
  1994 August B 40 80 31 54 1.0 40.1 80.2 31.0 54.3 
  1997 August B 41 81 31 55 1.0 40.6 81.3 31.4 55.0 
 1999 July B 41 81 31 55 1.0 40.7 81.4 31.5 55.1 
Paraguay 1990 d June, July, August G 43 242 86 484 … … 1 207.8 35.8 71.6 … … 
  1994 August - September G 87 894 175 789 … … 1 916.3 45.9 91.7 … … 
  1996 July - November G 108 572 217 143 … … 2 081.2 52.2 104.3 … … 
  1999 July – December G 138 915 277 831 106 608 186 565 3 311.4 42.0 83.9 32.2 56.3 
Peru 1997 Fourth quarter N$ 103 192 83 128 2.7 42.1 84.3 31.6 55.3 
  1999 Fourth quarter N$ 109 213 89 141 3.5 31.2 61.2 25.5 40.5 
Dominican Republic 1997 April RD$ 601 1 203 451 789 14.3 42.1 84.3 31.6 55.3 
Uruguay 1990 Second half NUr$ 41 972 83 944 … … 1 358.0 30.9 61.8 … … 
  1994 Second half $ 281 563 … … 5.4 52.1 104.1 … … 
  1997 Year $ 528 1 056 … … 9.4 55.9 111.9 … … 
  1999 Year $ 640 1 280 … … 11.3 56.4 112.9 … … 
Venezuela 1990 Second half Bs 1 924 3 848 1 503 2 630 49.4 38.9 77.9 30.4 53.2 
  1994 Second half Bs 8 025 16 050 6 356 11 124 171.3 46.9 93.7 37.1 65.0 
  1997 e Second half Bs 31 711 62 316 … … 488.6 64.9 127.5 … … 
  1999 e Second half Bs 49 368 97 622 … … 626.3 78.8 155.9 … … 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the respective countries. 
a
 Local currencies:  
Argentina: (A) Austral; ($) Peso  Bolivia: (Bs) Boliviano  Brazil: (Cr$) Cruzeiro; (R$) Real  Chile: (Ch$) Peso 
Colombia: (Col$) Peso     Costa Rica: (¢ ) Colón Ecuador: (S/.) Sucre      El Salvador: (¢ ) Colón 
Guatemala: (Q) Quetzal    Honduras: (L) Lempira Mexico: ($) Peso; (MN$) Nuevo Peso 
Nicaragua: (C$) Córdoba    Panama: (B) Balboa  Paraguay: (G) Guaraní     Peru: (N$) Peso 
Dominican Rep.: (RD$) Peso  Uruguay: (Nur$) Nuevo  Peso; ($) Peso        Venezuela: (Bs) Bolívar 
b
 International Monetary Fund “rf” series. 
c





 Nationwide total. 
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Chapter II 
Income distribution 
1.  Income concentration in the late 1990s 
In the late 1990s, income distribution in most of the Latin American 
countries continued to be highly concentrated, with a substantial share of 
total income remaining in the hands of the richest 10% of households. In 
almost all countries of the region, the richest decile received more than 
30% of total income, and in most of them (the exceptions being El 
Salvador and Venezuela), the figure was over 35% (in Brazil it was 45%). 
This decile’s average income was 19 times higher than the average for the 
40% of households with the lowest incomes, which received between 9% 
and 15% of total income. Uruguay is the exception in this case, in that the 
lowest-income group received about 22% of the total. In practically all of 
the countries, with the exception of Costa Rica and Uruguay, the per 
capita income of between 66% and 75% of the population was lower than 
the overall average (see table II.1). 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A simple comparison of the various household groups’ average 
incomes also demonstrates how high a degree of inequity exists in Latin 
America. In Bolivia, Brazil and Nicaragua, the per capita income of the 
richest quintile (20% of households) is more than 30 times greater than the 
poorest quintile’s. In the other countries, the average is also high (about 
23 times). The ratio of the wealthiest decile’s income to the income of the 
poorest four deciles also underscores the degree of concentration. In this 
case, the largest gap is seen in Brazil, where the most affluent decile’s 
income is 32 times greater than the combined incomes of the four other 
deciles. The simple average difference region-wide is 19.3, which is 
extremely high when compared, for example, to the figures for Uruguay 
(8.8) or Costa Rica (12.6), the countries with the best income distribution 
in the region.1  
The high degree of income concentration in Latin America can also be 
inferred from the Gini coefficient, which can be used to compare the overall 
income distribution in different countries or in different periods. A country 
ranking based on this indicator, calculated using the per capita income 
distribution for individuals,2 confirms that, at the end of the 1990s, the highest 
concentration was in Brazil, which had an index of 0.64, followed by Bolivia, 
Nicaragua and Guatemala, in that order, with values close to 0.60; at the 
other end of the scale, Uruguay and Costa Rica, also in that order, again had 
the least inequality, with Gini indices below 0.48 (see table II.2). 
Inequality nationwide does not necessarily follow the same pattern 
in urban and rural areas,3 as in the majority of the countries, there tends to 
be less equity in urban than in rural areas. Thus, in 7 out of 13 countries, 
the Gini coefficient for urban areas is higher than for rural zones. The 
most striking cases are those of Brazil, Chile and Colombia, where the 
difference between the indices around 1999 was 0.049 points in Brazil and 
0.042 points in the other two. Nonetheless, in some countries the situation 
is just the opposite, with income concentration being greater in rural areas 
than in urban centres. The largest gaps between urban and rural Gini 
                                                          
1  Although no figures are available that are comparable with those of the rest of the 
region, Cuba has probably maintained a less regressive income distribution than the 
other countries, despite the deterioration of that country's economy over the past 
decade. 
2  This method of calculating the Gini coefficient is different from the one used in the 
Social Panorama of Latin America, in which the values are based on household income 
distribution. 
3  As is well-known, average income levels are different in the two areas, and are 
invariably higher in urban zones. Although in some cases these differences are relatively 
small (for example, in Costa Rica), in others significant disparities are evident. In Bolivia, 
average income in urban areas is more than double the average income in rural areas. 
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coefficients are found in Bolivia and Paraguay, with 0.136 and 0.073 
points respectively.4 
Another indicator of income concentration is the percentage of 
persons whose per capita incomes are below the overall average. Average 
per capita income in Latin America falls between the seventh and eighth 
deciles, which means that between 67% and 77% of the population is 
below that threshold. In most of the countries, this proportion was smaller 
at the beginning of the 1980s. Thus, at present, around 75% of households 
have a below-average income. Moreover, because of this trend, a much 
larger share of increases in per capita GDP has gone to the top 25% of 
households in terms of income. Uruguay and Costa Rica, in that order, are 
the countries with the lowest percentage of persons receiving less than the 
average per capita income, while Brazil and Guatemala are at the opposite 
end of the scale (see table II.2). 
Another version of this indicator is the percentage of persons 
whose per capita incomes are less than half of the mean; this option is 
particularly useful in illustrating the heterogeneity of income distribution 
in the region, inasmuch as it describes a more irregular portion of the 
distributive spectrum. For example, as can be seen from table II.2, 
although Uruguay and Costa Rica have practically the same percentage of 
persons with incomes below the mean, they are four percentage points 
apart when the threshold is set at half of that value. 
According to this last indicator, most of the Latin American 
countries are in an intermediate range (between 40% and 50%), 
depending on what share of the population has an income of less than 
half of the average. Uruguay, Costa Rica, Venezuela and the Dominican 
Republic, in that order, have the least income concentration, since the 
share in question is under 40%. Brazil is the only country in the region 
where more than half of the population receives less than 50% of the 
mean income (see table II.2). 
This method has been used in other countries to gauge relative 
poverty, which is being defined as a situation in which income is 
insufficient to afford a level of consumption commensurate with the 
prevailing standards in a given society. In this case, the indicator is used 
somewhat like a traditional poverty line, except that it moves in tandem 
with fluctuations in average income. 
                                                          
4  Another trait that is common to much of the region is that inequality is greater nationwide 
than inequality in urban and rural areas taken separately. The only exceptions are Bolivia and 
Paraguay, where the rural coefficient is higher than the national one. When inequality 
nationwide is greater than inequality in the urban and rural subgroups, this indicates that the 
disparities in income distribution between the two types of areas may play a very important 
role in shaping the pattern of income distribution. 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.  Trends over the decade 
Over the past decade, the top 10% of households’ share of total 
income continued to increase in most countries, thereby strengthening the 
trend towards a worsening distribution in Latin America. In fact, over 
that period, the share of income received nationwide by households in the 
top decile increased in eight countries, declined in five (although 
significantly so in only two, Honduras5 and Uruguay) and held steady in 
one, Mexico. The countries in which the richest portion of the 
population’s share increased include several that had been characterized 
by a better distribution of income. This share rose from 35% to 37% in 
Argentina, from 26% to 29% in Costa Rica and from 29% to 31% in 
Venezuela. In Chile, it remained at slightly above 40%, and in Uruguay, 
although it declined over the decade as a whole, it rose from 26% to 27% 
between 1997 and 1999. The share of the highest decile also increased in 
Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Panama, (from 44% to 47%, 31% to 37%, 
38% to 41% and 36% to 37%, respectively) over the course of the decade. 
In contrast, in countries such as Colombia (between 1994 and 1999), El 
Salvador and Honduras, the highest-income group’s share declined; the 
decrease was less than two percentage points in Colombia and El 
Salvador, but was larger in Honduras (see table II.1). 
Trends differed with regard to the percentage of income received 
by the poorest 40% of households over the decade. This figure fell in 
five countries, rose in eight and held steady in one (Nicaragua). The 
steepest decreases were in countries that experienced major crises 
(Ecuador and Venezuela), but there was also a reduction in the share of 
the bottom 40% in Costa Rica, El Salvador and Mexico. Moreover, where 
there were improvements, they were relatively minor, and surpassed 
two percentage points in just one case (Colombia from 1994 to 1997, but 
with a slight deterioration from 1997 to 1999). The improvements 
amounted to more than one percentage point in three others (Honduras, 
Guatemala and Uruguay) and around 0.5% in Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Panama. 
The variations exhibited by the intermediate strata —i.e., the 50% of 
all households positioned between the poorest 40% and the richest 10%— 
generally did not follow the same pattern as in the case of the top and 
                                                          
5  It should be noted, however, that the data for Honduras for the 1990s may not be fully 
comparable owing to changes in the income-measurement methodology that were 
introduced with the 1994 household survey. These changes, which have to do, in 
particular, with how broad a definition of income was used for the study, may have 
influenced (although in a way that is hard to pinpoint) the distribution profile of 
household income in 1990, compared to that of subsequent years; thus, it may have 
affected the analysis of the trend throughout the decade. 
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bottom strata. In at least seven countries, changes in income share  
—increases and decreases alike— amounted to two percentage points or 
less. The share of total income received by this group was very similar at 
the beginning and end of the decade in Chile, Colombia (between 1994 
and 1999), Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela. The most interesting case is 
that of Venezuela, where the intermediate groups maintained their share 
in spite of the serious crisis that hit the country in the last half of the 
1990s. Only El Salvador (from 1995 to 1999), Honduras and Uruguay 
posted major gains in the relative income received by the intermediate 
strata. In the latter two cases, this was at the expense of the top decile. 
Brazil and Ecuador were the only countries in which relative incomes in 
this group fell by more than three percentage points, as a result of the 
strong relative gains made by the upper-income strata. In Argentina, the 
intermediate groups saw their share of income drop steadily throughout 
the decade, with the total decrease amounting to 2.6 percentage points. In 
Chile, this group's share declined by 0.8 percentage points from 1996 to 
2000, thus undoing the cumulative gains of the first half of the 1990s. In 
Uruguay, however, although the share of intermediate groups also fell by 
0.8 percentage points between 1997 and 1999, this decline was not large 
enough to reverse the strong improvement of previous years. Despite 
these fluctuations, the trend in the income share of intermediate groups 
indicates that in some countries these groups have relatively powerful 
means of defending their share of total income. 
The above trends strengthen the impression that income 
distribution has worsened. Among 13 countries in which nationwide 
information was available for the beginning and end of the decade, eight 
saw an increase in the ratio between the incomes of the highest decile and 
those of the poorest 40%, while only four saw a decline and one showed 
no change. The countries in which this disparity increased the most were, 
in this order, Ecuador (urban area), Costa Rica, Venezuela and Argentina, 
while the sharpest decreases occurred in Colombia (between 1994 and 
1997) and probably in Honduras as well (see figure II.1). 
An analysis of the percentage of the population having a per capita 
income of less than 50% of the average level yields similar results. Only 
two countries, Honduras and Uruguay, registered a significant reduction 
in this indicator of inequality.6 A number of others showed a marked 
increase (most notably the same countries which, as mentioned above, 
saw their income gap widen), while Brazil and Guatemala posted 
moderate upswings. In Chile, Nicaragua and Panama this indicator held 
fairly steady (see figure II.1). 
                                                          
6  This index can also be used to measure relative poverty. 
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The largest nationwide increases in the Gini coefficient during the 
decade were seen in Costa Rica and Venezuela. This indicator also 
deteriorated in Argentina (Greater Buenos Aires) and Ecuador (urban 
areas). Although to a lesser extent, inequality in income distribution  
was also somewhat greater at the end than at the beginning of the 
decade in Brazil and El Salvador (between 1995 and 1999), while in 
Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama, the situation was 
largely unchanged. Uruguay (urban areas) and Honduras, as well as 
Colombia (from 1994 to 1999), were the only countries of the region that 
managed to reduce income concentration, as gauged by the Gini index 
(see figure II.2). 
Among the countries mentioned, Brazil, in particular, is faced with 
the serious challenge of attempting to reverse the slight rising trend in 
income inequality that marked the 1990s. Brazil now has the highest 
income concentration indices in the entire region, with a Gini coefficient 
of 0.64. At the other end of the scale, Uruguay has clearly consolidated the 
gains it made in reducing inequality, since, in addition to maintaining low 
poverty indicators, it has continued to make a gradual improvement in its 
income distribution, albeit with ups and down during the period  
1997-1999; as a result, in 1999 it again posted the lowest income 
concentration in the region, with a Gini coefficient of 0.44 in urban areas. 
Other countries that succeeded in lowering inequality indicators  
in urban areas over the past decade were Bolivia, Honduras, Guatemala, 
Mexico and Panama. In some of these cases, however, the 1999 levels  
are still among the highest in the region. At the same time, rural 
inequality, in the countries in which it could be measured, increased in six 
(especially in Costa Rica and Mexico and, to a lesser extent, in Brazil, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama) and decreased in three (Chile, 
Colombia and Honduras) (see figure II.2). 
A comprehensive analysis turns up a number of notable features of 
Latin American economies and societies. First of all, in general, income 
distribution is not clearly related to the countries’ level of development. 
For example, Argentina and Uruguay, which both have quite high income 
levels in regional terms, had very different distribution structures and 
trends as of the end of the decade. A similar situation is found among the 
economies with lower average incomes, in which the level of inequality 
may be high, intermediate or low (see tables II.3 and II.4). By the same 
token, some countries maintained the status quo in terms of distribution 
in the 1980s and 1990s, while in others, the situation changed 
substantially. Argentina and Chile, which in the 1960s stood out for their 
relatively good income distribution patterns, are currently close to the 
regional average and some of their inequality indicators are even higher.
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In contrast, Costa Rica and Uruguay have maintained a social and 
political structure that is conducive to a more egalitarian income 
distribution, notwithstanding the changes in the domestic economy and 
in external economic relations that have occurred in recent years. The 
situation in Venezuela runs along much the same lines, since, even 
though it experienced a serious crisis in the second half of the 1990s and 
its income distribution clearly grew worse over the decade, it is still less 
inequitable than most of the other countries in the region. 
Table II.3 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PER CAPITA INCOME AND DEGREE OF INCOME 
CONCENTRATION IN URBAN AREAS, 1999 
Per capita income Income concentrationa 
 High     
 (More than US$ 4 000) Argentina High 
 Uruguay Low 
 Chile High 
 Mexico Intermediate 
 Brazil High 
 Intermediate     
 (Between US$ 2 000 Costa Rica Low 
 and US$ 4 000) Panama Intermediate 
  Venezuela  Low 
  Dominican Republic Intermediate 
 Colombia High 
 Low     
 (Less than US$ 2 000) El Salvador Low 
 Paraguay Intermediate 
  Guatemala High 
  Ecuador Intermediate 
  Bolivia Intermediate 
  Honduras High 
  Nicaragua High 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations from household surveys in the countries concerned. 
a
 Low (under 0.48), intermediate (between 0.48 and 0.54) and high (over 0.54) Gini coefficient. 
94 ECLAC 
Table II.4 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN URBAN 
AREAS, 1990-1999 
Per capita GDP growth in the 1990s a D10/D(1 to 4) b Gini index 
High (more than 4%)      
 Chile   Increased  Increased 
 Dominican Republic - - 
Intermediate (between 2% and 4%)     
 Argentina    Increased Increased 
 Panama   Decreased  Decreased 
 El Salvador   - - 
 Peru   - - 
 Uruguay   Decreased Decreased 
 Costa Rica   Increased Increased 
Low (1% to 2%)     
 Mexico   Decreased Decreased 
 Bolivia    - - 
 Guatemala   Decreased Decreased 
 Brazil   Increased Increased 
Zero or negative (minus 1% to 1%)   
 Colombia d   Decreased Decreased 
 Nicaragua   Increased No change 
 Honduras   Decreased Decreased 
 Venezuela e Increased Increased 
 Ecuador   Increased Increased 
 Paraguay   - - 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations from household surveys in the countries concerned. 
a
 Average annual variation in per capita GDP, based on 1995 prices. 
b
 D(1 to 4) represents the bottom 40% of households in terms of income, while D10 represents the upper 10% 
of households in terms of income. 
c
 Greater Buenos Aires. 
d
 The starting year is 1994. 
e
 Refers to national total. 
 
In summary, even though many countries managed to expand their 
economies and substantially increase their social expenditure, Latin 
America as a whole has not succeeded in making any substantial 
improvement in income distribution. Although economic growth has 
made it possible to reduce absolute poverty, the increase in output has not 
altered the way in which the benefits of such growth are distributed. Nor 
are there any signs that this situation is likely to change significantly in 
the short or medium term. 
In fact, of the 17 countries analysed, only 2 (Uruguay and probably 
Honduras), closed out the decade with positive results in reducing 
distribution inequality. Even in countries that achieved high and 
sustained growth rates, such as Chile, income distribution has been 
recalcitrant and disparities have persisted. 
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It is encouraging that a number of Central American countries have 
made progress -albeit to different degrees and on different scales- 
towards more even income distribution patterns in urban areas, although 
this subregion continues to exhibit high levels of concentration. Economic 
stability, more moderate financial fluctuations, the benefits brought by the 
economic boom in North America, the easing of demographic pressures 
from international migration and larger flows of remittances from 
nationals residing abroad are some of the factors that have contributed to 
this result. 
3. Factors influencing income distribution 
Over the past few years, it has been found that those economies of 
the region that have managed to start growing again, reduce inflation 
substantially, raise employment levels and apply efficient public policies 
have nonetheless failed to improve their income distribution. This is why 
it is often pointed out that it is not enough to simply strengthen economic 
growth and boost employment; measures must also be taken that have an 
impact in other spheres, such as education and taxation.7 It is also usually 
said that this problem can only be solved over the long term. 
In this context, it would be appropriate to conduct an in-depth 
study of economic and social policies, with particular reference to how 
such policies influence poverty and income distribution, although the 
connection between the two phenomena is not clear. Nor is it clear 
whether such issues can be efficiently tackled simultaneously. 
The starting point for an analysis of the relevant information is a 
ranking of households by per capita income. This ranking can be used not 
only to distinguish between indigent, non-indigent poor and non-poor 
households, but also to describe and assess income distribution, which 
can then be linked to other related variables (see figure II.3). 
First of all, an examination of the average number of years of 
schooling of both the head of household and of all employed household 
members shows up a high correlation between income distribution and the 
distribution of education. A broad consensus exists as to the importance of 
achieving equality of opportunity and regarding the fundamental role of 
education in economic growth. Accordingly, the governments of Latin 
America have made an effort to improve educational coverage and to lower 
drop-out rates. This commitment has brought significant progress in the 
field of primary and secondary education. 
                                                          
7  This holds true at least in those countries where the tax burden is known to be low. 
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As may be seen from the figures, between the beginning of the 
1980s and the mid-1990s the population’s average number of years of 
schooling rose steadily, while the educational levels of heads of 
households and of employed household members belonging to the six or 
seven lowest income deciles became less uneven. The educational gap 
between these households and the upper deciles also widened, however. 
In most countries, the labour force’s average number of years of schooling 
corresponds approximately to that of the employed household members 
of the seventh decile, while in the eighth decile, and especially in the 
ninth and tenth deciles, the number of years of schooling is significantly 
above the average (see figures II.3b and II.3c). Thus, the gap between the 
overall average, situated around the seventh decile, and that of the lowest 
income deciles is almost two years of schooling, whereas the gap between 
the former and the tenth decile is usually about four years. This illustrates 
the high degree of concentration existing in education, measured in terms 
of the number of years of schooling, as well as the fact that some social 
groups have managed to gain access to post-secondary formal education. 
At the other end of the scale, there are countries in which large sections of 
the population have still not managed, on average, to complete the basic 
cycle. However, the strategies for expanding the production sector that 
are now being applied in the region require educational levels 
comparable to those found in the most advanced countries, that is, those 
that are leading the field in technological innovation. It may therefore be 
concluded that the concentration of education contributes to a situation  
in which the people who have the necessary skills to work in occupations 
involving advanced technologies are the ones able to earn high incomes, 
thereby compounding the concentration of income distribution. 
Moreover, macroeconomic and institutional reforms are driving the 








                                                          
8  In many countries the degree of concentration would certainly be even higher if the 
disparities existing in the quality of educational services available to the various strata of 
the population were added to the differences in the number of years of schooling. 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 99 
Second, the current returns on property ownership also exhibit a 
distribution similar to that of total income. Household surveys capture 
only a portion of property income. Overall, they very probably 
underestimate such earnings, especially in the case of persons in the most 
prosperous strata. This is due to design and measurement difficulties, as a 
significant portion of such resources circulates within companies, in the 
form of capital reinvestment, although this also increases individual 
assets.9 Both household surveys and national accounts can be used, 
however, to estimate the portion of income deriving from ownership of 
real estate and companies that is distributed to households. 
Information from these sources (see figure II.3d) shows that the 
household distribution of property income is so highly concentrated that 
the overall average coincides with the observed value in the seventh, 
eighth or ninth decile, depending on the country. Although differences do 
exist across countries with regard to the relative share of total income that 
comes from this source,10 these figures indicate that the concentration of 
property (and, hence, of the income deriving from such assets) plays a 
highly important role in the regressivity of household income 
distribution. In terms of future trends, this may come to be a determining 
factor in the reproduction of inequalities and the gaps that exist between 
different individuals’ future opportunities for well-being. 
Third, households also display a number of demographic traits that 
are closely correlated with the income distribution profile. With regard to 
household size, for example, the households with the largest number of 
members tend to be heavily concentrated in the lowest income deciles. 
This fits in with the fact that small households, i.e., households with few 
members, usually represent a very significant proportion of households in 
the high-income deciles.11 In fact, in the highest decile of income 
distribution, households consisting of three persons or fewer usually 
account for far more than half of the total. Since the majority of larger 
households include a high percentage of children and consequently have 
high demographic dependency rates, these households’ income-
generating capacity relative to their size is limited. This is often 
compounded by the fact that large households in the poorer strata usually 
                                                          
9  A portion of the primary income declared by independent workers, especially those who 
are employers, should be recorded as returns on capital rather than as earned income. 
10  The proportion of total household income that derives from assets varies significantly 
from one country to another. The percentage varies from 10% to 25%; this can be 
considered a minimum range given the traditional underestimation of this variable in 
household surveys, which more marked in this case than in that of other income flows. 
11  This is usually reflected not only in distributions in which households are classified 
according to per capita income, but also, albeit to a lesser extent, in those where 
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have more economic difficulty in subdividing than those situated at the 
other end of the scale. 
Fourth, an examination of employment variables indicates that, in 
addition to the aspects relating to education, asset holdings and 
demographic features discussed above, other limitations that conspire 
against greater equity in the case of poor households. Just as educational 
factors may give rise to differences in people’s income levels, the number 
of employed household members also affects the family’s capacity to 
generate income. An analysis of this factor shows that the average 
number of employed persons per household tends to be much lower in 
the poorer deciles than in the upper-income deciles of the distribution. In 
addition, the ratio of the number of employed persons to the number of 
household members is at least twice as high in the richer households as in 
the households in the lowest income decile (see figure II.4). In other 
words, the gaps already noted between households belonging to different 
levels of the distribution are compounded by their differing capacity to 
generate income via employment. 
Figure II.4 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES): RATIO BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYED 
PERSONS AND THE TOTAL NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 









Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys in the countries 
concerned. 
a
 1993 figures. 
b
 1996 figures. 
It can thus be reasonably concluded that in a historical and structural 
context such as the one prevailing in Latin America, income distribution is 
closely associated with the household characteristics considered here. These 
factors are also closely interrelated. It therefore appears that, in terms of 
possible changes in the distributional structure over time, an improvement 
in one or the other of these dimensions, rather than in all of them 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 101 
simultaneously, would fail to trigger and/or sustain “virtuous circles” that 
could break the existing cycles of poverty and inequity. 
Education, for example, is usually considered to have the greatest 
potential, in the medium and long terms, for changing the conditions that 
lead to the reproduction of inequalities. It is even sometimes claimed that 
equity in education is a sufficient condition for such change. Although it 
is certainly very important to make progress in this direction, it is clear 
that upper-income households have traditionally enjoyed socio-economic, 
political and cultural conditions that guarantee advantages for their 
children with regard to the quantity and quality of education received, as 
well as other sorts of resources that permit the intergenerational transfer 
of a significant potential for differentiation. 
An analysis of the behaviour of indicators such as the educational 
level of heads of household and of all employed household members12 in 
the various distributional strata over the past 10 years reveals, first of all, a 
general increase in the average number of years of schooling of both 
household heads and employed members. This increase amounts to 
between approximately six months and one year (see table II.5). This 
advance however has not, however, had any appreciable influence on the 
other variables, nor has it brought an improvement in income distribution. 
Second, the distribution of years of schooling in the households in 
the various income deciles has varied in different ways from one country 
to the next. In those where the distribution of educational levels of heads 
and employed members of households was somewhat more equitable, the 
trend has been towards distributional structures similar to those found in 
countries where income distribution is less equitable. Thus, for example, 
in Costa Rica and Uruguay, the distribution of education now seems to be 
more concentrated than before, especially in the top income decile. 
Nevertheless, income distribution has remained constant in the first 
country and has improved significantly in the second. In the other 
countries, fluctuations in income distribution have, in most cases, not 
been very significant and have been coupled with small variations in the 
distribution of education. Chile constitutes a special case for at least three 
reasons: economic reforms are more soundly established than in many 
other instances; the country has experienced vigorous growth during the 
period considered; and its population has the highest average number of 
years of schooling of all the countries of the region. A comparison of the 
                                                          
12  The quality of education is also clearly of great importance and should also be taken into 
account together with the number of years of schooling. It has also been established, 
however, that those who accumulate more years of schooling usually have access to a 
higher quality of education as well, which means that the concentration of education 
may have been underestimated. 
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distribution of education in 1987 with that of 1996 shows that the average 
length of schooling increased by almost one year and that education is 
now somewhat more evenly distributed than in the mid-1980s. In 
addition, during the period 1987-1996 there was a significant increase in 
employment, as well as changes in the occupational structure. Income 
distribution has remained practically unchanged, however, despite the 
country’s economic growth and the greater distributional equity of 
education, measured in terms of years of schooling. 
Table II.5 
LATIN AMERICA (7 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS OF SCHOOLING 
OF HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD AND OF EMPLOYED HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS, 
BY INCOME DECILES, IN URBAN AREAS 
 Household deciles by per capita income 
Country   Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Chile              
 Heads 1987 8.6 6.4 6.5 6.8 7.2 7.4 7.9 8.9 9.7 11.7 13.7 
  1996 9.6 7.5 7.8 7.9 8.7 8.5 9.1 9.6 10.8 11.9 14.1 
 Employed members 1987 9.9 7.1 7.6 8.2 8.7 9.1 9.6 10.3 11.1 12.7 14.2 
  1996 10.8 8.1 8.7 9.3 10.1 10.2 10.7 11.0 11.8 12.9 14.5 
Colombia              
 Heads 1986 7.2 5.0 5.2 5.7 6.0 6.5 6.6 7.2 8.2 9.6 12.0 
  1994 7.6 5.4 5.8 6.0 6.3 6.5 6.9 7.8 8.8 10.2 12.6 
 Employed members 1986 8.1 5.2 5.8 6.5 6.8 7.4 7.7 8.3 9.2 10.5 12.6 
  1994 8.6 5.6 6.3 6.9 7.2 7.7 8.3 9.2 10.1 11.6 13.3 
Costa Rica             
 Heads  1984 8.1 5.2 6.4 6.6 7.0 7.6 8.3 8.4 9.2 10.4 12.2 
  1994 8.5 5.3 6.4 6.6 7.2 7.8 7.8 9.3 10.0 11.0 13.2 
 Employed members 1984 9.1 6.1 6.8 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.2 9.3 10.3 11.1 12.9 
  1994 9.4 6.3 7.0 7.6 8.1 8.8 9.0 10.2 10.8 11.8 13.4 
Honduras              
 Heads  1984 6.2 3.1 4.0 3.9 4.4 4.9 5.7 6.3 7.7 9.6 12.8 
  1994 6.4 3.6 3.6 4.6 4.9 5.5 6.2 7.0 8.2 9.1 11.7 
 Employed members 1984 7.1 3.3 4.2 4.5 4.9 5.8 6.7 7.3 8.5 10.3 12.9 
  1994 7.2 3.8 4.3 5.3 5.7 6.5 7.2 7.8 8.8 9.6 11.7 
Panama              
 Heads  1986 8.2 4.8 5.4 6.4 6.8 7.2 8.0 8.1 9.7 11.4 13.6 
  1994 9.1 6.2 6.7 7.5 7.6 8.3 9.0 9.7 10.6 11.5 14.0 
 Employed members 1986 9.2 4.8 6.0 7.2 7.6 8.3 9.1 9.6 11.1 12.4 14.4 
  1994 10.1 6.2 7.4 8.2 8.6 9.5 10.2 10.8 11.7 12.5 14.6 
Uruguay              
 Heads  1986 7.0 4.8 5.5 5.6 5.9 6.4 6.7 7.3 8.0 9.0 10.4 
  1994 7.3 5.6 5.8 6.1 6.1 6.4 6.7 7.0 8.3 9.4 11.5 
 Employed members 1986 8.2 5.6 6.5 7.0 7.5 7.9 8.2 8.7 9.1 9.8 10.8 
  1994 8.8 6.4 7.2 7.6 8.0 8.3 8.8 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.4 
Venezuela              
 Heads  1986 7.0 5.0 5.3 5.5 5.6 6.1 6.6 7.0 7.8 9.3 11.9 
  1994 7.2 5.2 5.9 6.5 6.7 7.0 6.9 6.7 7.8 8.5 10.9 
 Employed members 1986 7.9 5.2 5.9 6.3 6.6 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.7 10.0 12.3 
  1994 8.3 6.0 6.8 7.3 7.8 8.1 7.9 8.3 9.0 9.5 11.4 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys in the countries 
concerned. 
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One reason that might be given for this is that the countries began 
their economic reform processes at different times. According to this line 
of thought, the countries in which the distribution of education has 
become more concentrated than before might be the same ones where the 
change in the economic and employment structure has brought about a 
redistribution of labour income whereby persons with a higher level of 
education have become more highly paid than before. Thus, on the one 
hand, the link between education and income would be strengthened in 
the more dynamic sectors, which employ persons with whose levels of 
education are far above average and, on the other hand, would reduce the 
dispersion of income among those with below-average levels of 
education. This makes the case of Chile even more interesting, since, 
because economic reforms have been in place for a longer time and 
economic growth has been so buoyant, the changes in these variables 
illustrate the apparent effects of the new development modality in this 
respect more clearly. 
Although it may be too early to draw definitive conclusions, the 
information presented here does in some way call into question the 
effectiveness of attempts to modify income distribution via an educational 
policy designed to improve the distribution of opportunities, unless it is 
accompanied by other related initiatives in the areas of employment, 
demography and property income. In fact, all of the countries already 
implement policies and programmes on a regular basis in each of these 
areas; the challenge, however, lies in integrating them and giving greater 
weight to the areas previously given least attention, while at the same time 
strengthening those measures about which there is a greater consensus. 
Thus, for example, as lower-income households benefit, 
simultaneously, from various sectoral policies (housing and community 
infrastructure, credit for productive work, land access, technical 
assistance, assistance for women and young people entering the labour 
market), the increase in years of schooling will begin to have a stronger 
impact and labour productivity will rise.13 On many occasions, the effect 
of isolated policies is largely eroded by such factors as crowding in the 
home, which makes it difficult for children and young people to study 
properly, or a lack of capital goods and other productive resources, such 
as land and water, which significantly limit the level of earnings. The 
provision of assistance in obtaining certain assets, such as a home, can not 
                                                          
13  See Gerstenfeld and others (1995), which demonstrates the influence on school 
performance of factors such as the educational capacity of the household, its economic 
capacity, the physical infrastructure of the home and the level of family organization.  
Such a package of social policies as a whole can prevent educational policies from being 
neutralized. 
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only bring about a striking improvement in households’ levels of well-
being, but also afford them with greater access to credit. 
As noted in UNDP (2002), in the absence of policies that act 
simultaneously in various areas, widening wage gaps will spread to other 
social spheres, thereby reinforcing the trend towards segmentation in 
services and in the location of social groups within the urban 
environment. When this occurs, schools and neighbourhoods gradually 
lose their ability to function as significant sources of assets for families 
seeking a way to escape from poverty. 
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Methodological annex 
(a) Measuring inequality 
 
The economic and statistical literature offers a wide range of 
indicators for measuring income inequality. In general, they can be 
classified as: (i) traditional statistical indicators (absolute and relative 
range, statistical indicators of order, average relative deviation, variance, 
variation coefficient and log variance); (ii) entropy measures (Theil index); 
(iii) Gini coefficient; (iv) social welfare functions (Dalton and Atkinson 
indices); and (v) Lorenz curve. 
A good indicator of inequality is usually expected to meet the 
following criteria: 
• "Weak" transfer principle: when income is transferred from a 
wealthy household to a poor one, other things being equal, the 
indicator should show a decrease in the degree of inequality. 
• Independence of scale: the indicator should not vary in 
response to proportional changes or changes of scale (for 
example, changes in the unit used to measure income). 
• Population principle: income concentration in two 
populations with identical Lorenz curves should be the same, 
regardless of the size of the populations.  
• Additive decomposition: the income concentration for a 
population should be equal to the weighted sum of inequality 
among all subgroups within that population. 
• "Strong" transfer principle: when income is transferred from a 
wealthy household to a poor one, the decrease in equality will 
be more pronounced as the income gap between the two 
households widens. 
Given the importance of these criteria, and in the light of certain 
practical considerations, certain indices that are normally used to analyse 
income distribution have been chosen. Thus, the Lorenz curve is a basic 
statistical tool, since it shows the pattern of income distribution and the 
share held by the different groups in the population. In addition, given 
the ease with which it can be calculated and interpreted, the Gini 
coefficient (derived from the Lorenz curve) has become one of the most 
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widely used indicators despite its limitations with regard to additive 
decomposition.  
Among traditional statistical indicators, the variation coefficient 
and the log variance are also very useful because they take advantage of 
all available distribution data. In addition, the Theil and Atkinson indices 
are highly recommended, given their usefulness for theoretical purposes 
and their emphasis on lower incomes in the measurement of inequality. 
As far as the comparability of findings among these indicators in 
concerned, it should be noted that they are all ordinal in nature, they 
show different ranges of variation, and they meet different criteria; hence 
the values obtained are not comparable. Moreover, since they all measure 
only partial aspects of inequality, the results they generate are normally 
organized differently. Consequently, a definitive ranking for a given 
group of distributions can only be established if the group is kept 
constant regardless of the index used. Inequality indices should therefore 
be used to complement each other and an overall analysis should be made 
of all the results. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the values of a single index are 
comparable between different populations, but only as ordinal figures; in 
other words, they only show where greater or lesser inequality exists, but 
not the magnitude of the differences. 
(b) Measuring income concentration and poverty 
A number of different tools can be used to measure income 
concentration, each of which has certain advantages and disadvantages. 
One simple method is to estimate the percentage of the population whose 
income is below the average or is a fraction of the average. The higher this 
percentage, the greater the difference between the higher and lower 
values of the distribution or, in other words, the greater the inequality of 
the distribution. 
Some countries, particularly in Western Europe, regularly use this 
type of indicator to gauge relative poverty. As was noted at the beginning 
of this chapter, the term "relative poverty" refers to the notion that people 
in a given society are disadvantaged if they cannot afford certain goods 
that are considered basic in that society. For example, in highly developed 
countries, people might be classified as deprived if they cannot afford a 
television set, even though they have satisfied their minimum food and 
housing needs. This approach makes it almost impossible to establish a 
"poverty line" similar to the one used in the traditional, or normative, 
approach to poverty measurement, not only because of the difficulties 
involved in defining the types, amounts and prices of items to be 
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considered, but also because the threshold has to be changed from time to 
time to reflect changes in living standards. Bearing this in mind, some 
fraction of average income might reasonably be used as a relative poverty 
line. This figure typically ranges between 40% and 60% of income, 
represented as either the mean or the median distribution. 
Nevertheless, there are several practical drawbacks to this method 
of measuring relative poverty, two of which will be referred to here. 
There is the highly arbitrary choice involved in defining the income-level 
indicator (mean or median) and the respective cut-off fraction, and the 
fact that the poverty line has an elasticity of one with regard to mean 
income. Nevertheless, these difficulties aside, this approach underscores 
the strong interrelationship that exists between definitions and 
measurements of poverty and income distribution and the advantages of 
integrating the analysis of the two dimensions, as is the case in the present 
chapter. 
In order to gain a clearer picture of the implications of these 
methodological considerations with regard to Latin American countries, 
see table II.6, which contains figures on relative poverty. Note that the 
countries do not vary, with regard to relative poverty, to the same extent 
that they do with regard to absolute poverty, and that they are broadly in 
agreement with the distribution criteria. 
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Table II.6 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS 
HAVING INCOMES OF LESS THAN HALF THE MEDIAN INCOME LEVELS 
Country Year 50% of mean 50% of median 
Argentina a 1990 39.1 20.5 
 1999 44.2 21.4 
Bolivia 1989 b 44.1 20.6 
 1999 45.5 29.5 
Brazil 1990 53.9 26.6 
 1999 54.8 25.9 
Chile 1990 46.5 20.3 
 2000 46.4 20.3 
Colombia 1994 48.9 26.0 
 1999 46.6 21.8 
Costa Rica 1990 31.6 19.4 
 1999 36.1 20.7 
Ecuador c 1990 33.8 17.4 
 1999 42.0 18.8 
El Salvador 1995 38.4 22.0 
 1999 40.6 24.3 
Guatemala 1989 47.9 22.7 
 1998 49.5 21.7 
Honduras 1990 52.3 26.1 
 1999 46.4 25.7 
Mexico 1989 43.5 19.7 
 1998 43.1 22.9 
Nicaragua 1993 45.9 27.4 
 1998 45.9 26.7 
Panama 1991 46.4 24.1 
 1999 46.4 23.7 
Paraguay d 1990 33.4 16.4 
 1999 34.2 15.8 
Dominican Republic 1997 39.8 20.8 
Uruguay c 1990 36.8 17.4 
 1999 32.2 19.0 
Venezuela 1990 35.5 20.2 
 1999 38.6 21.6 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations from household surveys in the countries concerned. 
Note: The poverty levels reported here refer to the national level, except in the following cases: 
 a
 Greater Buenos Aires. b Eight main cities and El Alto. c Urban total. d Asunción metropolitan area. 
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Chapter III 
Employment 
By the late 1990s it had become more difficult to generate 
productive employment for a rapidly expanding labour force. As a result, 
both low-productivity occupation and open unemployment increased. 
This chapter examines the causes of the still-considerable growth rate of 
the economically active population (EAP), the difficulties related to its 
productive absorption in a context of slack economic growth and 
technological and administrative modernization, and the consequences of 
these trends, particularly the increases observed in tertiary- and informal-
sector employment, precarious employment and open unemployment.  
1. The labour supply 
In the 1990s the EAP increased at an average annual rate of 2.6%, 
which, though below the levels of previous decades, was still high 
enough to pose a major challenge in terms of job creation. This happened 
because the decline in EAP growth lagged behind the decline in overall 
population growth, the age structure of the region’s population shifted 
and women’s participation in the labour force increased.  
(a) The demographic transition and the EAP 
The population continued to expand at a high average annual rate 
in the 1990s (see table III.1). It should be recalled that between 1900 and 
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1950 the population grew at an average annual rate of 1.5%.1 Since then 
the rate of population growth, though high, has trended downward: 2.7% 
in the 1950s and 1960s, 2.4% in the 1970s, 2.1% in the 1980s and, as 
mentioned earlier, 1.7% in the 1990s. As a result, the population continued 
to grow in absolute terms: by 50 million in the 1950s, 65 million in the 
1960s, 74 million in the 1970s, 80 million in the 1980s and 70 million in the 
1990s (Bajraj and Chackiel, 1995, and Bravo and Rodríguez, 1993). 
Consequently, in the period 1950-1999 there was an exceptionally large 
population increase, from 159 million to 500 million, which generated an 
economic and social challenge of extraordinary magnitude. 
The situation varies from one country to another depending on 
how far the demographic transition has advanced. In the 1990s Bolivia 
and Haiti had high mortality and fertility rates, with average population 
growth of 2.1% per year. In countries at a more advanced stage of 
demographic transition mortality rates were lower but fertility rates 
remained high, generating population growth rates of 2.8%. In a number 
of other countries, including the most heavily populated ones, population 
growth had already peaked and begun to decline, since fertility had 
dropped to 1.9% per year. Lastly, there was a group of countries in which 
fertility rates had declined so far as to place average annual population 
growth as low as 1% (Bravo and Rodríguez, 1993).2 
(b) Age structure and the EAP 
A drop in the population’s growth rate does not immediately 
reduce the growth of the EAP because it has different impacts on different 
age groups. In effect, decreases in population growth are manifested most 
immediately and intensively in the under-15 age group. The growth rate 
of this group was 2.7% in the 1960s, but dropped to 1.7% in the 1970s, 
1.1% in the 1980s and 0.3% in the 1990s. The 15-to-64 age group has 
evolved very differently, however: in the 1960s its growth rate was 2.7%, 
like that of the under-15 group, but in the 1970s the rate rose to 2.9%. Not 
until the 1980s did it decline to 2.6%, later falling to 2.3% in the 1990s. In 
turn, the 65-and-over group maintained high growth rates in all four 
decades: 3.5% in the 1960s, 3.3% in the 1970s, 3% in the 1980s and 3.1% in 
the 1990s. In other words, in the 1990s the over-15 group grew much 
faster than the total population, boosting the increase in the EAP (see 
table III.1). This phenomenon becomes even clearer when each age 
                                                          
1  When the Spaniards arrived the region had a population of about 50 million. During the 
conquest this figure dropped to around 15 million, where it remained until the early 
nineteenth century. It then rose to 34 million in 1850, 75 million in 1900 and 159 million 
in 1950. 
2  See section 1(d). 
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group’s share of the total population is analysed: the decline in the 
growth rate of the under-15 group meant that this group declined as a 
percentage of the total population, from 40.4% in 1950 to 31.7% in 1999, 
while the 15-to-64 cohort increased its share from 56.1% to 62.9% and the 
65-and-over cohort, from 3.5% to 5.4%. While in the 1960s the 15-to-64 
cohort accounted for just 45% of the total increase in population, in the 
1990s it accounted for 80%, or 56 million of the additional 70 million 
people. This improved the economic dependency ratio but generated a 
huge challenge in terms of job creation (Chackiel, 1999). 
Table III.1 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN LABOUR MARKET AGGREGATES, 1990-1999 
(Millions of people and percentages) 
Description People (millions) Average annual growth rate 
(%) 
 1990 1999 1990-1994 1990-1999 
Total population 429.8 499.9 1.8 1.7 
 Urban 305.3 374.6 2.4 2.3 
 Rural 124.5 125.3 0.1 0.1 
Population under 15 years of age 155.2 160.2 0.4 0.3 
 Urban 102.8 112.2 1.1 1.0 
 Rural 52.4 48.0 -0.9 -1.0 
Working-age population 274.6 339.7 2.5 2.4 
 Urban 202.5 262.4 3.1 2.9 
 Rural 72.2 77.3 0.8 0.8 
Aged 15-64  254.6 313.2 2.4 2.3 
 Urban 188.0 242.2 3.0 2.9 
 Rural 66.6 71.0 0.7 0.7 
Aged 64 or over 20.0 26.5 3.2 3.1 
 Urban 14.5 20.2 3.8 3.7 
 Rural 5.6 6.3 1.5 1.4 
Economically active populationa 167.5 211.8 2.7 2.6 
 Urban 120.7 161.6 3.4 3.3 
 Rural 46.8 50.2 0.8 0.8 
Employed 159.8 193.7 2.4 2.2 
 Urban 114.1 144.2 2.9 2.6 
 Rural 45.8 49.5 1.0 0.9 
Unemployed 7.6 18.1 9.1 10.1 
 Urban 6.6 17.5 11.2 11.4 
 Rural 1.0 0.7 -9.4 -4.9 
Laid off 5.9 15.4 8.8 11.2 
 Urban 5.2 15.2 11.6 12.6 
 Rural 0.7 0.2 -27.4 -13.8 
Seeking work for first time 1.7 2.7 10.0 5.3 
 Urban 1.4 2.3 9.8 5.6 
 Rural 0.3 0.5 10.9 3.9 
Economically inactive populationa  107.1 127.8 2.1 2.0 
 Urban 81.8 100.7 2.5 2.3 
 Rural 25.4 27.1 0.8 0.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of estimates prepared by the Population Division of ECLAC - Latin 
American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) and special tabulations of data from household 
surveys conducted in the respective countries. 
a
 Aged 15 or over. 
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According to estimates, the annual growth rate of the 15-to-64 age 
group in the region will continue to trend downward, reaching 0.7% 
around 2020, while the rate of the 65-and-over group will climb to 3.5% 
and that of the under-15 group will be negative. In 2020 the share 
represented by each age group will therefore be as follows: under 15, 
23.7%; 15 to 64, 66.6%; and 65 or over, 9.7%. For subsequent decades, 
these projections indicate that the share of the 15-to-64 age group out of 
the total will change little, while that of the 65-and-over group will 
increase slightly and that of the under-15 group will decline somewhat.  
For example, in Uruguay, which is at a more advanced stage of 
demographic transition than the rest of the region, the proportion 
represented by the 15-to-64 group has varied by only a fraction of a 
percentage point since 1950 (Bajraj and Chackiel, 1995). 
(c) Women’s participation 
The participation rate, or the proportion of the working-age 
population incorporated into the labour force, is another factor that 
influences the size of the EAP. In the 1990s the total participation rate 
increased from 61% to 62.4%. This increase took place in urban areas and, 
especially, in the female workforce, which increased from 37.9% to 42% of 
the total (see table III.2). 
Table III.2 
LATIN AMERICA: RATES OF PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, 
BY SEX AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE (URBAN OR RURAL),a 1990-1999  
(Percentages) 
 Nationwide total Urban total Rural total 
Description 1990 1999 1990 1999 1990 1999 
Participation rate b 61.0 62.4 59.6 61.6 64.8 64.9 
 Men 84.9 83.6 81.4 81.0 93.7 91.5 
 Women 37.9 42.0 39.5 43.7 33.1 35.8 
Employment rate c 58.2 57.0 56.4 55.0 63.4 64.0 
 Men 81.2 77.6 77.1 73.5 91.8 90.4 
 Women 36.0 37.3 37.3 37.9 32.2 35.2 
Unemployment rate 4.6 8.6 5.5 10.8 2.2 1.3 
 Men 4.3 7.2 5.4 9.4 2.0 1.2 
 Women 5.1 11.2 5.7 13.3 2.9 1.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of estimates prepared by the Population Division of ECLAC - Latin 
American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) and special tabulations of data from household 
surveys conducted in the respective countries. 
a
 Aged 15 or over. 
b
 Economically active population as a proportion of the working-age population. 
c
 Employed population as a proportion of the working-age population. 
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The rate of women’s participation in the urban EAP increased most 
in the 25-to-49 age group and among women with higher levels of 
education. In general, the participation rate increases in step with the 
level of formal education: the rate is only 36% among women with 
between 0 and 3 years of schooling and 44% among those with 4 to  
6 years of schooling, but rises to 54% among those with 10 to 12 years and 
71% among those with 13 or more years. 
The influence of education on women’s economic participation is 
much more marked in countries with more highly developed economies. 
In those countries women with little education have very low 
participation rates. For example, in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay about 
20% of women with 0 to 3 years of schooling work, whereas the figure is 
much higher in less developed countries such as Bolivia, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua. This difference probably reflects the fact that 
the higher a country’s level of economic and educational development, 
the harder it is for women with little education to find employment 
because requirements in terms of work skills and formal education are 
more exacting. In addition, as the proportion of more highly educated 
women rises, less qualified women progressively lose their ability to 
compete. Furthermore, lack of access to childcare facilities, which is a 
more frequent problem among women with less schooling, represents yet 
another obstacle to their participation in the labour market. 
Over the long term the process of demographic transition will help 
to reduce the labour supply and will therefore ease the pressure for job 
creation. The same cannot be said of the participation rate, however, since 
it will probably continue to increase quickly as more and more women 
join the workforce. In the 1990s the female EAP grew at an annual rate of 
3.8%, while the male EAP expanded by 2.3%. As a result, by the end of the 
decade the proportion of the working-age female population that 
participated in the labour market approached or exceeded 50% and, in 
some cases, the absolute increase in women’s employment was similar to 
or higher than the increase in men’s employment. The rate of female 
participation will therefore help to keep the EAP growth rate high and 
will exert expansionary pressure on the overall labour supply. 
(d) The demographic transition and EAP growth 
As shown in table III.3, the Latin American countries are at 
different stages of demographic transition (see ECLAC, 2000b, p. 67). One 
group of countries consists of those3 that were at an early or moderate 
stage of demographic transition in the 1990s. These countries recorded 
                                                          
3  Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. 
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rapid growth in the total population and even faster growth in the 
working-age population (3.2%), which increased the share of the working-
age population out of the total. This increase, together with a 1.4% rise in 
the workforce participation rate, led to annual EAP growth of 3.5% (2.9% 
for men and 5% for women). 
Table III.3 
LATIN AMERICA: LABOUR FORCE, BY STAGE OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION  
IN THE COUNTRIES, 1990-1999 
(Percentages) 
 
Growth of the 
working-age 
population a 
Variation in the overall 
participation rate b 
Growth of the economically 
active population a 
Stage of transition  Total Total Men Women Total Men Women 
Early and moderate 
transition c 
3.3 1.1 -2.7 4.6 3.5 2.9 4.9 
 3.2 1.4 -2.3 4.9 3.5 2.9 5.0 
 Bolivia 2.7 2.0 -1.2 4.8 3.0 2.6 4.0 
 El Salvador 3.4 0.2 -5.5 4.8 3.4 2.8 4.9 
 Guatemala 3.1 2.5 -0.8 6.0 3.6 2.9 5.9 
 Honduras 3.5 1.6 -3.7 6.7 3.8 3.1 6.2 
 Nicaragua 3.8 -0.8 -3.5 1.8 3.6 3.4 4.2 
 Paraguay 3.1 1.0 -1.4 3.3 3.3 2.9 4.3 
Full transition c 2.6 2.4 -0.3 5.2 3.0 2.5 4.3 
 2.5 1.2 -1.8 4.2 2.8 2.3 3.8 
 Brazil 2.4 -0.1 -3.1 3.1 2.3 1.9 3.2 
 Colombia 2.3 3.2 0.8 5.4 2.9 2.4 3.8 
 Costa Rica 2.8 5.3 3.6 7.1 3.8 3.3 5.4 
 Ecuador 3.0 2.5 -1.0 6.1 3.5 2.8 5.2 
 Mexico 2.6 2.1 -1.3 5.5 3.0 2.4 4.5 
 Panama 2.4 2.7 0.4 5.3 2.9 2.4 4.2 
 Peru 2.5 1.7 -0.3 4.0 2.8 2.4 3.7 
 Dominican Republic 2.4 1.9 -0.7 4.7 2.8 2.3 3.8 
 Venezuela 2.8 2.3 -0.9 5.5 3.3 2.7 4.6 
Advanced transition c 1.4 2.2 0.3 4.0 1.9 1.5 2.7 
 1.7 1.7 0.0 3.3 2.1 1.7 2.8 
 Argentina 1.7 1.0 -0.3 2.2 1.9 1.7 2.3 
 Chile 1.7 3.5 0.7 6.1 2.5 1.9 3.9 
 Uruguay 0.8 2.2 0.4 3.8 1.2 0.9 1.8 
Simple average 2.6 1.9 -1.0 4.8 3.0 2.5 4.2 
Weighted average 2.5 1.3 -1.5 4.1 2.8 2.3 3.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of population projections prepared by the Population Division of ECLAC - 
Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE). 
a
 Annual growth rate.  
b
 Difference in percentage points between the overall participation rates recorded in 1990 and 1999. 
c
 The shaded figures are simple averages. The figures that follow are weighted averages. 
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A second group of countries4 had reached a more advanced stage 
of demographic transition and had experienced a significant decline in 
population growth. This reduced the growth of the working-age 
population to 2.5%. This rate, combined with a 1.2% increase in workforce 
participation, translated into an annual EAP growth rate of 2.8% (2.3% for 
men and 3.8% for women). 
Lastly, the countries5 that are now in the final phase of 
demographic transition experienced a lengthy and considerable decline in 
their population growth rates, and the effects of this phenomenon are 
already fully evident. The annual growth rate of the working-age 
population (1.7%) offset the rapid growth in workforce participation 
(1.7%) and generated the region’s lowest rate of EAP expansion, at 2.1% 
(1.7% for men and 2.8% for women). 
These differences in rates of EAP expansion generated different 
levels of demand for job creation. 
(e) Labour migration 
The impact of migration on EAP growth is another point that 
warrants discussion. The acknowledged inability of agricultural activity 
to absorb the expansion of the rural labour force helps to swell migration 
from the countryside to the cities and, as a result, to speed the rate of  
non-agricultural EAP growth. The agricultural EAP grew at an annual 
rate of just 0.8%, while the non-agricultural EAP expanded by 3.3%. 
In addition, in recent decades international migration, especially to 
the United States, has become much more significant, serving as an escape 
route from labour market difficulties. Temporary, seasonal or cyclical 
mobility and intraregional migration also became more common from the 
1960s onward. In any event, it is clear that most of the Latin American 
countries, particularly those in South America, have not experienced mass 
emigration on a scale that could significantly alleviate the problem of 
productive absorption of the labour force, as it did in the European 
countries between 1850 and 1914. 
2. Productive employment of the labour force 
The challenge of absorbing a rapidly growing labour force was 
compounded by an economic recession in the 1980s and low rates of 
                                                          
4  Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and 
Venezuela. 
5  Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. 
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economic expansion in the 1990s. This led to increases in both low-
productivity employment and open unemployment. 
(a) The EAP, the employed EAP and labour productivity in the 
1990s 
The need to employ the labour force in a productive manner can be 
broken down into three different components: the need to supply the 
labour force with jobs, the need to increase its average productivity and 
the need to extend that increase to the entire labour force in order to even 
out the existing disparities within and between sectors and segments of 
production. This last component will be discussed later. With respect to 
the first two, it is undoubtedly desirable for the growth rate of the 
employed EAP to be as close as possible to that of the EAP as a whole. It 
is also desirable for GDP growth to substantially exceed the growth of the 
employed EAP so that the average productivity of the labour force will 
rise. An increase in employment without a simultaneous and generalized 
increase in productivity results in spurious labour absorption, where 
productivity gains are concentrated in just a few segments or sectors. This 
only serves to consolidate structural disparities and does not help to 
reduce poverty. 
In the 1980s the annual growth of regional GDP amounted to 1%, 
while that of the EAP and the employed EAP was almost 3%. Although a 
large proportion of the workforce found employment, much of it was in 
low-productivity jobs, which translated into a decline in average labour 
productivity. Thus, in the 1990s the countries inherited the onerous task 
of reversing this deterioration. 
These trends improved somewhat in the 1990s, since GDP 
expanded at an annual rate of 3.2%, while the EAP grew by 2.6% and 
employment, by only 2.2%. The decade began auspiciously, but between 
1994 and 1997 the growth rates of GDP and employment dropped to 3.3% 
and 2.3%, respectively, then continued to trend downward between 1997 
and 1999, reaching 1.3% and 1.6% (see figures III.1 and III.2). On the 
positive side, average labour productivity increased, albeit modestly, with 
respect to its level in the 1980s. On the negative side, even though EAP 
growth was slower, employment growth fell 0.4% below its level of the 
1980s and, at 1.6%, again overtook GDP growth (1.3%), thereby reducing 
average labour productivity and increasing spurious absorption. 
Moreover, the gap between the EAP and the employed EAP widened 
(0.8%), even though EAP growth had slowed to 2.4%. As a result, the 
economies’ performance in the 1990s did not appreciably offset the 
negative trends of the previous decade. 
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Figure III.1 



























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of estimates prepared by the Population Division of ECLAC - Latin 
American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) and special tabulations of data from household 
surveys conducted in the respective countries. 
a
 WAP: working-age population (aged 15 or over). 
b
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Figure III.2 
LATIN AMERICA: TOTAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)  
AND EMPLOYMENT, 1990-1999 











Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a EAP: economically active population (aged 15 or over). 
 
(b) Weak growth in urban areas 
The slackness of economic growth in Latin America in the 1990s  
is particularly evident from an examination of patterns in the  
non-agricultural labour force. A look at the weighted average for  
20 countries (see table III.4) shows that regional GDP expanded by an 
average annual rate of 3.3% and the employed EAP, by 2.6%. As a result, 
during the decade productivity increased by a modest 0.5% per year, 
while employment growth trailed EAP growth by 0.7%. As mentioned 
earlier, the agricultural EAP increased by only 0.8%. Part of the increase 
was absorbed by activities in this sector, but responsibility for the rest of 
the rural population fell, through the channel of migration, on productive 
activities in urban areas. The average productivity of non-agricultural 
activities grew even more slowly than that of total activities (0.5%, 
compared to 1%) and the capacity of those activities to meet the demand 
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Table III.4 
LATIN AMERICA: URBAN OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY, 1990-1999 
(Annual growth rates) 
  Urban economically active populationb  
Country Gross domestic producta 
product a 
Total Employed Productivity 
Argentina c 4.6 2.3 1.2 3.4 
Bolivia d 4.7 4.9 5.0 -0.3 
Brazil 2.3 3.1 2.1 0.2 
Chile 6.1 3.0 2.7 3.4 
Colombia 3.8 3.8 2.3 1.4 
Costa Rica 5.0 4.7 4.5 0.4 
Cuba -1.3 2.1 2.0 -3.3 
Ecuador d 2.5 4.8 3.6 -1.1 
El Salvador 4.6 4.4 4.3 0.4 
Guatemala 4.5 4.0 3.9 0.6 
Haiti -1.8 4.7 5.4 -6.8 
Honduras 3.6 5.4 5.5 -1.8 
Mexico 2.9 3.7 3.6 -0.7 
Nicaragua 2.5 4.1 4.1 -1.5 
Panama 4.6 3.7 4.4 0.2 
Paraguay e 2.1 4.5 4.1 -1.9 
Peru 4.7 3.5 3.1 1.6 
Dominican Republic 5.9 3.9 4.6 1.2 
Uruguay d 2.9 1.5 1.2 1.8 
Venezuela 1.3 3.6 3.0 -1.7 
Latin America  3.1 3.3 2.6 0.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures and special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted 
in the respective countries. 
a
 Non-agricultural output. 
b
 The years taken into account are as follows: Argentina, 1990 and 1999; Bolivia, 1989 and 1999; Brazil, 1993 and 
1999; Chile, 1990 and 1998; Colombia, 1991 and 1999; Costa Rica, 1990 and 1999; Ecuador, 1990 and 1999; El 
Salvador, 1990 and 1999; Guatemala, 1989 and 1999; Haiti, 1990 and 1999; Honduras, 1990 and 1999; Mexico, 
1989 and 1998; Nicaragua, 1990 and 1998; Panama, 1989 and 1999; Paraguay, 1990 and 1999; Dominican 
Republic, 1990 and 1997; Uruguay, 1990 and 1999; and Venezuela, 1990 and 1999. These are years for which 
employment data based on household surveys were available. 
c
 Estimates of the economically active population and employment are for greater Buenos Aires. 
d
 Estimates of the economically active population and employment are for total urban areas. 
e
 Estimates of the economically active population and employment are for Asunción and the Central Department. 
These processes reveal the opposite effects of two powerful trends. 
On the one hand, the slower growth of the working-age population 
reduces EAP growth and eases the pressure to generate employment. On 
the other hand, agricultural activities still do not provide enough 
employment for the rural labour force. This leads to migration, which 
increases the non-agricultural EAP and intensifies the need for 
employment in this sector. Almost all the Latin American countries 
recorded significant growth in their non-agricultural EAP, in contrast to 
the situation in a number of English-speaking Caribbean countries, for 
example, where rural-to-urban migration has been much more limited. 
These general trends varied from one country to another within the 
region. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador all had labour 
absorption shortfalls (measured as the difference between the growth of 
the non-agricultural EAP and that of the non-agricultural employed EAP) 
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of 1% or more, which pointed to serious job creation problems. In the 
other countries the rate of urban job creation was similar to the increase in 
non-agricultural EAP, even where this population group expanded at an 
annual rate of 4% or more.6 
With regard to trends in the productivity of non-agricultural 
labour, Argentina and Chile registered an appreciable rise in the 
corresponding annual growth rate (3.4%). Nine other countries 
experienced smaller increases (including Brazil, with 0.2%, and Uruguay, 
with 1.8%), while the remaining nine posted negative rates. 
In Chile the 3.4% growth in productivity was combined with a non-
agricultural job creation rate that was only 0.3% lower than the rate of 
increase of the EAP. Argentina’s high rate of productivity growth (3.4%) 
was offset by a negative job creation rate (-1.1%). In other countries 
modest gains in productivity were accompanied by insufficient job 
creation: in Brazil, for example, productivity grew by only 0.2% and 
absorption, by -1%, while in Colombia the figures were 1.4% and -1.5%, 
respectively. The trend in the other countries was a relatively high rate of 
job creation, close to the increase in the non-agricultural EAP, 
accompanied by very slight or negative productivity growth. 
Since rural-to-urban migration will undoubtedly persist in many 
countries in the coming years, the growth rate of the urban EAP will 
continue to be high. In nine countries the urban EAP grew at a rate of 4% 
or higher as a result of the combined effects of growth in the working-age 
population and in female participation, which were further exacerbated 
by the persistence of rural-to-urban migration (see table III.4). Under 
these conditions, sufficient productive employment in non-agricultural 
activities cannot be created unless GDP growth is strong. 
3. Tertiarization of the labour force 
(a) Increased employment in commerce and services 
The economic doldrums of the 1990s were accompanied by 
sweeping changes in the employment structure. The key aspects of this 
transformation were sectoral changes in employment, principally a 
continued decline in the relative importance of the primary and 
secondary sectors, and an increase in the proportion of jobs created in 
commerce and services. 
                                                          
6  Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. 
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Between 1990 and 1999 agricultural employment expanded at an 
annual average rate of 0.7%, which raised its absolute volume from  
37.2 million to 39.8 million. However, this increase was not enough to 
prevent it from declining as a proportion of total employment, from 23.3% 
to 20.5% (see table III.5). This spurred migration to the cities and 
increased the number of non-agricultural jobs in rural areas. 
Table III.5 
LATIN AMERICA: SELECTED FEATURES OF THE EMPLOYED POPULATION,a  
1990-1999 
(Thousands of people and percentages) 
  People (thousands) Structure (percentages) 
Description  1990 1999 1990 1999 
Employed      
 Age (in years) 159 841 193 714 100.0 100.0 
 15 - 24  42 741 45 275 26.7 23.4 
 25 - 44  79 612 96 042 49.8 49.6 
 45 - 59  27 724 38 216 17.3 19.7 
 60 and over  9 764 14 181 6.1 7.3 
 Years of schooling 159 841 193 714 100.0 100.0 
 0 - 5  73 387 72 505 45.9 37.4 
 6 - 9  41 366 59 066 25.9 30.5 
 10 - 12  22 046 37 783 13.8 19.5 
 13 or more  23 043 24 361 14.4 12.6 
 Segment of activity 159 841 193 714 100.0 100.0 
 Agriculture 37 227 39 789 23.3 20.5 
 Industry 26 911 29 065 16.8 15.0 
 Construction 9 499 12 284 5.9 6.3 
 Transport and communications 7 159 9 839 4.5 5.1 
 Commerce 27 747 36 968 17.4 19.1 
 Finance 4 581 8 932 2.9 4.6 
 Social services 30 325 36 695 19.0 18.9 
 Personal services 8 131 9 960 5.1 5.1 
 Domestic services 7 886 9 754 4.9 5.0 
 Not classified  374 429 0.2 0.2 
Size of establishment b 100 116 113 051 100.0 100.0 
(owners and employees)     
 1 - 5  26 538 34 621 30.7 32.3 
 6 - 10  9 242 11 687 10.7 10.9 
 11 - 49  28 267 31 572 32.7 29.4 
 50 or more 22 514 29 352 26.0 27.4 
 Not classified 13 554 5 818 - - 
Secondary income earners c 71 404 82 393 44.7 42.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of estimates prepared by the Population Division of ECLAC - Latin 
American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) and special tabulations of data from household 
surveys conducted in the respective countries. 
a
 Aged 15 or over. 
b
 By number of people employed. Percentage structure excludes segments not classified. 
c
 Refers to employed people whose income is lower than that of the household’s primary breadwinner. 
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Notwithstanding the increase in the urban labour supply, the 
growth of industrial employment fell below the average rate of 
employment growth. As a result, its share of total employment dropped 
from 16.8% to 15%, while employment in construction rose from 5.9% to 
6.3% of the total. The combined share of the two sectors thus fell from 
22.7% to 21.3%. Accordingly, although another 4.7 million people found 
employment in the production of primary and secondary goods, their 
relative share of total employment declined from 46% to 41.8%. 
By contrast, employment in commerce increased from 17.4% of 
total employment in 1990 to 19.1% in 1999, thanks to the creation of  
9.2 million jobs, which was double the number of jobs created in the 
primary and secondary sectors combined. The share of services out of the 
total increased from 31.9% to 33.6% over the same period, absorbing  
14.4 million people. Within services, the largest absolute increase took 
place in social services, which absorbed 6.3 million, while employment in 
financial services also increased at a very high annual rate, almost 
doubling the number of people employed in this segment even though it 
is still quite small in relative terms. Personal and domestic services 
remained stable as a proportion of the labour force, although both 
increased in absolute terms, by a total of 3.2 million people. Lastly, 
employment in transport and communications increased from 4.5% to 5% 
of the total, absorbing 2.7 million workers. 
In conclusion, of the 33.8 million new jobs created during the 
decade, agriculture accounted for 7%; industry, 6.5%; construction, 8.3%; 
transport and communications, 8%; commerce, 27.2%; and services, 
42.9%. The services portion can be broken down as follows: financial 
services, 13%; social services, 18.9%; personal services, 5.3%; and domestic 
services, 5.7%. Thus, more than 78% of the new jobs created in the 1990s 
were in the tertiary sector, with the result that this sector came to 
represent an even bigger proportion of the employment structure. 
As a result of these developments, in 1999 the sectoral distribution 
of the Latin American workforce was as follows: agriculture, 20.5%; 
industry and construction, 21.3%; transport and communications, 5.1%; 
commerce, 19.1%; and services, 33.6%. In turn, the services workforce was 
divided as follows: financial services, 4.6%; social services, 18.9%; 
personal services, 5.1%; and domestic services, 5%. 
The countries exhibit no major differences with regard to the 
decline in the relative importance of employment in goods-producing 
sectors. The agricultural sector shrank in all the countries and the 
industrial sector contracted in most of them. The biggest downturns in 
industry were seen in countries with a large industrial base, such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela. In Mexico 
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the opposite occurred, since the industrial sector expanded. Another way 
to view this process is to examine trends in manufacturing employment, 
which declined more in countries with higher per capita GDP and higher 
rates of GDP growth (ECLAC, 2001b, chapter VI). 
(b) Productive absorption and sectors producing tradable and 
non-tradable goods 
It is particularly interesting to review employment trends in sectors 
that produce tradable and non-tradable goods and services. In most Latin 
American countries employment expanded faster in sectors that produce 
non-tradable goods and services than in tradable goods-producing 
sectors, except in Brazil and Peru, where the two sectors grew at similar 
rates, and in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Venezuela,  
where employment in tradables sectors grew faster (see table III.6).7 In 
addition, the two sectors’ respective capacities to increase productivity 
and generate employment tend to evolve separately. In general, the 
tradables sector absorbs little labour but achieves productivity gains. By 
contrast, the non-tradables sector usually has a greater capacity to 
generate employment, but at the cost of nil or negative rates of 
productivity growth. 
The low rate of job creation in the tradables sector was evident even 
in those countries where the sector’s output increased relatively quickly. 
In Argentina, for example, the GDP of the tradables sector expanded at an 
annual rate of 3.6%, while the variation in total employment was -1.3%. In 
Brazil these figures were 2.4% and 0.2%, respectively; in Chile, 5.6% and  
-0.4%; in Colombia, 1.7% and -0.1%; in Costa Rica, 5.5% and 1.3%; in 
Mexico, 3.4% and 1.7%; in Panama, 3% and -0.6%; in Uruguay, 1.1% and  
-1.1%; and in Venezuela, 2.7% and 0.7% (see table III.7). In some smaller 
and less developed countries, however, the tradables sector diverged 
from this trend. In El Salvador employment in this sector grew by 3.6%, 
while total employment expanded by 3.5%. In Honduras employment in 
tradables expanded by 3.2% and total employment, by 2.9%; in Nicaragua 
these figures were 4.3% and 3.9%, respectively. This atypical behaviour 
can be attributed to the development of the maquila industry, stimulated 
by the proximity of the United States market. 
 
                                                          
7  In a number of countries some non-tradable services, such as segments of the tourism 
sector, may be significant. However, since most of the countries’ national accounts 
estimates do not identify the amounts corresponding to these segments, growth rates in 
the tradables sector may be to some extent underestimated, in cases where they are 
representative and have expanded rapidly. 
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Table III.6 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) IN THE 1990s 
  Annual variation 
 Tradable and non-tradable sectors 
 
GDP GDP goods and 
services a Tradable sectors b Non-tradable sectors c 
  1991-1999 1991-1999 1991-1999 1991-1999 
Argentina 4.5 4.5 3.6 4.8 
   (3.4) (2.5) 
Bolivia 4.1 4.4 3.4 5.1 
   (3.9) (3.1) 
Brazil 2.9 2.3 2.4 2.3 
   (2.2) (1.9) 
Chile 6.3 6.0 5.6 6.3 
   (4.7) (3.7) 
Colombia 3.1 3.4 1.7 4.3 
   (1.1) (6.2) 
Costa Rica  5.0 4.9 5.5 4.5 
   (6.3) (3.0) 
Cuba -1.5 -1.5 0.4 -3.0 
   (1.0) -(0.3) 
Ecuador 2.3 2.5 3.3 1.8 
   (4.1) -(0.2) 
El Salvador 4.7 4.1 3.6 4.4 
   (5.1) (2.4) 
Guatemala 4.2 4.2 3.0 4.7 
   (2.8) (4.1) 
Haiti -1.4 -1.6 -4.0 0.2 
   -(6.9) (1.9) 
Honduras 3.2 3.4 3.2 3.4 
   (4.0) (1.3) 
Mexico 2.8 2.8 3.4 2.6 
   (3.9) (1.6) 
Nicaragua 3.4 3.4 4.3 2.5 
   (1.6) -(1.4) 
Panama 4.2 4.4 3.0 4.7 
   (3.4) (2.3) 
Paraguay 2.3 2.3 2.0 2.5 
   (0.8) (0.1) 
Peru 4.9 4.8 4.9 4.8 
   (4.0) (2.6) 
Dominican Republic  5.6 5.6 3.9 6.4 
   (4.4) (3.1) 
Uruguay 3.7 3.0 1.1 3.7 
   (0.1) (1.5) 
Venezuela 2.1 1.2 2.7 0.4 
   (0.9) (0.7) 
Total 3.3 3.0 2.9 3.0 
   (2.8) (2.1) 
Source: ECLAC, regressions on the basis of official figures provided by the countries. 
a
 The total is the sum of the output generated by the tradable goods- and services-producing sector and 
that generated by the non-tradable goods- and services-producing sector. It is therefore not the same as 
gross domestic product, since it does not include adjustments for banking services, value-added taxes or 
import duties. 
b
 The figures shown in brackets are for the manufacturing industry. 
c
 The figures shown in brackets are for social, community and personal services. 
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Table III.7 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): TOTAL AND WAGE EMPLOYMENT, 1990-1999 
(Annual rates of variation) 
 Total Total employment Waged employment a 










 1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 1990-1999 
Costa Rica 3.7 1.3 5.2 4.5 3.2 5.2 
  (2.1) (3.7)  (2.9) (3.5) 
El Salvador d 4.3 3.5 4.6 4.8 4.0 5.1 
  (4.1) (2.2)  (5.2) (3.7) 
Guatemala 3.6 2.2 5.6 2.7 2.9 2.6 
  (6.0) (2.3)  (4.4) -(0.3) 
Honduras 3.9 2.9 5.2 3.0 2.3 3.4 
  (6.6) (4.4)  (7.3) (3.8) 
Mexico 3.0 1.7 3.9 2.6 1.7 2.1 
  (4.0) (4.6)  (3.4) (3.9) 
Nicaragua 3.5 3.9 3.3 3.6 5.8 2.5 
  (1.2) (1.6)  (4.0) (3.2) 
Panama 3.5 -0.6 5.6 4.1 1.7 4.8 
  (3.5) (2.7)  (3.5) (2.4) 
Subtotal  
(weighted average) 
3.2 1.8 4.1 2.8 2.0 2.7 
 
 
(4.1) (4.3)  (3.6) (3.6) 
Argentina d 1.2 -1.3 1.7 1.6 -1.4 2.5 
  -(1.5) (2.2)  -(1.6) (2.4) 
Bolivia d 5.0 7.6 4.4 3.8 3.6 3.9 
  (8.1) -(0.9)  (4.9) (1.5) 
Brazil 1.6 0.2 2.4 1.7 0.2 2.5 
  (0.3) (2.4)  (0.2) (2.8) 
Chile 2.3 -0.4 3.6 2.8 -0.1 4.3 
  -(0.2) (4.6)  (0.0) (6.0) 
Colombia 1.7 -0.1 2.8 1.2 0.2 1.9 
  -(0.4) (3.1)  -(0.4) (2.1) 
Ecuador d 3.6 2.2 4.1 3.5 1.6 4.1 
  (1.4) (4.2)  (0.6) (3.1) 
Paraguay e 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.7 4.7 4.7 
  (4.5) (3.3)  (5.6) (3.5) 
Uruguay d 1.2 -1.1 1.8 1.5 -0.3 2.0 
  -(1.8) (1.0)  -(2.0) (1.1) 
Venezuela 2.7 0.7 3.4 1.5 0.1 2.0 
  (1.6) (2.5)  -(0.3) (1.3) 
Subtotal  
(weighted average) 
1.8 0.2 2.6 1.8 0.1 2.5 
  (0.2) (2.5)  -(0.1) (2.6) 
Total (weighted average) 2.2 0.8 3.0 2.1 0.7 2.6 
 
 (1.5) (2.9)  (0.9) (2.9) 
Source: ECLAC, estimates based on special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a
 Figures are for wage earners between the ages of 25 and 59, working 20 hours or more per week. 
b
 The figures in brackets refer to the manufacturing industry. 
c
 The figures in brackets refer to government, social, community and personal services. 
d
 Total for urban areas. 
e
 Asunción and the Central Department. 
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In Mexico technology-intensive production was combined with the 
development of the maquila industry. Manufacturing output expanded at 
an annual rate of 3.9% but productivity dropped (-0.1%), since total 
employment increased by 4%. The productivity of wage employment 
alone increased at a positive, albeit modest, rate (0.5%), since this type of 
employment grew more slowly (3.4%). The combination of considerable 
labour absorption and slight or negative productivity growth was 
attributable to the growing importance of the maquila sector. In 1989 this 
sector had accounted for just over 10% of wage employment in 
manufacturing, but it expanded so quickly (at an average annual rate of 
10.4%) that by 1998 it represented almost 19% of manufacturing 
employment. Maquila accounted for 46% of all new jobs in the 
manufacturing sector over this period. At the same time, employment in 
non-maquila manufacturing expanded much more slowly (2%), with the 
result that this subsector’s share of total wage employment in 
manufacturing slid from almost 90% in 1989 to 81% in 1998. 
It can therefore be concluded that although the upturn in the 
production of tradable goods has helped to drive economic growth and 
increase productivity, its effects on employment have been weak except in 
countries with a growing maquila sector (Mexico and some of the Central 
American and Caribbean countries). At the same time, although the 
maquila industry generates employment, it has shown little or no capacity 
to increase productivity, and must therefore be ruled out as the basis of a 
regional strategy for economic growth and the creation of productive 
employment. 
In general, the responsibility for generating employment has fallen 
on the non-tradables sector, although in Argentina, Colombia and 
Uruguay this sector also generated too few jobs, with the inevitable result 
that open unemployment went up. Also, in a number of countries 
tradable services, such as transport and certain tourism segments, 
expanded briskly and had significant effects on output and employment. 
This asymmetry between the tradables and non-tradables sectors, 
with the exceptions mentioned above, not only accentuated the 
heterogeneity of the Latin American economies but also had an impact on 
the labour market. Furthermore, it has been exacerbated by the fact that 
the gap between the incomes of wage earners with higher and lower 
levels of schooling has tended to widen. 
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4. Modernization and informalization of the labour 
force 
Another key feature of the transformation of the employment 
structure in the 1990s was the growing contrast between the few branches 
and sectors in which productivity grew strongly and the other branches 
and sectors the majority in which productivity increased only slightly 
or not at all. In other words, the modernization of certain occupations 
took place alongside an increasingly marked informalization of the 
workforce. 
In conditions of slack or modest economic growth, a large part of 
the workforce faces the dilemma of remaining unemployed or accepting 
employment in low-productivity occupations. Since there is little 
unemployment protection in Latin America, most workers prefer to avoid 
unemployment by resorting to low-productivity jobs. This was the 
pattern in the 1980s and also in the 1990s, although in the latter decade 
open unemployment also rose. 
Much debate has surrounded the question of whether or not the 
tertiarization of the employment structure is conducive to modernization. 
The answer to this depends on whether the tertiarization derives from 
economic growth or, on the contrary, from a lack of momentum in the 
economy, which drives workers to seek employment in commerce and 
services. The two processes exist side by side in Latin America, but 
informalization prevails over modernization. 
In effect, the 1990s were a time of intensive tertiarization, when 66% 
of all new jobs in urban areas were generated in the informal sector (see 
table III.8; the breakdown by country is given in tables A.6 and A.7 of the 
statistical appendix). The proportion of unskilled own-account workers in 
commerce and services displayed the largest increase (24.2%), followed 
by increases in the shares of workers (employers and employees) in 
microenterprises (18.2%), domestic workers (9.4%) and unskilled  
own-account workers in industry and construction (8.1%) and in primary 
occupations (6%).8 Most of these new jobs were of low quality, evincing 
the urban economy’s poor capacity to raise average labour productivity. 
This conclusion holds true for most of the 17 countries considered, 
particularly the most heavily populated ones, such as Brazil, Colombia 
and Mexico. In Argentina and Chile, by contrast, most new jobs were in 
                                                          
8  In the formal sector, which generated 34.1% of all new jobs, the biggest increases in 
employment were for wage- or salary-earning professionals and technicians (20.1%), 
entrepreneurs and independent professionals and technicians (6.5%), wage or salary 
earners other than professionals and technicians (5.4%) and public-sector employees 
(2.1%). 
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the formal sector, although Argentina also recorded a substantial increase 
in open unemployment. 
As a result of these patterns, informal employment expanded from 
41% of the total in 1990 to 46.3% in 1999 (see table III.8). The contraction of 
the formal sector reflected a decline in the proportion of private-sector 
employees other than professionals and technicians, from 35.9% to 29.1%, 
and in the proportion of public-sector employees, from 16% of the labour 
force in 1990 to 12.9% in 1999. These relative decreases were not fully offset 
by the increases observed in the share of professionals and technicians 
working in the private sector (from 4.7% to 7.8%) and in that of employers 
and independent professionals and technicians (from 3.8% to 4.3%). 
Table III.8 
LATIN AMERICA: DISTRIBUTION OF THE EMPLOYED POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS, 
BY LABOUR MARKET SEGMENT AND LABOUR STATUS, 1990-1999 
(Percentages of the total employed population in urban areas  
and thousands of employed persons) 
 
Composition of urban 
employment 
Share of each category 
between 1990 and 1999 
Type of labour status 1990 1999 Percentages Thousands of 
employed persons 
Total employed persons 100.0 100.0 100.0 26 216 
 Total formal sector  58.9 53.6 34.1 8 933 
 Public sector  16.0 12.9 2.1 551 
 Private sector 44.4 41.3 32.0 8 382 
 Employers, independent professionals and 
technicians  
3.8 4.3 6.5 1 703 
 Employees 40.6 36.9 25.5 6 679 
 Professionals and technicians 4.7 7.8 20.1 5 260 
 Non-professional, non-technical 
workers 35.9 29.1 5.4 1 419 
 Total informal sector 41.0 46.3 65.9 17 284 
 Employment in microenterprises a 14.7 15.5 18.2 4 784 
 Domestic employment 5.4 6.3 9.4 2 466 
 Unskilled own-account workers  22.3 25.8 38.3 10 034 
 In agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing 2.2 3.0 5.9 1 559 
 In industry and construction 4.3 5.2 8.1 2 131 
 In commerce and services 15.8 17.7 24.2 6 344 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a
 Includes employers and employees in firms with up to five workers.  
The wage gap between different segments of the workforce also 
widened. In general, occupational earnings were slow to increase, and 
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grew at a lower rate than per capita income. Moreover, in most of the 
countries these increases were too small to bring earnings back up to the 
levels recorded before the crisis of the 1980s. In almost every case, 
upturns in income reflected the combination of a large jump in the 
earnings of workers employed in the fastest-growing activities of the 
modern sector and the slower (or even negative) growth of the earnings of 
all other urban workers. As a result, the income gaps between the formal 
and informal sectors and between more and less skilled workers yawned 
even wider (ECLAC, 2000b). 
Wage disparities between the formal and informal sectors increased 
in all the countries for which data are available (see table III.9). The same 
was true of the average income of workers in these two sectors in all the 
countries except Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama. Within each sector, 
income disparities between workers in higher- and lower-skilled jobs also 
increased everywhere except Argentina, although that country’s situation 
is not fully comparable to those of the other countries owing to the 
upsurge in its open unemployment rate. By contrast, and with few 
exceptions, income disparities between men and women tended to 
narrow. The main exception was Panama, where these disparities are 
smaller than in any other country of the region. 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5. Increased precariousness of labour conditions 
In the 1990s labour conditions underwent a number of changes, 
including a decline in formal employment contracts; the proliferation of 
temporary and part-time jobs; the lack of social security coverage; the 
expansion of permissible grounds for dismissal; the reduction of 
severance pay; and restrictions on the right to strike, collective bargaining 
and union membership. 
One of the ways in which more precarious employment conditions 
have been manifested is the increase in the proportion of wage or salary 
earners employed in temporary jobs. For example, in urban areas of Chile, 
Colombia and Costa Rica there was a substantial increase in non-
permanent jobs, especially in microenterprises, where the proportion of 
temporary jobs is twice the proportion found in larger firms. Workers in 
the tertiary sector the fastest-growing are the ones most strongly 
affected by the increase in temporary hiring. Workers in low-skilled 
occupations are also particularly likely to be hired on a temporary basis, 
thus broadening the gap between more and less skilled workers. 
According to data from seven countries in the region, towards the 
mid-1990s more than 40% of employees in Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, and 
more than a third in Argentina and Colombia, lacked open-ended 
contracts. More recent data show that 20% of employees in Chile and 33% 
in Mexico did not have such contracts. This trend intensified throughout 
the decade, as demonstrated by developments in Argentina, Brazil and 
Peru. The worst affected were microenterprise employees; data show that 
the differences between these workers and those employed in larger firms 
were 60 points in Mexico, about 40 points in Chile and Paraguay and a 
little over 30 points in Brazil. 
Precarious labour conditions translate into a sharp downturn in 
wages (see table III.9). In all the countries considered the employment 
income of non-permanent employees was much lower than that of 
permanent employees. A similar gap exists between employees with and 
without a contract of employment. The biggest differences were observed 
in Mexico, where the earnings of workers without contracts amounted to 
41% of the earnings of workers with contracts. 
Another form of precariousness occurs when workers lack social 
security coverage or health insurance. Microenterprise employees are 
again the worst off in this respect, although the situation varies 
substantially from one country to another (see table III.10). In Bolivia and 
Paraguay over 60% of employees have no social security coverage, while 
in Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico and Venezuela the figure is just 
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over a third. The countries with the broadest coverage are Chile, Costa 
Rica here social security covers between three quarters and four fifths 
of the labour force and Uruguay, where only a tiny percentage of the 
population is not covered. 
Table III.10 
LATIN AMERICA (10 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYEES WITHOUT  
SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE 
(Percentages) 
  Size of establishment 
Country Year Total Up to 5 workers More than 5 workers 
Argentina 1990 29.9 64.8 18.2 
 1997 37.3 74.1 22.7 
Bolivia 1989 57.3 88.5 40.3 
 1997 61.8 90.7 46.9 
Brazil 1990 26.9 - - 
 1996 34.9 68.4 22.4 
Chile 1990 20.1 42.5 13.2 
 1996 19.6 43.6 13.1 
Costa Rica 1990 22.5 66.2 11.8 
 1997 26.2 71.2 14.0 
El Salvador 1997 45.6 85.2 28.4 
Mexico 1989 36.3 - - 
 1996 35.6 79.1 20.3 
Paraguay 1995 64.4 94.3 47.2 
Uruguay 1981 2.8 5.9 1.9 
 1997 3.9 7.0 2.8 
Venezuela 1997 38.8 79.1 24.5 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
6. Open unemployment 
(a) Economic growth and unemployment 
It is very probable that the main cause of the disparity between 
labour supply and labour demand is the decrease in the proportion of jobs 
created in the primary and secondary sectors, as well as the fact that some 
subsectors  such as financial establishments, telecommunications, 
insurance and business services  have modernized through the intensive 
use of new technologies, which has reduced their capacity to generate 
employment. 
The jump in unemployment in the 1990s was not, however, a 
universal phenomenon in the region, although most of the South 
American countries felt its effects. Unemployment climbed steadily in 
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Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, although in Brazil it reached levels 
equivalent to only half the rates recorded in the other two countries. 
Unemployment also worsened in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. In Chile it did not begin to rise until 1998, after 
having gone down systematically since the beginning of the decade. By 
contrast, unemployment tended to subside in Mexico and most of the 
Central American and Caribbean countries. Once it had recovered from 
the effects of the 1995 crisis, Mexico saw a clear downturn in urban 
unemployment, which returned to a rate of about 2.5%. The figure also 
dropped in some Central American countries, such as El Salvador, 
Honduras and Nicaragua, while in Costa Rica it stayed relatively 
moderate (see figure III.3 and tables III.11 and III.12). 
(b) Unemployment by income level, sex and age group 
Unemployment continues to affect the lower income bands the 
most. As shown in table III.13, in 17 Latin American countries and in the 
group of eight countries that experienced a more rapid increase in 
unemployment between the mid- and late 1990s,9 the percentage of 
unemployed people in the poorest 40% of the population (quintiles I and 
II), which continued to be considerably higher than the overall rate of 
unemployment, increased significantly between 1994 and 1999. This 
phenomenon is thus one of the main determinants of poverty and 
inequality. Unemployment also rose in another 40% of households 
(quintiles III and IV), particularly in the eight countries worst affected by 
the crisis. The increase in urban unemployment even impinged on the 
highest-earning quintile. At the end of the decade the three quintiles with 
the highest incomes recorded rates of unemployment twice as high and 
in some countries three times as high as the rates posted in the middle 








                                                          
9  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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Figure III.3 





















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official government figures. 
a
 The figures relating to economic growth correspond to the weighted average of 19 countries of the 
region. 
Table III.11 
LATIN AMERICA: LEVEL AND COMPOSITION OF UNEMPLOYMENT, 1990-1999 
(Thousands of people and percentages) 
    People (thousands) Annual rate of variation (%) 
    1990 1999 1990-1999 
Unemployed 7 643 18 118 10.1 
 Urban areas 6 600 17 457 11.4 
 Rural areas 1 043 661 -4.9 
 Laid off  5 932 15 391 11.2 
  Urban areas 5 225 15 204 12.6 
  Rural areas 708 186 -13.8 
 Seeking work for the first time 1 711 2 728 5.3 
  Urban areas 1 376 2 253 5.6 
  Rural areas 335 475 3.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of estimates prepared by the Population Division of ECLAC - Latin 
American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) and special tabulations of data from household 














































































Annual GDP growth 


















































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT, 1990-2000 
(Average annual rates) 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000a 
Latin America and the Caribbean            
Weighted average 5.8 5.7 6.5 6.5 6.6 7.5 7.9 7.5 8.1 8.8 8.5 
Simple average 9.5 9.6 9.8 10.0 9.5 10.1 10.5 9.9 9.7 10.6 10.8 
Argentina b 7.4 6.5 7.0 9.6 11.5 17.5 17.2 14.9 12.9 14.3 15.1 
Barbados c 14.7 17.3 23.0 24.3 21.9 19.7 15.6 14.5 12.3 10.4 9.2 
Bolivia b 7.3 5.8 5.4 5.8 3.1 3.6 3.8 4.4 6.1 8.0 7.6 
Brazil b 4.3 4.8 5.8 5.4 5.1 4.6 5.4 5.7 7.6 7.6 7.1 
Chile d 9.2 8.2 6.7 6.5 7.8 7.4 6.4 6.1 6.4 9.8 9.2 
Colombia b e 10.5 10.2 10.2 8.6 8.9 8.8 11.2 12.4 15.3 19.4 20.2 
Costa Rica 5.4 6.0 4.3 4.0 4.3 5.7 6.6 5.9 5.4 6.2 5.3 
Cuba c ... 7.7 6.1 6.2 6.7 7.9 7.6 7.0 6.6 6.0 5.5 
Ecuador e 6.1 7.7 8.9 8.9 7.8 7.7 10.4 9.3 11.5 15.1 14.1 
El Salvador 10.0 7.9 8.2 8.1 7.0 7.0 7.5 7.5 7.6 6.9 6.5 
Guatemala 6.0 4.2 1.6 2.6 3.5 3.9 5.2 5.1 3.8 ... … 
Honduras c 7.8 7.4 6.0 7.0 4.0 5.6 6.5 5.8 5.2 5.3 … 
Jamaica c 15.3 15.4 15.7 16.3 15.4 16.2 16.0 16.5 15.5 15.7 15.5 
Mexico 2.7 2.7 2.8 3.4 3.7 6.2 5.5 3.7 3.2 2.5 2.2 
Nicaragua 7.6 11.5 14.4 17.8 17.1 16.9 16.0 14.3 13.2 10.7 9.8 
Panama d e 20.0 19.3 17.5 15.6 16.0 16.6 16.9 15.5 15.2 14.0 15.2 
Paraguay 6.6 5.1 5.3 5.1 4.4 5.3 8.2 7.1 6.6 9.4 10.7 
Peru f 8.3 5.9 9.4 9.9 8.8 8.2 8.0 9.2 8.5 9.2 8.5 
Dominican Republic  ... 19.6 20.3 19.9 16.0 15.8 16.5 15.9 14.3 13.8 13.9 
Trinidad and Tobago c e 20.1 18.5 19.6 19.8 18.4 17.2 16.2 15.0 14.2 13.1 12.5 
Uruguay f 9.2 8.9 9.0 8.3 9.2 10.3 11.9 11.5 10.1 11.3 13.6 
Venezuela 11.0 9.5 7.8 6.6 8.7 10.3 11.8 11.4 11.3 14.9 14.0 
Source: ECLAC, prepared on the basis of ECLAC, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 2000 (LC/G.2118-P), Santiago, Chile, February 2001. United Nations publication, Sales  
No. E.00.II.G.1; and Current conditions and outlook: Economic survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 
2000-2001 (LC/G.2142-P), Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.II.G.121. 
a
 Preliminary figures. 
b




 Metropolitan region. 
e
 Includes hidden unemployment. 
f
 Capital city. 
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Table III.13 
LATIN AMERICA: RATE OF URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT IN 17 COUNTRIES AND  




(17 countries) Eight countries with a steep rise in unemploymenta 
 
 1994 1999 1994 1999 
Rate of unemployment:     
 Both sexes 7.1 10.6 6.6 13.1 
 Men 6.7 9.4 5.8 11.3 
 Women 7.7 12.3 7.8 15.5 
 Young people aged 15-24 14.0 20.0 14.0 24.8 
 Quintile I (lowest 20% income quintile) 14.8 22.3 15.8 27.8 
 Quintile II 8.1 12.7 8.3 15.6 
 Quintile III 5.6 9.4 5.5 11.2 
 Quintile IV 3.9 6.5 3.7 8.0 
 Quintile V (highest 20% income quintile) 2.3 4.3 2.0 4.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a
 Countries with rising rates of unemployment in the period, of close to or higher than 10%: Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
In addition, unemployment continues to be particularly rife among 
young people between the ages of 15 and 24, who represent between a 
quarter and a fifth of Latin America’s workforce. Even before the Asian 
crisis the unemployment rate in this group was almost double the 
regional average, and in most countries these young people represented 
almost half the total number of unemployed workers. Between 1994 and 
1999 this age group’s unemployment rate rose from 14% to 20%, and to 
24.8% in the eight countries hardest hit by the crisis. This group’s relative 
share of total unemployment dropped slightly, owing to an increase in 
unemployment among the primary labour force. 
Lastly, gender differences with regard to employment worsened. In 
the urban areas of 17 countries in the region, female unemployment rose, 
on average, from 7.7% to 12.3%, while male unemployment climbed from 
6.7% to 9.4%. These gaps widened even more, to women’s disadvantage, 
in the eight countries hardest hit by the crisis. 
(c) Unemployment and well-being 
The impact of unemployment on the well-being of the different 
population groups depends not only on the level of unemployment, but 
also on the average duration of periods of unemployment and the wage 
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losses suffered by workers who subsequently manage to find 
employment (see figure III.4). 
Figure III.4 
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES): TIME SPENT SEEKING EMPLOYMENT  
BY LAID-OFF WORKERS,a 1994-1999 














Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in the 
respective countries. 
a
 Does not include unemployed persons who have been seeking work for more than two years. 
In economies with high rates of unemployment, the prolongation of a 
period of unemployment impacts negatively in three different ways: it hurts 
unemployed workers themselves, owing to the loss of human capital or 
reintegration into the labour force at lower wages; the families of 
unemployed workers suffer a loss of well-being if they are forced to liquidate 
assets, engage in child labour or drop out of school; and the economy at large 
suffers because of the decline in the average level of wages, the contraction in 
demand for goods and the resulting recessionary effects. An examination of 
the situation in six of the region’s countries where unemployment practically 
doubled shows that the out-of-work period increased from an average of 4.4 
to 5.3 months for men and a little more, from 4.7 to 5.7 months, for women. 
The duration of the period of unemployment increased by the same amount 
of time about a month among both heads of household and workers 
who were not heads of household. 
Although differences in the size of the reserve wage could largely 
account for the marked differences in the average duration of 















A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 139 
unemployment observed between unemployed workers with different 
levels of schooling, the fact that less skilled workers spend more time 
seeking work also seems to reflect problems with the supply and loss of 
jobs in the region’s economies. Although more highly skilled workers 
spent much longer periods out of work than less skilled ones in the 11 
countries for which data are available and in the six countries that 
registered the largest increases in unemployment, between 1994 and 1999 
the average length of unemployment increased faster among less skilled 
workers; that is, those with fewer than 10 years of schooling. 
One final point that warrants discussion is the loss of income 
workers are forced to accept in order to find a new job. According to a 
study on Uruguay conducted by Bucheli and Furtado (2001), the wage 
loss faced by workers aged 23 to 59 who managed to find a new job 
represented between 23% and 34% of the amount they had earned in their 
previous employment. This serves to illustrate what happens in urban 
markets where the labour force is largely wage-dependent and 
unemployment persists at relatively high rates. 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 141 
Chapter IV 
Occupational stratification 
The occupational stratification that prevailed in Latin America in 
the late 1990s reflects the inequality existing in the region with respect to 
productive assets, professional qualifications and occupational income. 
Grouped on the basis of these criteria, the occupational strata may be 
divided into three relatively homogeneous levels: upper, middle and 
lower. The upper level accounts for 10.3% of the employed workforce, 
with incomes considerably higher than those corresponding to the other 
levels, which clearly set them apart from the latter. The middle level 
includes only 14.5% of the employed workforce, but the lower group 
encompasses 75% of the employed, many of whom earn an income that is 
insufficient in itself to maintain a typical four-member Latin American 
family above the poverty line. 
1. The basic structure of occupational stratification 
The expansion of non-manual and urban occupations in the 
postwar period and the concomitant reduction in manual and agricultural 
work caused a marked change in the structure of the workforce. This 
process has continued over the last two decades, but unlike the pattern in 
the past, it has not brought major changes in occupational income, so that 
a more in-depth study needs to be carried out on the integration and 
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characteristics of the different occupational strata, especially those that 
group together non-manual and urban occupations.1 
The information available on the earnings of the different 
occupations makes possible a more realistic evaluation of the situation of 
each level, particularly in the case of non-manual occupations, which 
were regarded as the clearest expression of upward social mobility 
between 1950 and 1980. This information shows how difficult it is for 
many occupations, both manual and non-manual, to increase earnings 
and thus bring the persons in question fully into the middle classes. 
Owing to these factors, the prevailing occupational stratification in Latin 
America is still characterized by a large lower stratum, although currently 
this stratum is not composed predominantly, as was the case in the past, 
of manual and agricultural occupations. This process of relative reduction 
in the income obtained by non-manual middle-level occupations is 
consistent with the fact that in most countries average household income 
has shifted in the last two decades from about the 66th percentile to about 
the 75th percentile, which indicates that 75% of households receive 
incomes below the mean. 
As already noted, the occupations employing most of the 
workforce of Latin America in the late 1990s may be ordered in three 
levels, upper, middle and lower, when examined on the basis of certain 
basic variables, such as ownership of productive assets, level of 
qualifications, authority exercised in the workplace, and occupational 
income. The upper level accounts for 10.3% of the workforce employed in 
the eleven countries under consideration and comprises non-manual 
occupational categories that must possess either productive assets 
(employers), a high level of professional skills (professionals), or authority 
in the workplace (managers). The average occupational income 
corresponding to this level is equivalent to 12.5 times the poverty line and 
its members have an average educational level of 11.6 years of schooling. 
The middle level is also made up of non-manual occupations: its members 
have an intermediate degree of professional skills or authority 
(supervisors, middle level professionals, technicians) or are 
administrative employees. This level accounts for 14.5% of the workforce 
and the average occupational income is equivalent to 4.9 times the 
poverty line, with an average of 11.2 years of education. The lower level 
encompasses a vast and heterogeneous group of manual and non-manual 
occupations, whose members do not have productive assets or positions 
of authority and have a relatively low degree of professional skills. This 
level covers 74.5% of the workforce, with an average occupational income 
                                                          
1  Some conceptual aspects of occupational stratification are dealt with in the 
methodological annex. 
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equivalent to 2.4 times the poverty line and an average educational level 
of 5.5 years of schooling. This level can be broken down into two groups 
of roughly the same size which, although both lack sufficient levels of 
income and education to have access to a reasonable degree of well-being, 
may be clearly differentiated from each other by the levels of these 
characteristics. The first group is made up of commercial employees and 
blue-collar workers, artisans and drivers, who have an average income 
equivalent to 3 times the poverty line and 6.5 years of schooling, while the 
second group, consisting of workers providing personal services and 
agricultural workers, has an average income equivalent to 1.8 times the 
poverty line and 4.3 years of schooling (see table IV.1). 
Table IV.1 
LATIN AMERICA (11 COUNTRIES): SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DIFFERENT 
OCCUPATIONAL STRATA, 1999 







  Total 148 737 944 100.0 3.8 6.9 
1. Employers 6 589 655 4.4 14.1 8.9 
2. Executives and managers 3 069 273 2.1 11.9 11.7 
3. Professionals 5 676 632 3.8 11.1 14.6 
  1 + 2 + 3 15 335 560 10.3 12.5 11.6 
4. Technicians 12 004 237 8.1 5.7 11.5 
5. Administrative employees 9 502 927 6.4 3.8 10.9 
  4 + 5 21 507 164 14.5 4.9 11.2 
6. Workers in commerce 18 888 087 12.7 2.8 7.1 
7. Blue-collar workers, artisans, drivers 40 126 684 27.0 3.1 6.2 
  6 + 7 59 014 771 39.7 3.0 6.5 
8. Personal services workers 22 792 347 15.3 2.1 5.9 
9. Agricultural workers 29 168 673 19.6 1.6 3.1 
  8 + 9 51 961 020 34.9 1.8 4.3 
  6 + 7 + 8 + 9 110 975 791 74.6 2.4 5.5 
10. Armed Forces 897 701 0.6 7.2 10.6 
11. Unclassified 21 728 0.0 5.2 10.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys of the respective countries. 
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As this basic structure of occupational stratification in Latin 
America shows, only one out of every ten members of the employed 
workforce is equipped to obtain an income that will enable him or her to 
enjoy a high standard of living. Below this occupational elite, a little less 
than 15% have attained an intermediate position on the occupational 
pyramid, thanks mainly to their educational attainments, which are 
similar to those of the upper level, although their occupational income is 
much lower. Lastly, the base of the pyramid is made up of three-quarters 
of the workforce, whose members, despite their considerable labour 
heterogeneity, obtain occupational incomes very similar to each other and 
far removed from those received by the other two levels. 
These three levels constitute the basic structure of the occupational 
stratification of the region and give a general idea of its features. Clearly, 
in order to carry out a more detailed analysis of this structure, an 
examination must be made of the internal composition of each of these 
levels and of the variations that occurred in this structure in each of the 
countries during the 1990s. However, an analysis of this kind will not 
show any major variation from the overall picture. Similarly, the validity 
of the criteria used to classify the occupations may be open to question, 
but given the differences in the occupational income of the three levels, 
and especially between the upper category and the two others, it is 
difficult to imagine that a change in the classification criteria would lead 
to any substantial change in the general view of this basic structure. 
(a) The upper level 
The upper level consists of three occupational strata: i) employers; 
ii) senior officials and private and public managers, and iii) professionals. 
Employers account for 4.4% of the workforce and receive average 
occupational incomes that are much higher than any of the other strata 
(14.1 times the poverty line), although they have an average educational 
level (8.9 years of schooling) which is lower than that of the middle strata. 
Two-thirds of all employers are micro-entrepreneurs, since they employ 
fewer than 5 persons; most of them are engaged in non-agricultural 
activities, with an average income of 12.1 times the poverty line, while the 
remaining employers are engaged in agricultural activities with a slightly 
lower average income (8.8 times the poverty line). The remaining third of 
employers employ six or more persons and, as may be supposed, their 
occupational income rises as the number of employees increases. Those 
that employ between 6 and 9 persons have an average income equivalent 
to 15.6 times the poverty line, when they work in non-agricultural 
activities, and 12.1 times the poverty line when they work in agricultural 
activities; those who employ 10 or more persons earn an income  
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27.3 times the poverty line (non-agricultural) and 29.3 times the poverty 
line (agricultural). Employers who employ ten or more persons make up 
the occupational stratum with the highest income of the entire workforce, 
far outpacing all the rest. However, employers with smaller businesses 
also receive a high income compared with the rest of the workforce, 
which shows the decisive importance of ownership of productive assets 
in determining the place that one occupies in the occupational 
stratification pyramid. 
Senior officials and private and public executives represent 2.1% of 
the total workforce, and the vast majority work in businesses that employ 
10 persons or more. Their average occupational income is equivalent to 11.9 
times the poverty line, but varies considerably if we take into account the 
size of the business in which they work: those employed in businesses with 
10 or more employees have an income equivalent to 14 times the poverty 
line, which is almost twice that of the minority working in smaller 
businesses. Not all surveys differentiate between employees on the basis of 
whether they belong to the public or private sector, which prevents us from 
presenting figures for all the countries together. According to available 
information, private executives in some countries, such as Chile, El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Paraguay, earn more than their public 
counterparts; in others, such as Colombia and Costa Rica, the reverse is 
true, while in Panama and Venezuela, there is not much difference in 
income between the two. The average years of schooling of the members of 
this stratum (11.7 years) is not particularly high, so that their level of 
income depends significantly on the degree of authority they wield within 
the private or public organization where they work (see table IV.1). 
Professionals account for 3.8% of the workforce and earn an 
average occupational income equivalent to 11.1 times the poverty line, for 
an average of 14.6 years of schooling. As in the case of executives and 
managers, 75% of them work in businesses that employ 10 or more 
persons, although in this stratum, the remaining 25% work 
independently. The few professionals who are engaged in enterprises of 
up to nine persons earn considerably less than those who work in larger 
establishments or who are independent. In this respect, there is no clear 
trend among independent professionals, since in some countries they 
have a higher income than those working in medium-sized or large firms, 
while in other countries, the reverse is true. 
(b) The middle level 
This level is made up of occupational strata that do not own 
productive assets. One of the strata is made up of persons with a middle 
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level of professional skills (technicians) or of authority (supervisors); the 
other is made up of administrative employees. 
Technicians and supervisors account for 8.1% of the workforce, and 
on average their occupational income is 5.7 times the poverty line and 
they have an educational level of 11.5 years’ schooling. As already noted, 
their educational level is similar to that of the higher level, but their 
income is much lower. Close to 75% of technicians and supervisors work 
in companies that employ 10 or more persons; the remaining 25% are 
divided up among those who work in smaller enterprises or as 
independent workers. The occupational income of technicians and 
supervisors who work in enterprises of up to nine persons is markedly 
lower than that of their counterparts who work in larger businesses or 
who are independent. 
Administrative employees make up 6.4% of the workforce and 
have an average income equivalent to 3.8 times the poverty line and  
10.9 years of schooling. Almost all the members of this stratum work as 
wage earners, and most belong to establishments that employ ten or more 
persons. In the latter case, the earnings of administrative employees are 
equivalent to 4.3 times the poverty line, but those that are employed in 
micro-enterprises or small enterprises have much lower earnings, 
between 2.6 and 3 times the poverty line, similar to those obtained by 
manual workers of the lower level. As in the case of technicians and 
supervisors, administrative employees derive little benefit in terms of 
occupational income from their years of schooling. 
(c) The lower level 
As already noted, the lower level is made up of a heterogeneous set 
of occupations, predominantly manual, which includes workers in 
commerce; blue-collar workers, artisans, operatives and drivers; workers 
in personal services, and agricultural workers. 
Workers in commerce are divided into three basic subcategories of 
occupations, which are not always clearly discernible in the household 
surveys: i) independent merchants who do not employ any staff but have 
their own premises; ii) wage-earning salesmen or women, and iii) street 
vendors. The available information indicates that, as a whole, this stratum 
accounts for 12.7% of the workforce; its members have, on average,  
7.1 years of schooling and occupational income equivalent to 2.8 times the 
poverty line. This stratum, together with that of agricultural workers, has 
the particular feature of being made up of a higher proportion of  
own-account workers than of wage earners, with a not insignificant 
proportion of unpaid workers. Of the total of this stratum, 37% are  
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wage earners, 53% are own-account workers and 10% are unpaid 
workers. Almost half of the wage-earning salespersons in the commercial 
sector work in establishments that employ up to five persons; this is quite 
important, because the average income for these occupations increases in 
proportion to the size of the establishment: in establishments of up to  
5 employees, the average occupational income is 1.9 times the poverty 
line; in those of 6 to 9 employees, it is 2.6, and in those of 10 or more, it is 
3.3. Own-account salespersons in the commercial sector have a higher 
income than that of wage earners (3.4 times the poverty line), which is 
due to the fact that this category encompasses, as already noted, both 
established independent merchants and street vendors. In those countries 
whose surveys distinguish between the two groups of occupations in 
terms of occupational income, it is possible to pinpoint the differences 
between them: in Brazil, for example, the average income of established 
merchants is 4.5 times the poverty line, while that of street vendors is  
2.3 times the poverty line; in Colombia, the incomes are 2.5 and 1.8 times 
the poverty line, respectively. It is hard to estimate the quantitative 
weight of independent merchants who do not employ hired labour, but it 
is probable that in Latin America as a whole it may vary between 1.5% 
and 2% of the total of the workforce, with an average income closer to the 
middle than the lower level. 
Blue-collar workers, artisans, operatives and drivers account for 
27% of the workforce and have an average income 3.1 times the poverty 
line and an educational level of 6.2 years of schooling. More than 40% of 
these workers are employed in establishment of 10 employees or more 
and earn an average occupational income equivalent to 3.5 times the 
poverty line. Almost 30% are own-account workers, with an income  
3.3 times the poverty line, while the rest work in enterprises with up to 
nine employees, where income ranges between 2.3 and 2.6 times the 
poverty line. Admittedly, the members of this stratum have different 
levels of qualifications and different degrees of authority in the firm, and 
this naturally has consequences from the point of view of occupational 
income, but unfortunately it is hard to analyse this aspect with the 
information available. In the few countries where it is possible to explore 
the subject, the differences in terms of skills and authority are seen to 
have a similar impact on income to that linked to the size of the 
establishment (small, medium-sized or large). At all events, given the gap 
between the average income of this group and the income of the middle 
level, it is very unlikely that this group includes more highly skilled 
occupations which might make it possible for such employees to move up 
to the middle level.  
Workers in personal and security services account for 15.3% of the 
workforce, with an occupational income equivalent to 2.1 times the 
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poverty line and an average of 5.9 years of schooling. The vast majority 
are wage earners, divided up fairly evenly between micro- and small 
enterprises, on the one hand, and medium-sized and large enterprises, on 
the other. As in most of the remaining strata, those working in medium-
sized and large enterprises earn higher incomes, followed by independent 
workers and finally, with the lowest average incomes, those employed in 
micro- and small enterprises. 
Agricultural workers make up 19.6% of the total workforce and 
have, on average, an occupational income equivalent to 1.8 times  
the poverty line and an educational level of 3.1 years of schooling. 
Approximately half of them are own-account workers, 30% are  
wage earners and the rest are unpaid family members. There are no major 
differences between the occupational income of the first two subgroups, 
although those working as wage earners in medium-sized and large 
enterprises earn more. 
The basic occupational stratification structure described above 
reveals the high degree of inequality between the incomes of the different 
strata: a result which coincides with the data on income distribution  
in the region. The strata that make up the upper level, in particular 
medium- and large-scale employers, earn an income that sets them apart 
from the rest, forming an elite characterized by its high standard of living. 
The strata of the middle level earn incomes which, although only 40% of 
those obtained by the upper level strata, still afford employees in this 
category in the countries with the highest average income levels a 
reasonably comfortable standard of living. This strata’s share of total 
employment is not as significant as might have been assumed, because of 
the weakening of the State’s employment capacity, which has reduced the 
number of technicians and professionals that it employs, and because of 
the loss of status by some occupations corresponding to employees in 
commerce and some administrative employees, which means that they 
can no longer be included in the middle level strata. Thus, the incomes 
received by the workers in commerce and administrative employees in 
question are not sufficient to enable them to improve their living 
conditions substantially. The lower level, for its part, comprises all those 
occupations which provide such a low occupational income that it leaves 
many workers highly vulnerable to poverty. Among the persons 
employed in these occupations, independent merchants and more highly 
skilled blue-collar workers and operatives are in a slightly better situation, 
but at the base of the stratification system, in many of the countries 
considered, there are many salespersons in commerce and personal 
services workers and agricultural workers whose occupational income 
scarcely keeps them above the poverty line. 
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The basic structure of occupational stratification did not change 
significantly in the 1990s. In 1999, the share of the upper level was 0.3% 
smaller than in 1990, following a slight decline in the percentage of 
professionals and employers. The share of the middle level also declined 
by 0.2%, because the decline in the percentage of administrative 
employees (1.5%) was not offset by the increase in technicians and 
supervisors. The share of the lower level, however, increased by 2.3%. In 
this level, the percentage corresponding to agricultural workers (0.6%) 
diminished, while that of blue-collar workers, artisans, operatives and 
drivers remained more or less stable and there was an increase in workers 
in commerce (1.4%) and in personal services and security (1.8%). 
Admittedly, the changes were not substantial, perhaps partly because the 
1.3% of unclassified workers listed in the 1990 figures was eliminated in 
the 1999 figures. At all events, the changes indicated here are compatible 
with the trends pointed out in other studies, such as the absence of 
occupational mobility, the persistent relative reduction in agricultural 
workers and the likewise relative increase in low-productivity urban 
occupations in the tertiary sector. 
The occupational income of the workforce as a whole fell, on 
average, by only 0.1%, although as may readily be supposed, it increased 
in some strata and diminished in others. It diminished slightly, by the 
equivalent of 0.3% of the poverty line, among employers, but increased 
among executives and senior officials (0.5), professionals (1.2) and 
technicians (0.4). Apart from personal services and security workers, for 
whom a small increase was recorded (0.2), occupational income declined 
in all the other strata: administrative employees (0.2 times the poverty 
line); blue-collar workers, artisans, operatives and drivers (0.1); workers 
in commerce (0.6), and agricultural workers (0.4). These changes, 
although moderate, indicate the existence of a process of concentration of 
occupational income in the upper level occupations within a context of 
reduction of average occupational income (see table IV.1). 
Finally, attention should also be drawn to the higher educational 
level of the workforce, which increased from 6.2 years of schooling in 
1990 to 6.9 years in 1999. This process, which will be examined in more 
detail below, shows that there is a persistent inconsistency between, on 
the one hand, the increase in the educational level and, on the other, the 
relative lack of labour opportunities in the middle and upper levels  
and the reduction in the occupational income of most of the manual and 
non-manual occupations of the lower level. 
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2. Basic structure and national situations 
The occupational stratification structure prevailing in Latin 
America corresponds to a relatively low degree of development and a 
high degree of structural heterogeneity, which is evident when one 
compares the different occupational strata and analyses the composition 
of each of them. In the countries where the average occupational income 
increased significantly during the 1990s, the proportion of the workforce 
employed in the upper and middle levels of stratification increased while 
the workforce in the lower level decreased. The opposite occurred in 
those countries where average occupational income diminished. 
Generally speaking, however, two trends predominated: one towards a 
decrease in the proportion of the workforce employed in the upper and 
middle levels and the other towards an increase in that of the lower level, 
both as a result of the decline in average occupational income, which 
shows the scant upward structural mobility registered in the 1990s in 
most of Latin America. 
The basic structure described does not merely represent the 
statistical average of national situations, which could possibly be very 
different from one another: on the contrary, it is a true reflection of reality, 
since there is a great similarity in this respect between the majority of 
countries, even the most heavily populated. Thus, according to the 
general structure, the workforce of Latin America was distributed in such 
a way that 10.3% were in the highest level, 14.5% in the middle level and 
74.6% in the lower level, and if we look at some representative individual 
cases we see that the distributions were very similar. For example, the 
proportions existing in Brazil at the end of the 1990s were 9.3%, 14.2% and 
75.4%, respectively; in Colombia, they were 9.5%, 14.4% and 76.1%, and in 
Mexico, they were 10%, 16,7% and 73.1% (see table IV.2). This similarity 
stems from the fact that there is a fairly close relationship between the 
degree of economic development of a country and the distribution among 
the three levels of stratification. In most countries in the region, the 
average occupational income of the workforce is between 3 and 4 times 
the poverty line, and this is faithfully reflected in the general average  
of 3.8 times the poverty line. This average is consistent with the  
above-mentioned percentage distribution of the workforce by 
occupational level. If the average occupational income were higher, the 
proportion represented by the lower level in the workforce would be 
smaller, and concomitantly, that corresponding to the middle and upper 
levels would be higher. This stands out clearly when we look at the 
stratification structure of the countries under consideration. Chile, for 
example, is the country where the average level of occupational income is 
highest (7.3 times the poverty line) and the lower stratum is smallest, 
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since it represents 65.5% of the workforce; next comes Costa Rica with  
6.2 times the poverty line and 68.7%; Panama, with 5.4 and 67.9%; Brazil, 
with 3.9 and 75.4%; Mexico with 3.7 and 73.1%; Venezuela, with 3.6 and 
72%; El Salvador, with 3.4 and 78.2%; Colombia with 3.2 and 76.1%; 
Paraguay, with 2.9 and 78.5%; Nicaragua, with 2.8 and 82.5%, and 
Guatemala, with 2.8 times the poverty line and 84.9%. The greater part of 
the workforce of Latin America is employed in economies that reflect the 
basic stratification structure, but when we look at countries which depart 
from this more generalized degree of development, the differences 
between them stand out quite markedly, so that the country with the 
highest occupational income has a lower level which is almost 20% 
smaller than that of the country where occupational income is lowest. 
Clearly, the pattern of occupational stratification is affected by a number 
of  factors, but it does correspond to a great extent to the country’s 
average occupational income, for the development process and 
occupational income are linked to the distribution of workers among the 
different economic sectors, to their manual or non-manual and wage-
earning or own-account status, and to the relative importance of the 
different sizes of establishments, i.e., large, medium-sized or small (see 
table IV.2).  
If we compare more closely the situation of Chile and Guatemala, 
which are the countries with the highest and the lowest average 
occupational income, respectively, the differences between them in this 
respect stand out clearly. As already noted, in Guatemala the lower level 
accounts for almost 20% more of the workforce than in Chile, which is 
due largely to the fact that agricultural workers account for a much larger 
share of the total than in Chile (36.2% compared with 13%). In addition, 
the composition of these workers varies significantly between one country 
and the other. In Guatemala, 35% are own-account workers and more 
than 20% are unpaid; the rest are wage earners, but only half of them 
work in enterprises with 10 or more workers. In Chile, own-account, 
workers represent only 25% of the total, there are practically no unpaid 
workers, and the remaining 75% are wage-earners, most of whom work in 
medium-sized and large enterprises. 
The proportion of persons working in the personal services and 
security category is higher in Chile (16.6%) than in Guatemala (10%), 
which, as will be shown later in greater detail, indicates that the increase 
in average occupational income in Chile has tended to be concentrated in 
the upper level, which results in a greater demand for employees in 
security work and personal services to serve those belonging to that level. 
The percentage of blue-collar workers, artisans and drivers is not very 
different in the two countries: 22.9% in Guatemala and 26.4% in Chile, but 
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once again, there is a contrast in their composition, although not as much 
as in the case of agricultural workers. The percentage of independent 
workers is quite similar in the two countries between 25% and 30% of 
the total and in both cases there are few unpaid workers. Therefore, the 
percentage of wage earners is also quite similar, but the major difference 
stems from the fact that in Chile most wage earners work in medium and 
large-scale enterprises, while in Guatemala they work predominantly in 
micro- and small enterprises. There is also a marked contrast between the 
two countries with respect to vendors in the commercial sector, since in 
Guatemala they account for a higher percentage (16%), than in Chile 
(9.5%) and more than 80% of them are own-account workers or are 
unpaid. In Chile, 60% of the sales personnel in the commercial sector are 
wage earners and half of them work in medium-sized or large enterprises. 
In the middle level, the differences between the two countries are 
observed not so much in the internal composition of the strata as in the 
proportion that they represent. In Guatemala, technicians, supervisors 
and administrative employees together make up only 5.9% of the 
workforce, whereas in Chile they account for 16.3%. In both countries, 
however, they are mostly wage earners who work in medium-sized and 
large enterprises. The nature of the work of technicians is such that a 
certain percentage operate as own-account workers, but the same does 
not apply to supervisors and administrative employees. Any increase in 
these occupations depends on the emergence and expansion of 
productive establishments and State agencies which bring about 
economic and social development. This leaves little room for own-account 
workers. 
At the upper level, the occupation of senior official or private or 
public-sector manager is also related to the development of productive 
organizations and government agencies, so that their expansion depends 
on the degree of development attained by each country; in Chile, senior 
officials and private or public managers account for 4.6% of the 
workforce, compared with 1.2% in Guatemala. The comparison between 
the two countries is particularly interesting in the case of employers. The 
first point to note is that the proportions are not too different: 4.1% in 
Chile and 3.4% in Guatemala, and in both countries the majority of 
employers devote themselves to non-agricultural activities: 88% in Chile 
and 73% in Guatemala. The two countries are also similar on another 
score, since more than 80% of agricultural employers are micro- or small 
entrepreneurs, while in non-agricultural activities, the corresponding 
percentages are 70% in Chile and 90% in Guatemala. In other words, the 
proportion of entrepreneurs is slightly higher in Chile and most of them 
are engaged in non-agricultural activities. Moreover, in Chile there is a 
higher percentage of employers with establishments that employ ten or 
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more persons, but the differences between the two countries are not very 
significant in this respect. These figures reveal that the increase in average 
occupational income does not raise substantially the proportion of 
employers. As the degree of development rises, the amount of productive 
assets increases, but their ownership becomes more concentrated, leading 
to the appearance of large-scale employers who account for much of the 
ownership of such assets. Finally, economic and educational development 
increases the number of professionals. In Chile they represent 8.8% of the 
workforce and in Guatemala, only 4.6%, In both countries, the vast 
majority of professionals are wage-earners in medium-sized and large 
private and State-owned enterprises, so that those who work 
independently account for only about 10% of the total number of 
professionals. 
A comparison of the countries that occupy the extremes in terms of 
average occupational income is instructive because it gives a clear idea of 
the impact of the degree of economic development on the distribution of 
the workforce in the different levels and strata and allows us to pinpoint 
some of the features of the internal composition of those strata. However, 
none of these features fully reflects the predominant stratification 
structure in the region. In the predominant structure, which is similar to 
that of Brazil and Mexico, the average occupational income is somewhat 
less than four times the poverty line, which is closer to the level of 
Guatemala than that of Chile, and with a productive system characterized 
by a higher degree of heterogeneity in terms of productivity, income and 
distribution of the workforce among the strata. Countries such as Brazil 
and Mexico display a higher degree of heterogeneity, since characteristics 
typical of the two extremes in development, such as those that occur in 
Guatemala and Chile, coexist side by side. 
In Brazil and Mexico, the proportion of the workforce situated in 
the upper level is 9.3% and 10%, respectively; these figures are similar to 
those for Guatemala and are almost half those of Chile. Although  
Brazil and Mexico have highly developed economic sectors with a 
predominance of large establishments and a large State apparatus 
compared with the regional average, the professionals, executives and 
senior officials employed in these establishments and in State agencies are 
proportionally few in relation to the size of their workforce. Moreover, as 
already mentioned, whatever the degree of development of the countries, 
the percentage share of the upper level should not be expected to grow 
through an increase in employers, who account for a little more than 4% 
in Brazil and Mexico. Conversely, the proportion represented by the 
middle level strata in Brazil and Mexico is similar to that of Chile and 
more than double that of Guatemala, which highlights the importance of 
educational development in those countries and the significant number of 
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occupational opportunities that the urban economy has managed to 
provide in them. 
In Brazil and Mexico, structural heterogeneity is a feature of the 
lower level too. In Brazil, agricultural workers still represent close to 22% 
of the workforce (a percentage intermediate between that of Chile and 
that of Guatemala); of this percentage, only 25% work in medium-sized or 
large enterprises, 50% are own-account workers, and the remaining 25% 
are unpaid workers. In other words, 16% of the employed workforce in 
Brazil is made up of peasants who work on their own account or are 
unpaid. The corresponding figure in Mexico is almost 10%, that is, lower 
than in Brazil, but three times as high as in Chile. Moreover, Brazil and 
Mexico have a higher percentage of own-account or unpaid salespersons 
in commerce than Chile, but there are no major differences between those 
two countries and Chile as regards the percentage of persons who work in 
personal and security services. As regards blue-collar workers, artisans, 
operatives and drivers, there are no appreciable differences compared 
with Chile and, in fact, among the 11 countries considered in this chapter, 
Mexico has the highest percentage of employed persons in this stratum 
(31.8%) and also the highest percentage of those who work in medium-
sized and large enterprises (14.8%). In short, with respect to the 
distribution of the workforce in the levels and strata, the different 
situations observed in Latin America are due in particular to the different 
degrees of economic development achieved by the countries. 
The figures showing the evolution between 1990 and 1999 illustrate 
clearly the effects of economic growth on the distribution of the workforce 
in the various strata and occupational levels. In those countries, like Chile 
and Costa Rica, where the average occupational income increased most 
between those years, the percentage represented by the lower level 
diminished considerably, while that of the other two levels increased 
concomitantly. In Chile, where the highest increase in average 
occupational income during the period was recorded, the share of all the 
strata of the upper and middle levels rose from 15.3% to 25% of the total 
workforce, setting Chile apart from the remaining countries. In Costa 
Rica, where this increase was more moderate, the share of the strata of the 
upper and middle levels together rose from 26.5% to 31.1% over the 
period. In countries such as Mexico where the average occupational 
income grew very little in the 1990s, the proportion of the workforce 
belonging to the upper and middle levels only grew from 25.2% to 26.7%. 
Finally, in the countries where the occupational income diminished, such 
as Venezuela, the proportion of those strata declined from 33.7% to 27.6%. 
With respect to the lower level strata, the proportion of agricultural 
workers fell in all the countries, and in most of them the proportion of 
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workers in commerce and in personal services and security increased. No 
clear trend was discernible with regard to the percentage of blue-collar 
workers, artisans, operatives and drivers, since it rose in some countries 
and declined in others. The predominant overall trend for the eight 
countries for which information is available for the years 1990 and 1999 
was the decline in the workforce belonging to the upper and middle 
levels and the increase in the percentage employed in the lower level, 
which is a reflection of the decline in the average occupational income 
and the scant occupational mobility existing in the 1990s. 
3. Inequality in occupational stratification 
Most of the eleven countries examined in this chapter have very 
uneven occupational income distribution structures. In particular, unlike 
the situation in the more developed countries, the upper level strata 
obtain an average income that is considerably higher than the rest, 
especially compared with the lower level, which encompasses, as we 
know, the majority of employed persons. In most countries, the low level 
of average occupational income is combined with marked inequality, in 
sharp contrast to the situation in Costa Rica, where occupational income 
distribution is much more egalitarian. 
Unlike the distribution of the workforce, the distribution of 
occupational income in the different countries is not determined by the 
level of average occupational income, since there are countries with 
similar incomes which have different degrees of inequality and, 
conversely, countries with very different income levels which have 
similar degrees of inequality. For example, if the countries are ranked on 
the basis of the average occupational income recorded in 1999 and 
examined according to the number of times that the income of medium-
sized and large non-agricultural employers exceeded the national 
average, we obtain values that vary between 2.2 and 16.1 times the 
poverty line (see table IV.3). 
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Table IV.3 
LATIN AMERICA (8 COUNTRIES): SOME FEATURES OF THE PREVAILING 
OCCUPATIONAL STRATA, 1990 AND 1999 







  1999 
  Total 142 866 679 100.0 3.9 6.9 
1. Employers 6 315 967 4.4 14.3 9.0 
2. Executives and managers 2 983 465 2.1 11.9 11.7 
3. Professionals 5 526 415 3.9 11.1 14.5 
  1 + 2 + 3 14 825 847 10.4 12.6 11.6 
4. Technicians 11 613 214 8.1 5.8 11.5 
5. Administrative employees 9 209 179 6.4 3.8 10.9 
  4 + 5 20 822 393 14.6 4.9 11.2 
6. Workers in commerce 17 957 391 12.6 2.8 7.2 
7. Blue-collar workers, artisans, drivers 38 710 353 27.1 3.1 6.2 
  6 + 7 56 667 744 39.7 3.0 6.5 
8. Personal services workers 21 981 791 15.4 2.1 5.9 
9. Agricultural workers 27 662 488 19.4 1.6 3.1 
  8 + 9 49 644 279 34.7 1.8 4.3 
  6 + 7 + 8 + 9 106 312 023 74.4 2.5 5.5 
10. Armed Forces 886 257 0.6 7.2 10.6 
11. Not known 20 159 0.0 5.5 10.7 
    1990 
  Total 109 709 636 100.0 4.0 6.2 
1. Employers 4 941 431 4.5 14.6 7.8 
2. Executives and managers 2 262 655 2.1 11.4 11.1 
3. Professionals 4 313 580 3.9 10.2 14.0 
  1 + 2 + 3 11 517 666 10.5 12.3 10.8 
4. Technicians 7 851 736 7.2 5.4 11.0 
5. Administrative employees 862 557 7.9 4.0 10.2 
  4 + 5 16 473 293 15.0 4.7 10.6 
6. Workers in commerce 12 258 753 11.2 3.4 6.4 
7. Blue-collar workers, artisans, drivers 29 810 385 27.2 3.2 5.3 
  6 + 7 42 069 138 38.3 3.3 5.6 
8. Personal services workers 14 898 839 13.6 1.9 4.5 
9. Agricultural workers 22 141 485 20.2 2.0 2.6 
  8 + 9 37 040 324 33.8 2.0 3.4 
  6 + 7 + 8 + 9 79 109 462 72.1 2.7 4.6 
10. Armed Forces 1 226 196 1.1 5.5 9.5 
11. Not known 1 383 019 1.3 3.2 6.3 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of household surveys of the respective countries. 
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Among these countries, the distributive structure of Costa Rica is 
particularly worthy of note, first, because none of the strata in that 
country have occupational incomes less than 3.6 times the poverty line, 
and second, because the income is distributed in a fairly egalitarian 
manner, since the vast majority hover around the general average. 
Underlying this distribution are a number of different factors, one of the 
most important of which is the occupational structure in Costa Rica. The 
percentage of employers agricultural and non-agricultural is almost 
double the regional average. Furthermore, agricultural workers account 
for a lower percentage than the regional average, quite apart from the fact 
that the Costa Rican agricultural sector stands out within Latin America 
for its better land distribution, substantial diversification of production 
and significant assimilation of technical progress. For these reasons, 
agricultural wage earners in Costa Rica have an income equivalent to 4.6 
times the poverty line, which is three times the regional average and is the 
highest of all the countries studied. These factors, among others, explain 
why occupational incomes in Costa Rica have a much more limited 
spread than in other countries of the region and are therefore much closer 
to the national average. Moreover, the income of medium-sized and large-
scale entrepreneurs is only 2.2 times above the national average; that of 
managers of medium and large-scale enterprises is 2.1 times above the 
average; that of administrative employees is similar to the average; that of 
blue-collar workers and artisans is equivalent to 85% of the average, and 
that of agricultural workers, to 75% (see table IV.4). 
In Chile, for example, there are no occupational strata with incomes 
less than 3.3 times the poverty line, but this positive fact is combined with 
considerable inequality in the distribution of occupational income. As 
already noted, in Chile the occupational income of medium and large-
scale non-agricultural employers is almost seven times the national 
average and that of medium and large-scale agricultural employers is 16 
times the average, while that of medium and large-scale managers is five 
times as high. In contrast, the occupational income of administrative 
employees is equivalent to only 70% of the national average, that of blue-
collar workers and operatives, 64%, and that of personal services, security 
and agricultural workers, around 45% of the average. 
When we compare the incomes for the same occupations in Chile 
and Costa Rica, the degree of inequality can be seen to increase as one 
goes up the occupational stratification scale. Thus, the average 
occupational income of all the lower strata, measured as multiples of the 
poverty line, is higher in absolute terms in Costa Rica than in Chile, and 
the same applies even to administrative employees. Technicians and 
supervisors receive the same occupational income in the two countries, 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































but differences, and quite marked ones, emerge in the three strata which 
make up the upper level. Managers and senior officials in Chile earn 25% 
more than those in Costa Rica; professionals 37% more and employers 
more than three times the income of those in Costa Rica. It would be 
beyond the scope of this study to consider the causes of the different 
degrees of inequality existing in the two structures; they are probably due 
to a combination of technical/economic and political/institutional causes. 
The latter play a decisive role in the distribution of economic and political 
power in the two societies, and hence in the capacity of each of the strata 
to defend and increase their income. 
The comparison between the two countries also serves to define 
more accurately the influence of economic growth on occupational 
stratification. It has already been noted that growth has an important 
impact on the proportion that each of the strata represents in the 
workforce as well as on the internal composition of each of them. This 
also influences to an appreciable extent the absolute occupational income 
that such strata earn; however, its influence is considerably smaller as 
regards the distribution of the increases in occupational income among 
the different strata. Chile enjoyed rapid growth over most of the last 15 
years, boosted by a significant transformation in its economic structure. 
Because of this, as already noted, the occupational structure was modified 
in the sense of an increase in upper and middle-level occupations and a 
reduction in the lower level. These structural modifications have not, 
however, brought with them a more equitable distribution of 
occupational income. The occupations of the upper level have broken 
away from the rest as a result of the sharp increase in their occupational 
income, making them an extremely affluent group. In contrast, while the 
number of occupations that make up the middle level has increased 
significantly, their income is getting closer to that of the lower level. In the 
lower level, for its part, the majority of the workforce obtains occupational 
incomes close to half of the national average. At all  events, there is no 
doubt that the increase registered in average occupational income in the 
1990s reached all occupational strata, thus helping to raise consumption 
and reduce poverty. 
Unfortunately, the more egalitarian distribution of occupational 
incomes prevailing in Costa Rica is rare in Latin America, since most 
countries show a considerable degree of inequality. It may also be noted 
that while the buoyant economic growth in Chile has not translated into a 
more equitable distribution among the occupations, the situation in other 
countries has been even more negative, with lower average occupational 
income being combined with marked inequality. 
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In Brazil, where average income is equivalent to 3.9 times the 
poverty line, in 1999 those employed in personal services and security 
earned an average income equivalent to only twice the poverty line, while 
agricultural workers received only 1.2 times the poverty line, showing 
that large segments of the employed did not earn enough to keep  
an average-sized family above the poverty line. This situation coexists 
with a high degree of inequality. The income of medium and large-scale  
non-agricultural employers was almost six times the average for the 
workforce as a whole, and that of executives and managers in the same 
types of establishment was more than three times the national average 
and the average income of professionals. For its part, the income of the 
middle-level strata exceeds the national average by close to 50% and that 
of technicians and administrative employees exceeds it by close to 10%, 
but 75% of the workers belonging to the lower level obtain an income that 
is below the average (agricultural workers, for example, only earn the 
equivalent of 30% of the national average) (see table IV.4). 
In Mexico, where the average occupational income in 1999 was  
3.7 times the poverty line, personal services and security workers and 
agricultural workers also received incomes close to or less than twice the 
poverty line, which shows the difficulties that these employees face in 
trying to bring their families out of poverty. This situation is also 
accompanied by marked inequality. The average occupational income of 
medium and large-scale non-agricultural employers in Mexico is more 
than ten times that of the workforce as a whole, and in the case of 
managers and senior officials of medium and large establishments, it is 
nearly five times as high. From the level of administrative employees 
downwards, occupational income falls sharply: this category obtains only 
80% of the national average, but agricultural workers are in an even 
worse position, earning barely 38% of the average. If we consider the two 
extremes, it may be noted that a medium-sized or large-scale non-
agricultural employer in Mexico obtains, on average, an occupational 
income more than 20 times as high as that of an agricultural worker, while 
in Chile, it is 14 times as high but in Costa Rica, only 3 times as high. 
In short, the foregoing analysis reveals that a high degree of 
inequality in the distribution of occupational income may be observed in 
situations which are very different in terms of the actual amount of the 
average occupational income. This confirms the idea stated in many 
ECLAC studies that an increase in income is not necessarily accompanied 
by greater equality in its distribution. As already noted, analysis of the 
recent Chilean experience reveals two contrasting points: first the 
substantial rise in average occupational income has enabled almost all of 
the occupations of the lower level to obtain relatively high average 
incomes compared with the Latin American average, and this has made a 
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decisive contribution to poverty alleviation. However, in contrast with the 
above, this higher income has not been distributed equitably among the 
occupational strata, because the higher the position attained in the 
occupational stratification, the greater the resources available for 
obtaining occupational income and the greater the capacity for defending 
them. 
At all events, if inequality persists or increases in a structure, but at 
the same time the average occupational income increases, many lower-
level strata can earn sufficient income to have access to goods and services 
considered typical of the middle level. Thus, an apparently paradoxical 
effect is produced: on the one hand, a very uneven stratification structure 
develops, which seems to favour the polarization of occupational income 
between the upper level and the group formed by the middle and lower 
levels, but on the other, both manual and non-manual occupations of the 
middle level and some of the lower level provide sufficient income for a 
good number of persons to accede to goods and services that can make 
them feel part of the middle strata. If we look at this process from the 
perspective of the relative distribution of occupational income among the 
strata, it is clear that we are dealing with a stratification structure made 
up of a minority with very high incomes, a broad base with much lower 
income, and a middle level which, although growing in size, obtains 
incomes not much different from those of the lower level. Conversely, if it 
is viewed from the perspective of the increase in absolute income, as 
already noted it will be seen that poverty is reduced and a part of the 
lower strata feel that their level of consumption has improved sufficiently 
to enable them to consider themselves part of the middle strata. 
As most of the countries in the region did not enjoy rapid economic 
growth in the 1990s, they do not reflect the contrast between a rising 
occupational income and inequitable income distribution. Therefore, the 
main problem in most of the countries is not whether it is more important 
to have growth in absolute occupational income or an improvement in its 
equitable distribution among the strata, but rather how to wrestle with a 
situation in which there is a low level of occupational income, very slow 
or zero economic growth and considerable distributive inequality. 
4. Occupational income of the lower strata 
In the eleven countries considered, approximately 30% of 
occupations provide, on average, an income lower than the minimum 
estimated to be necessary to maintain a typical four-member household 
above the poverty line. However, the relationship between occupational 
income and poverty is not linear, because the percentage of open 
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unemployment varies from one country to another and, in addition, 
because relatively low occupational incomes can permit some of the 
households to overcome poverty, especially in those countries where the 
average number of employed persons per household is high and the 
amount of non-labour income earned by households is significant. 
A substantial proportion of the occupations belonging to the lower 
level provide occupational income that is not sufficient in itself to keep a 
family with four members above the poverty line. The lower the average 
income corresponding to a given occupation is, compared with a certain 
minimum level, the greater the probability that the worker’s household 
will be poor. However, the relationship between the level of occupational 
income and the incidence of poverty in a given country is not so simple or 
linear as it might appear at first sight, because other factors exist that help 
households to reduce the negative influence of the lower individual 
wages on the family’s living conditions. National poverty percentages are 
influenced above all by the level of open unemployment and the average 
occupational income. Two countries may have a fairly similar average 
occupational income, but if in one of them the rate of open 
unemployment is higher, the proportion of poor households will also be 
higher. Households differ also in the number of members and the number 
of persons employed and in terms of the proportion of non-labour income 
in the family income. These factors affect the relative importance that 
occupational incomes have as determinants of the household’s poverty 
status, so that it is advisable to consider only as a tentative approximation 
the establishment of a level of occupational income which would, 
supposedly, be sufficient in all countries to maintain a household above 
the poverty line. 
Nevertheless, this does not detract from the importance of seeking 
to raise the occupational income of jobs at the lower level, because 
although this is not the only determining factor of poverty, it is one of the 
most important. 
In the light of the above-mentioned facts, we may consider, as a 
tentative estimate, that 2.5 times the poverty line is the minimum 
occupational income necessary to place a household with 4 members 
above the poverty line. According to this criterion, in Chile and Costa 
Rica, where occupational income reached an average of 7.3 and 6.2 times 
the poverty line, respectively, in 1999, all occupations receive 
occupational incomes above the minimum. In Panama, with an average 
income 5.4 times the poverty line, only the agricultural occupations 
(16.4% of the employed) provide incomes below the minimum. El 
Salvador, although it has a level of average income considerably below 
that of Panama (3.4 times the poverty line), is in this respect in almost the 
164 ECLAC 
same situation as the latter country, since only the agricultural 
occupations (19.6% of the total) do not attain a minimum income of  
2.5 times the poverty line. In Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, which have 
average occupational incomes of 3.9, 3.7 and 3.6 times the poverty line, 
respectively, persons employed in personal services, security and 
agricultural activities do not earn the necessary minimum; they account 
for 39% of employed persons in Brazil, more than 28% in Mexico and 26% 
in Venezuela (see tables IV.3 and IV.4). 
In Colombia, where the average income is 3.2 times the poverty 
line, workers in commerce and those engaged in personal and security 
services (32% of the workforce) earn incomes below the minimum, but the 
other occupations of the lower level earn incomes that barely exceed the 
limit. Finally, in those countries where the average occupational income 
of the workforce is less than three times the poverty line, almost all the 
occupations of the lower level receive incomes below the minimum: these 
occupations account for 57% of the workforce in Paraguay, 60% in 
Nicaragua, and 85% in Guatemala. 
In short, as might be expected, the occupations belonging to the 
middle and upper levels all obtain incomes above the minimum. In 
addition, when the average occupational income is more than six times 
the poverty line (Chile and Costa Rica), all the occupations receive 
average incomes which are sufficient in themselves to keep a typical 
household above the poverty line. In the remaining countries, where the 
average occupational income is lower than that of the above-mentioned 
countries, the incomes of the occupations of the lower level generally fall 
as average income declines. When countries have an average income that 
varies between three and four times the poverty line, it is very probable 
that agricultural workers and employees in personal and security services 
will receive occupational incomes below the minimum and it is very 
probable also that the incomes corresponding to the remaining 
occupations of the lower level will be very close to this limit. In those 
countries where the average occupational income is below three times the 
poverty line, the most likely situation is that all lower level occupations 
will have average incomes that do not by themselves allow a family to 
stay above the poverty line. 
Between 1990 and 1999, there were some variations in the countries 
owing to the different evolution of the respective average occupational 
income. Costa Rica and Venezuela were the only countries of the eight for 
which information was available where all the occupations obtained 
income above the minimum in 1990. In Costa Rica, this condition was 
maintained in 1999, owing to the favourable trend in the average 
occupational income and the equitable pattern of income distribution 
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among occupations. In Venezuela, on the other hand, the fall in average 
occupational income from 4.5 times the poverty line in 1990 to 3.6 times in 
1999 meant that in 1999, workers in personal and security services and 
agricultural workers had incomes less than 2.5 times the poverty line. In 
Chile, thanks to the sharp improvement in average occupational income, 
it was possible to raise the income of workers in personal services and 
security, which was below the minimum in 1990, and at the same time to 
move agricultural workers a little further from the poverty threshold. The 
sound economic performance recorded in Panama in the 1990s meant that 
the occupational income of personal services and security workers rose 
above the minimum and also brought the income of agricultural workers 
almost to the point of passing that level. In 1999, the situation in Brazil 
and Mexico did not differ from that prevailing in 1990, since personal 
services and security workers and agricultural workers continued to earn 
less than the minimum. In Colombia, on the other hand, all the strata of 
the lower level continued to obtain earnings less than or just over the 
minimum in 1999, while in Guatemala there was a regressive trend, since 
workers in commerce, who earned more than the minimum in 1990, lost 
this position, and in 1999 all the occupations of the lower level earned 
incomes below 2.5 times the poverty line. 
5. Occupational income and educational level 
The educational level of the workforce continued its upward trend 
during the 1990s, but the majority had still not achieved enough years of 
schooling to move out of the lower occupational income levels, while 
there was still a high degree of educational inequality among the different 
strata, although less so than with respect to income. 
On the basis of the weighted averages of 10 countries, the 
workforce as a whole had 6.9 years of schooling in 1999. The stratum with 
the highest level of education was that of the professionals, who had  
14.6 years of schooling, followed by executives and managers (11.7 years), 
technicians (11.5), administrative employees (10.9), employers (8.9), 
workers in commerce (7.1), blue-collar workers, artisans, operatives and 
drivers (6.2), workers in personal services and security (5.9), and 
agricultural workers (3.1). The general average rose from 6.2 years of 
schooling in 1990 to the above-mentioned level of 6.9 years at the end of 
the decade (weighted averages of eight countries) and an increase was 
recorded in all the strata: in the stratum of employers, the average 
increased by 1.2 years of schooling; in that of executives and managers, 
0.6, as also in the case of professionals; for technicians, 0.5; for 
administrative employees, 0.7; for workers in commerce, 0.7; for  
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blue-collar workers, artisans, operatives and drivers, 0.9; for personal 
services and security workers, 1.4, and for agricultural workers, 0.5 years 
(see table IV.5). 
During the 1990s, along with the rise in the educational level of the 
workforce, there was a continued increase in the disparity (already very 
significant in the 1980s) between that rise and the decline in occupational 
income (from 4 to 3.8 times the poverty line between 1990 and 1999). In 
some countries where the workforce had a relatively low educational 
level, a great effort was made to raise it, but this has not yet translated 
into an increase in average occupational income. In El Salvador and 
Paraguay, for example, the average number of years of schooling of the 
workforce at the end of the decade was 6.6 and 7.2, respectively: figures 
close to those of countries like Costa Rica, whose educational 
development is of longer standing, and where the average is 8 years of 
schooling. Nevertheless, the average occupational incomes of all three 
continue to be very different, since in El Salvador and Paraguay they were 
3.4 and 2.9 times the poverty line, respectively, while in Costa Rica, the 
average was 6.2 times the poverty line. In other words, El Salvador and 
Paraguay have an educational gap of less than two years of schooling 
compared with Costa Rica, but their occupational income is only half that 
of the latter country. This type of trend should point to the need for 
caution vis-à-vis strategies which place too much emphasis on 
educational development as the preferred method of increasing 
occupational income. 
In various studies by ECLAC, attention has been drawn to the fact 
that the relationship between the rise in the educational level of the 
workforce and the increase in occupational income is not linear. It has 
also been emphasized that in most countries, 12 years of schooling seem 
to constitute the minimum threshold for education to play a significant 
role in the improvement of occupational income and in poverty reduction. 
Anyone who has an educational level of less than 12 years of schooling 
and does not own productive assets will find it very difficult to move up 
from the lower occupational strata, with their correspondingly low 
incomes. However, as the above data show, the mere fact of attaining an 
educational level similar to that of the middle strata is no guarantee either 
of attaining a correspondingly higher occupational level. In order to have 
some chance of acceding to a middle or upper occupational level, it is 
necessary to have close to or more than 12 years of schooling, and to 
enhance this chance, it is necessary to reach the highest educational level, 
with 14 or more years of schooling. It is therefore clear that families and 
the State must make an enormous effort to raise the educational 
qualifications of the workforce. 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































With regard to the educational levels of the different occupational 
strata, professionals have attained a level of education which puts them 
clearly above the strata forming the upper level, standing out as a true 
elite in terms of education, just as medium and large-scale employers are 
with respect to income. The latter have an occupational income which is 
considerably higher than that corresponding in theory to their relatively 
low educational level, which shows the importance of owning productive 
assets in order to obtain high income, even with few years of schooling. A 
point which should also be taken into consideration is the fact that there 
are major differences in the educational levels of the different types of 
employers: employers owning medium-sized and large establishments 
usually have a much higher educational level than that of the owners of 
small businesses and above all those of micro- and small enterprises. 
Furthermore, as is well known, in this latter stratum occupational income 
is mingled with the returns on wealth, thus distorting the value of the first 
type of income. 
Another interesting point is that in educational stratification, 
occupations are ranked differently from the stratification based on 
income; in the latter, the main cut-off point occurs between the upper 
level whose average income is 12.5 times the poverty line and the 
remaining levels, in which the best-paid occupation is that of technician, 
with an average remuneration of 5.7 times the poverty line. In educational 
stratification, however, the main cut-off point is located between the 
occupations of the upper and middle levels, on the one hand, and those of 
the lower level on the other. This difference in terms of the place where 
the main cut-off point is located in the two stratification structures that 
based on income and that based on education reveals that the 
occupations of technician, supervisor and administrative employee are 
the most affected, in this respect, since on average they have a level of 
education very similar to that of executives and managers and 
substantially higher than that of employers, yet they obtain a much lower 
income than these two groups. 
Although educational expansion, as already noted, has led to a 
situation where many countries have substantially increased the number 
of years of schooling of the workforce, there are still important differences 
between them, which show up for example in the disparity existing in 
1999 between the average of 10.6 years of schooling recorded in Chile and 
the average for Guatemala of 4.3 years. However, it is clear that there is a 
tendency for the occupations of the middle and upper levels of all 
countries to converge with respect to the educational level. A 
professional, manager, technician or administrative employee will tend to 
have an educational level that is fairly similar in all countries. For 
example, while the average years of study in Chile are more than double 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 169 
those in Guatemala, Chilean professionals only have on average 35% 
more years of schooling than Guatemalans, and in the case of 
administrative employees only 20% more. However, all the occupations of 
the lower level in Chile have more than twice as many years of schooling 
as those in Guatemala. Nevertheless, although as already noted the 
educational level has risen in all the strata of all countries, major 
differences still exist between the various levels within the same country. 
In Guatemala, for example, a professional has eight years more schooling 
than a blue-collar worker, and in Chile, seven years more, although this 
difference is less today than it was a few decades ago. 
6. Stratification of occupations and of households 
If households are classified on the basis of the occupation of the 
main breadwinner, average per capita household income reproduces in a 
fairly proportional way the order of average incomes of the occupational 
strata. This highlights the importance of the occupation of the main 
breadwinner for household stratification. However, the fact that almost 
half of Latin American households have more than one breadwinner 
affects the per capita income of the household, depending on the 
occupations and the country involved. In the case of lower-income 
occupations of the lower level, the fact of having more than one employed 
person per household reduces poverty or the percentages of poverty, 
depending on the average income of the country and the size of the 
households. In the upper level, having another employed person does not 
have much impact in view of the high income of the main breadwinner. 
The greatest influence shows up in the middle level and in the higher part 
of the lower level, where households with more than one employed 
person usually have higher average incomes than those of households 
with only one employed person. 
The occupation of the main breadwinner has a sufficiently strong 
influence on family income to cause the per capita income of households 
classified on the basis of this occupation to maintain, in a fairly 
proportional way, the order of the average incomes of the occupational 
strata. Thus, as we can see from table IV.6, the weighted averages for the 
overall employed population in the eight countries for which data were 
available for 1990 and 1999 indicate that when the main breadwinners are 
employers, senior officials, executives or professionals, the per capita 
income of the households varies between 5.4 and 5.9 times the poverty 
line, while the figures for the remaining occupations are as follows: 
technicians or supervisors, 3.1 times the poverty line; administrative 
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employees, 2.1; workers in commerce, 1.6; blue-collar workers, artisans 
and drivers, 1.4; personal services and security workers, 1.2, and 
agricultural workers, 0.9 times the poverty line. In other words, although 
households can improve their income by having more of their members in 
the workforce, their basic position will continue to be determined 
fundamentally by the occupation of the main income earner. 
In many households in Latin America, the per capita income of the 
household has improved thanks to the incorporation of more than one 
member in the workforce. The increasing incorporation of women into the 
labour force, the classic involvement of unpaid family members in rural 
areas or the forced incorporation of children and young people in times of 
crisis, are some of the mechanisms through which households manage to 
improve per capita income. At the end of the 1990s, the number of 
employed persons per household, in the group of households with 
employed persons, stood at an average of 1.8, a figure which falls to 1.6 if 
we take into consideration households without employed persons. The 
number is smaller in countries with higher average occupational income: 
if we take into account all households, the figure is 1.4 in Chile and 1.5 in 
Costa Rica and Panama, and 1.6 in the rest of the eight countries under 
consideration, except Venezuela, where it is 1.7. 
These figures conceal widely differing situations. In the set of eight 
countries examined, 47.6% of households have more than one 
breadwinner, while 41.6% have one breadwinner and 10.8% have none. In 
those with none, 9.2% are headed by inactive heads and 1.6% by 
unemployed heads (see table IV.7). As might be expected, there tends to 
be a higher percentage of households without employed persons in the 
countries where there is a higher average occupational income: for 
example, taking the two extremes in this respect, 14% of households in 
Chile are in this situation and only 6.2% of those in Guatemala. This is 
due to the fact that in countries where there is higher occupational 
income, there is a higher proportion of heads of household who are aged 
65 years or more and/or who can afford not to work. Admittedly, the 
proportion of households with an unemployed head also has an impact, 
but this proportion does not vary according to the greater or lesser 
average occupational income prevailing in each country. 
The analysis by countries does not reveal exactly which households 
resort most frequently to the strategy of increasing the number of 
employed persons. As already noted, countries with a higher average 
occupational income tend to have a lower number of employed persons 
per household, owing to their higher proportion of households without 
employed persons; but if we consider only the households with employed 
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persons, the figures vary very little from one country to another. Nor are 
there substantial differences in the number of persons employed in the 
households, when these are grouped according to the occupational 
stratum of the main breadwinner, although this number tends to be 
slightly higher in the strata of the middle and upper levels, where it 
amounts to a simple average of 1.8 in the eight countries under 
consideration, than in the lower-level strata, where the average goes 
down to 1.7 (see table IV.8). 
If we simultaneously consider the number of employed persons 
and the size of the household, we can determine to what extent the 
increase in the number of employed household members is a necessary 
survival strategy for a large household or whether, unlike this situation of 
necessity, it is a means adopted by households to increase their well-being 
still further, even when the main breadwinner is able on his/her own to 
place the household in the middle or upper level. 
Occupational density, which is the ratio of the number of employed 
members to the total number of members in the household, is a suitable 
indicator for understanding the relative intensity of employment in the 
different strata. As shown in table IV.8, the overall group of households of 
the eight countries under consideration has an occupational density of 
0.44, but this rises to 0.49 if we take into account only those households in 
which there is at least one employed member. In this respect, there are 
appreciable differences between the countries, varying from a maximum 
of 0.53 for all households in Brazil and a minimum of 0.44 in the case of El 
Salvador and Venezuela, but such differences are due to complex factors 
associated more with the willingness to accept different types of work, 
especially low-productivity work, than with the average occupational 
income existing in each country. 
The differences in occupational density are better understood if we 
consider them from the standpoint of the occupational hierarchy of the 
household, this being understood as the greater or lesser capacity to 
generate income as a result of education, wealth or social factors. Thus, 
we can see that occupational density is lower in low-level households 
than in those of the middle or high level, since the latter are in a position 
to find employment for a larger number of members, having received a 
better education and benefited from a network of social relationships that 
make it much easier for various members to find employment. In the 
households in which the main breadwinner has a upper level occupation, 
the occupational density is 0.51, declining to 0.49 for a middle level 
occupation and to 0.45 for a lower level occupation. 
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Thus, households whose heads belong to occupational strata of the 
upper and middle levels have a slight difference in their favour in terms 
of the chance of finding employment for other members of the family and 
a much more substantial advantage with respect to occupational density. 
This difference in the occupational density of households according to the 
stratum of the main breadwinner is seen in all the countries under 
consideration, although it tends to be greater in those where the average 
occupational income is higher (see table IV.8). 
As may be inferred to some degree from the above, the impact of 
the number of employed persons on household income varies 
considerably depending on the occupational stratum of the main 
breadwinner. In those strata which are at the lower end of the scale, 
especially agricultural workers, this impact is quite weak, since the 
households tend to be very large and to have a relatively small number of 
employed members, so that the occupational density is also low. Clearly, 
as the number of employed persons increases so does the average income 
of any household, thus ensuring an improvement in its living conditions. 
Nevertheless, if the household is very large, the increase in per capita 
income coming from the higher number of employed members will not be 
significant and often will not exceed that of smaller households with only 
one employed person. In general, an increase in the number of employed 
persons in larger households relieves the extreme poverty that having 
only one employed person would imply, but does not make it possible to 
raise substantially their per capita income, especially in those countries 
where there is a large mass of poor peasants. In Brazil, for example, 
households in which the main breadwinner is an agricultural worker 
have the highest average of employed persons (2.1) of all the strata in all 
countries, but there is no difference in the average income of these 
households regardless of whether they have only one or more than one 
member employed, which shows that large households or those where 
the main breadwinner receives an extremely low income have no choice 
but to have other members join the labour force. 
At the other extreme of the stratification scale, households whose 
main breadwinner has a upper level occupation can in theory benefit even 
more from the incorporation of other members into the workforce, 
because generally such households are smaller than those of the lower 
strata. However, this is not usually the case. When these households have 
more than one employed member, the average income does not increase 
very significantly, owing largely to the fact that additional workers 
usually earn much lower occupational incomes than that of the main 
breadwinner. 
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In reality, the greater impact of the increase in the number of 
employed persons on average income does not occur in households in 
which the main breadwinner belongs to the extremes of the job 
stratification scale, but in those that are in the middle level and in the 
upper part of the lower level, such as those corresponding to 
administrative employees, workers in commerce and urban manual 
workers. In these households, if other members join the workforce, it adds 
substantially to the household’s average income. On the basis of the 
available information, it may be stated that in many households whose 
heads belong to these strata, a significantly higher income has been 
achieved than in the case of just one employed member, which has 
contributed to their upward social mobility. Although this is a common 
occurrence, it cannot be said to apply to the region as a whole, since it 
does not occur in Mexico and only occurs to a limited degree in Brazil. 
Furthermore, owing to the difference in occupational income existing 
between the occupations of the middle and upper level, the increase 
generated by the higher occupational density is not sufficient to enable 
middle-level households to receive incomes as high as those of the upper 
level. This situation occurs only in Costa Rica, where the differences 
between the occupational incomes of the different strata are slight. Nor is 
it easy for a household whose main breadwinner has a lower-level job to 
obtain the income characteristic of a middle-level occupation by 
increasing the number of employed persons, although there have been 
examples of this. Consequently, the increase in household income owing 
to a higher number of employed persons does not generally enable a 
household to cross the income barrier between the different occupational 
levels. 
Naturally, poverty is more prevalent in households without 
employed persons, since it affects 68.9% of them, followed by those with 
inactive heads (41.6%) and by households that have only one employed 
person (41.2%), declining to 31.9% in those where there is more than one 
employed person. 
The greater occupational density helps to reduce poverty, 
especially in households where the main breadwinner has a lower-level 
occupation, because obviously, when the occupational income is higher, 
this is often sufficient in itself to keep the household above the poverty 
line. However, when the income of the main breadwinner is very low, the 
incorporation of new members into the workforce may alleviate poverty 
but not succeed in overcoming it. This is particularly evident when the 
main income earners of the household are agricultural workers, since in 
this case the low occupational income is compounded by the fact that an 
important proportion of the other members are unpaid family workers 
(see table IV.8). 
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In households where the main breadwinners work in non-
agricultural manual jobs, the proportion of unpaid family members is 
usually much less and the household smaller than in the case of 
agricultural occupations, so that the addition of another member into the 
workforce usually means a more significant improvement in total 
household income. The chance of this permitting the household to 
overcome poverty depends on the occupational income obtained by the 
employed members of the household, however, which is quite low in 
some countries in the case of some urban occupations, such as personal 
services jobs. 
In any event, as already noted, the fact that greater occupational 
density is not sufficient to reduce the proportion of poor households in 
those situations where occupational income is very low does not mean 
that this higher density does not help to improve living conditions by at 
least relieving the gravity of their poverty. 
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Methodological annex 
Criteria applied in defining occupational strata 
Studies on occupational stratification usually use a variety of 
variables to define the main occupational groups or strata. The most 
important of these variables are those relating to i) the relationship 
between persons and the means of production, which makes it possible to 
distinguish between the basic categories of owners or employers 
subdivided in turn according to the size of the firm and of wage-
earners and own-account workers; ii) the nature of the work (manual and 
non-manual); iii) the degree of skills, divided generally into three levels: 
high, middle and low; iv) the degree of authority exercised in the 
enterprise, also divided generally into three levels; v) the type of contract 
service, middle and labour, according to Goldthorpe’s classification 
and lastly, vi) the branches and sectors of activity to which people belong. 
In the vast majority of empirical studies on the subject, the classification of 
strata or major occupational groups has been made on the basis of some 
of these variables, although the emphasis may be placed on certain 
variables in particular, according to each author’s implicit or explicit 
theoretical orientation. For example, the occupational classifications used 
by some official agencies, such as the Registrar General of the United 
Kingdom, the first of which dates back to 1911, pay special attention to 
the level of skills and authority and the nature of the work carried out; 
those of neo-marxists, such as Wright, place emphasis on the ownership 
of the means of production, while not ignoring the level of skills and 
authority; while neo-Weberians, such as Goldthorpe, combine the 
relationship with the means of production with the level of skills and 
authority, the separation into agricultural and non-agricultural branches 
and, especially, the nature of the contract: a criterion which they use to 
establish their well-known division between the service class, the middle 
class and the working class. Of course, another point of great importance 
in defining the strata that are used is the universe to which the study will 
apply (for example, for obvious reasons, the studies carried out in the 
developed countries pay much less attention to the agricultural 
occupations than those carried out in Latin America). It is also important 
to determine whether the study will use first hand data or data drawn 
from censuses or household surveys. When second-hand information is 
used, as is the case in this study, it must respect the classification 
contained in the original study, which may be modified or adapted, but 
always within narrow limits. 
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Based on the above-mentioned criteria, the classification of strata 
used in this study is as follows: 
i)  Employers, divided on the basis of size of enterprise into 
micro-employers (up to four or five employees, depending on 
the country), small-scale employers (from four or five to nine 
or ten employees) and medium and large-scale employers 
(from ten or eleven employees and up). 
ii)  Senior officials, managers and directors. 
iii)  Highly skilled professionals. 
iv)  Middle-level professionals, technicians and supervisors. 
v)  Administrative or clerical employees. 
vi)  Workers in commerce. 
vii)  Blue-collar workers, artisans, operatives and drivers. 
viii)  Personal services and security workers. 
ix)  Agricultural workers. 
In general, these are the occupational strata that are usually used in 
household survey classifications, but in this study it was necessary in 
some cases to adjust the data to match this classification, in order to 
ensure that the data corresponding to eight countries in the 1989-1990 
period and to eleven countries in the 1999-2000 period were comparable. 
The nine strata mentioned constitute the basic categories used here 
for the analysis of occupational stratification, although, in so far as the 
information allowed it, additional variables were also used to obtain a 
more detailed overview of each of the strata. This is particularly relevant, 
since the strata are large conglomerates of occupations, and although they 
display a basic degree of homogeneity, it is always possible to discern 
various sub-strata among them, depending on the level of skills, the size 
of the enterprise in which the persons are employed, whether they are 
wage-earners or own-account workers, public or private employees, and 
other similar parameters. Finally, the strata, and whenever possible the 
sub-strata, were studied and compared on the basis of three main 
variables: the proportion that they represented in the labour force, the 
average occupational income of each of them (measured in multiples of 
the poverty line), and the average years of schooling. 
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Chapter V 
Intergenerational transmission of opportunities 
for attaining well-being 
This chapter, which covers 18 countries of the region, shows how, 
despite the efforts made to extend the coverage of the formal education 
system, the socioeconomic and family origin of individuals continues to 
be a determining factor in their present and future opportunities for 
education and for social and economic integration. The fact that 
educational opportunities and consequently, opportunities for access to 
more stable and better-paid employment are to a high degree inherited 
is a key element in the reproduction of socioeconomic inequalities, and 
limits the potential for taking advantage of competitiveness strategies 
based on technological progress and the accumulation of knowledge. 
1. Transmission of opportunities for well-being 
The opportunities for well-being of more than half of all Latin 
Americans are restricted at an early stage by the nature of the 
intergenerational transmission of educational capital and work 
opportunities, which is one of several determining factors in the high and 
persistent level of socioeconomic inequality in the region. 
Around 75% of young people in urban areas are from households 
in which the parents have inadequate educational capital (less than  
10 years of schooling) and, on average, more than 45% do not reach the 
educational threshold required for attaining well-being, which, while 
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varying from country to country, is currently around 12 years of 
schooling (see figure V.1 and table V.1). 
Figure V.1 
LATIN AMERICA: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 20 TO 24 

















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
Young people who surpass the education of their parents and secure a basic educational capital 
Young people who surpass the education of their parents but do not secure a basic educational capital 
Young people who do not surpass the education of their parents but secure a basic educational capital 
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Table V.1 
LATIN AMERICA (GROUPS OF COUNTRIES): INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATIONAL 
BETTERMENT OF CHILDREN AGED FROM 20 TO 24 YEARS, BY SEX,  
URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, 2000 
(Percentages)a 
Geographical area 
Urban areas Rural areas 
Educational betterment Educational betterment 
Young people who 
surpass the education 
of their parents 
Young people who do 
not surpass the 
education of their 
parents 
Young people who 
surpass the education 
of their parents 
Young people who do 
not surpass the 







































Low group Both sexes 100 41 9 12 37 100 13 10 0 77 
  Men 100 37 9 12 42 100 13 11 0 76 
  Women 100 47 10 12 31 100 13 9 0 77 
Intermediate 
group Both sexes 100 40 9 14 36 100 19 13 3 65 
  Men 100 34 9 13 43 100 16 11 3 70 
  Women 100 47 9 15 29 100 24 15 3 57 
High group Both sexes 100 43 9 18 31 100 25 18 3 54 
  Men 100 36 9 18 38 100 20 19 3 59 
  Women 100 51 8 18 23 100 33 18 3 46 
Total, all 
countries Both sexes 100 40 9 15 36 100 18 13 2 67 
  Men  100 35 9 14 42 100 16 13 2 70 
  Women 100 47 9 15 29 100 23 13 2 62 




Simple averages of the country data. 
b
 The countries are grouped according to the gross enrolment ratio for the secondary cycle in the mid-
1990s, according to figures from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). The low group consists of 
Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Venezuela; the intermediate group includes 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, and the high 
group consists of Argentina, Chile, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. 
The opportunities for young people who live in rural areas are even 
more limited, as around 80% do not manage to accumulate the minimum 
educational capital, even when a lower threshold is considered (see table 
V.2).1 This high proportion of young people inherit an inadequate 
education which, in the course of their lives, results in badly paid jobs and 
reduces their own opportunities for well-being and those of their families. 
 
                                                          
1  For rural areas, the threshold for children was set at 9 years, while for the parents, less 
than 6 years of schooling was considered inadequate. 
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Table V.2 
LATIN AMERICA (GROUPS OF COUNTRIES): CHILDREN AGED FROM 20 TO 24 YEARS 
WHO DID NOT SURPASS THE EDUCATION OF THEIR PARENTS AND WHO 
COMPLETED LESS THAN 12 YEARS OF SCHOOLING, BY SEX AND  
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THEIR PARENTS,  
URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, 2000 
(Percentages)a 
Geographical area 
Urban areas Rural areas 
Educational level of parents Educational level of parents 
Group of  






















Low group Both sexes 37 55 48 31 21 10 77 82 72 58 13 16 
  Men 42 59 55 34 25 13 76 80 70 63 11 13 
  Women 31 48 40 27 16 7 77 84 72 52 10 18 
Both sexes 36 52 48 35 24 11 65 75 62 48 20 9 
Intermediate 
group 
Men 43 59 52 42 30 12 70 79 67 56 20 15 
  Women 29 44 42 28 18 10 57 69 53 37 20 7 
High group Both sexes 31 41 44 38 21 15 54 63 56 46 32 34 
  Men 38 51 53 47 24 18 59 67 64 47 39 41 
  Women 23 30 33 29 17 13 46 56 43 43 21 28 
Both sexes 36 51 48 36 23 11 67 75 64 51 20 17 
Total, 
all countries 
Men 42 57 55 42 28 14 70 77 68 57 23 19 
  Women 29 43 40 29 18 9 62 72 58 43 15 17 




Simple averages of the country data. 
b
 The countries are grouped according to the gross enrolment ratio for the secondary cycle in the mid-
1990s, according to figures from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). The low group consists of 
Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Venezuela; the intermediate group includes 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, and the high 
group consists of Argentina, Chile, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. 
The intergenerational factor is even more apparent from the low 
proportion of young people who significantly exceed the educational 
level of their parents, despite the notable extension in educational 
coverage between the two generations.2 
The average years of schooling of young people have risen from  
7.1 to 10.4 years in urban areas, and from 3 to 6.8 in rural areas, yet only a 
little over 33% of urban young people and 20% of rural young people 
have achieved a significant and sufficient increase in education compared 
with their parents (see figure V.2). 
                                                          
2  Although there are other important factors, such as the demographic, asset ownership 
and employment aspects of households, for most people educational capital is the main 
determining factor of their opportunities for future well-being. 
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Figure V.2 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE YEARS OF SCHOOLING OF YOUNG PEOPLE AGED  


















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 National total. 
In the following sections of this chapter, data will be presented on 
the chain that determines the different opportunities for well-being 
according to the social stratum of the household of origin, together with 
data on the way in which this is reflected in income distribution. When 
the information is presented by groups of countries, details of the figures 
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2. The transmission of educational capital 
Despite the significant extension of educational coverage in the 
region over the past 15 years, young people from the lower social strata 
have had few opportunities to achieve a level of education that would 
allow them subsequently to attain a minimum level of well-being. At 
present, just over 30% of young people whose parents did not complete 
their primary education manage to finish the secondary cycle. In contrast, 
the secondary cycle is completed by 75% of children whose parents had at 
least ten years of schooling. 
The continuing link between access to education and the social 
stratum of origin indicates that the well-being opportunities of young 
people today have already been shaped to a large extent by the pattern of 
inequalities that prevailed in the previous generation. This results in a 
rigid social structure and little social mobility. This inequality even limits 
opportunities to improve income distribution in the medium term, 
because educational capital the number of years of schooling and the 
quality of education is the main route, and for the majority the only 
route, to obtaining well-paid employment. 
Analysis of the intergenerational transmission of educational 
inequalities is particularly important with regard to the possibilities of 
completing the secondary cycle, which today is the threshold for avoiding 
poverty. There are very sharp differences in the proportion of young 
people who complete 12 or more years of schooling according to the level 
of education of their parents. Thus, among the countries for which 
information is available, in those with relatively lower levels of coverage 
for secondary education Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Paraguay and Venezuela only one in every three young people whose 
parents completed less than six years of education manage to complete 
their secondary education. In contrast, three out of every four young 
people whose parents completed more than 12 years of schooling reach at 
least this level (see table V.3). 
In countries with higher secondary enrolment ratios Argentina, 
Chile, Panama, Peru and Uruguay there are also differences of 
educational level among young people according to the educational 
capital of their household of origin. In these countries, the proportion of 
urban young people who complete 12 or more years of schooling reaches, 
on average, 60%: a figure which is higher than the average for the first 
group of countries in the table (53%). This gap is also apparent in rural 
areas (37% compared to 11%). In these countries with higher ratios, while 
only 36% of children of parents with less than six years of schooling 
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complete secondary education, over 90% of the children of parents who 
completed secondary school reach that level (see figure V.3). 
Table V.3 
LATIN AMERICA (GROUPS OF COUNTRIES): YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 20 TO 24 YEARS 
WITH A MINIMUM OF 9, 12 AND 14 YEARS OF SCHOOLING, BY EDUCATIONAL  
LEVEL OF THEIR PARENTS, URBAN AREAS 
(Simple average of the countries, percentages) 
Educational level of the parentsa Group Years of schooling Year Total 
0-5 6-9 10-12 13 or more 
Low groupb At least 9 years 1990 65 49 81 90 96 
  2000 69 51 81 94 96 
 At least 12 years 1990 43 28 53 74 84 
  2000 53 33 63 77 91 
 At least 14 years 1990 19 10 21 39 57 
  2000 20 8 18 31 57 
At least 9 years 1990 62 49 76 93 96 Intermediate 
groupc 
 2000 70 51 79 89 96 
 At least 12 years 1990 43 29 53 75 88 
  2000 54 32 59 75 92 
 At least 14 years 1990 16 7 20 39 60 
  2000 23 7 22 36 62 
High groupd At least 9 years 1990 77 58 80 91 96 
  2000 79 58 75 94 97 
 At least 12 years 1990 52 30 51 72 88 
  2000 60 36 51 75 90 
 At least 14 years 1990 16 6 12 26 48 
  2000 22 6 12 29 54 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 Average years of schooling of the head of household and his/her spouse. 
b
 Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Venezuela. 
c
 Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Mexico. The Dominican Republic was excluded, 
as comparable data were not available for both years. 
d
 Chile, Panama and Uruguay. Argentina and Peru were excluded, as comparable data were not available 
for both years. 
The data for rural areas also show differences deriving from the 
prevailing educational climate in the home. As in urban areas, throughout 
the 1990s a gap remained between the percentages of young people from 
households of different educational levels who completed at least nine 
years of schooling. Between the beginning and end of the decade, there 
was a certain rigidity in the distribution of educational opportunities, due 
largely to the educational climate of the home (see table V.4). 
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Figure V.3 
LATIN AMERICA: YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 20 TO 24 YEARS WITH A MINIMUM OF 9,  
12 AND 14 YEARS OF SCHOOLING, ACCORDING TO THE EDUCATIONAL  
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It is disturbing to note that the efforts made to extend educational 
coverage over the past ten years have not succeeded in reducing the gap 
between young people from different social strata. If all of the data relating 
to the urban areas of 15 countries at the beginning and end of the 1990s are 
considered, it will be seen that the differences in the proportions of young 
people aged 20 to 24 with 12 years of schooling from households with 
different educational capital remained virtually unchanged (see table V.4). 
Table V.4 
LATIN AMERICA (GROUPS OF COUNTRIES): YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 20 TO 24 YEARS 
WITH A MINIMUM OF 9 AND 12 YEARS OF SCHOOLING, BY EDUCATIONAL  
LEVEL OF THEIR PARENTS, RURAL AREAS 
(Simple average of the countries, percentages) 
Educational level of the parentsa Group Years of schooling Year Total 
0-5 6-9 10 or more 
Low group b At least 9 years 1990 14 12 64 69 
  2000 21 18 59 90 
 At least 12 years 1990 7 6 34 58 
  2000 11 9 41 65 
At least 9 years 1990 24 20 55 90 Intermediate 
group c 
 2000 34 28 63 94 
 At least 12 years 1990 13 10 32 64 
  2000 22 15 44 87 
High group d At least 9 years 1990 44 31 72 89 
  2000 55 41 70 92 
 At least 12 years 1990 28 17 52 76 
  2000 37 24 49 78 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 Average years of schooling of the head of household and his/her spouse. 
b El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. Bolivia, Paraguay and Venezuela were excluded, as comparable 
data were not available for both years. 
c
 Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Mexico. Ecuador and the Dominican Republic were 
excluded, as comparable data were not available for both years. 
d
 Chile and Panama. Argentina, Peru and Uruguay were excluded, as comparable data were not available 
for both years. 
The above shows that, for the majority of young people in the 
region, educational capital continues to depend on the education of their 
parents and the economic capacity of their household of origin. Two 
aspects are worthy of note in this respect. First, the inequality of 
educational opportunities already manifests itself at the primary school 
level. In urban areas of Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Paraguay and Venezuela, the percentage of young people who did not 
complete more than 8 years of schooling fluctuated between 11% and 
47%, and most of them were from homes where the parents had not 
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surpassed that educational level either. In Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico and the Dominican Republic, these 
percentages fluctuated between 20% and 49%, and in Argentina, Chile, 
Panama, Peru and Uruguay, between 9% and 34% (see table V.4). There is 
a high probability that young people who complete only eight years of 
schooling will reproduce the poverty of their household of origin. 
Inadequate educational capital is one of the main stumbling blocks in the 
efforts to reduce extreme poverty (see figure V.4). 
Second, differences in the number of years of schooling are not the 
only source of inequality in educational capital. The quality of the 
education that young people receive also varies according to the social 
stratum from which they come. Measurements of the level of learning 
show significant differences between public and private schools. Delich 
(2002) states that while the average student in public schools scarcely 
learns 50% of the contents of the official curriculum, the graduates of 
private schools easily come close to 100%. In the same study, this author 
says that an analysis of reading and writing tests shows that two out of 
five pupils in the fourth or fifth grade do not understand what they read, 
and those two come precisely from families with a low socioeconomic 
level. Although the data from household surveys cannot be used to 
analyse the gap in educational quality, there are clear indications that 
those who manage to complete more years of education have generally 
received better-quality education.  
Many governments in the region have carried out educational 
reforms focused on the curricula, institutional changes and the allocation 
of more financial resources. It is possible that such reforms may manage 
to bring the results and educational achievements of students from 
private and public establishments closer together, and thus reduce the 
educational inequalities between different socioeconomic strata.3 It has 
not been sufficiently emphasized, however, that a very substantial 
proportion of the educational inequalities that are transmitted from one 
generation to another are still related to the number of years of schooling 
completed by young people from different social strata, independently of 
the quality of the education that they receive. Attempts to improve 
education may have little effect if they are not accompanied by policies 
                                                          
3  In the same study cited above (Delich, 2002, pp. 32 and 33), it is claimed that a review is 
also needed of the inequalities that have arisen in the educational system, which raise 
questions about education in general and which are greater in the public than in the 
private sector. There is a huge gap between a child who goes to school in Greater Buenos 
Aires, where he has three hours of classes in an overcrowded room for 50 days a year, 
and another child, also in a public school with a double-shift system who learns 
languages, computer studies and other subjects, as occurs in the capital. It is easy to 
imagine what this difference will mean, ten years later, in terms of income. 
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that extend the period for which young people in the middle and lower 
strata remain in the school system. A high proportion of these young 
people do not stay at school for the 12 years that are considered the 
minimum requirement. 
Figure V.4 
LATIN AMERICA: AVERAGE LABOUR INCOME AND PERCENTAGE OF POOR PEOPLE 




















Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 PL: poverty lines. 
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3. Educational capital and employment opportunities 
The intergenerational transmission of opportunities for well-being, 
which begins in the household of origin and continues at school, links 
educational attainment with the occupations that are most likely to be 
accessible, and the income deriving from them. Those who complete 13 or 
more years of schooling (post-secondary education), will mainly be 
professionals, technicians or directors, who in urban areas amount to 
about 45% of this group (see table V.5).4 The average monthly income for 
this group as a whole is between 4 and 18 poverty lines (see table V.6), 
with professionals and technicians earning an average of 6.5 poverty lines 
and directors receiving an average of 10. 
In rural areas, 52% of those who have this level of educational 
attainment would work in the types of occupations mentioned (see table 
V.5). Unlike urban areas, where there is a relatively large supply of high 
qualifications and those who have them are therefore found in a greater 
variety of occupations, in rural areas there is a higher concentration of 
highly-qualified persons in professional, technical and upper 
management occupations. This higher concentration is clearly visible 
when the countries are grouped according to the level of gross secondary 
enrolment: in the lowest-level group (Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras), the percentage of young people aged 20 to 29 years with post-
secondary education who are in occupations of a professional or specialist 
nature or who reach upper management positions amounts to 75%; in the 
intermediate-level group (Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
Mexico and the Dominican Republic) this percentage is around 42%, and 
in the group with the highest secondary enrolment ratios (Chile, Panama 
and Peru) it is no more than 35%. 
The other occupations which are easily accessible with 13 or more 
years of schooling are those of administrative employee, accountant, 
salesperson or shop assistant: occupations which in most of the countries 
are exercised by between 35% and 45% of persons with that educational 
level in urban areas, with an average monthly income usually between 3.5 
and 5.5 poverty lines. 
                                                          
4  In Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela, the joint 
duration of the primary and secondary cycles is 11 years (see UIS, 2003). In these 
countries any education as from the twelfth year of schooling is considered to be post-
secondary. 
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Table V.5 
LATIN AMERICA (GROUPS OF COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF 
YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 20 TO 29 YEARS WHO WORK 20 OR MORE HOURS  
PER WEEK, BY OCCUPATION AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL,  
URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, 1999a 
URBAN AREAS 































Low group Total 100.0 11.3 3.7 15.9 16.5 33.6 7.1 9.2 2.7 
  0-8 100.0 1.2 1.6 5.1 16.9 43.7 11.7 15.2 4.7 
  9-12 100.0 8.0 3.0 20.5 19.5 34.9 5.2 7.3 1.7 
  13 or more 100.0 38.1 9.2 27.1 10.1 11.2 1.0 2.3 1.0 
Intermediate 
group Total 100.0 10.3 2.5 14.5 19.5 32.3 4.8 11.5 4.5 
  0-8 100.0 0.7 0.8 3.9 17.0 42.8 9.2 17.5 8.1 
  9-12 100.0 4.9 2.1 18.9 24.4 33.5 3.5 10.3 2.4 
  13 or more 100.0 37.4 6.8 25.6 16.7 9.7 0.4 3.0 0.4 
High group Total 100.0 13.9 2.5 16.2 16.4 30.9 5.4 11.6 3.2 
  0-8 100.0 0.7 1.0 3.2 12.4 42.0 11.0 20.8 8.9 
  9-12 100.0 3.8 1.9 17.3 20.5 36.3 5.1 12.5 2.7 
  13 or more 100.0 41.5 5.0 25.6 11.5 11.2 1.0 3.5 0.7 
Total 
countries Total 100.0 11.6 2.9 15.4 17.6 32.4 5.7 10.8 3.5 
  0-8 100.0 0.9 1.1 4.1 15.7 42.9 10.5 17.6 7.2 
  9-12 100.0 5.6 2.3 19.0 21.7 34.7 4.5 9.9 2.2 
  13 or more 100.0 38.8 7.1 26.1 13.0 10.6 0.7 2.9 0.7 
RURAL AREAS 































Low group Total 100.0 4.7 1.8 1.6 7.3 18.2 12.7 4.7 49.1 
  0-8 100.0 0.6 1.7 0.5 5.8 17.0 12.9 5.4 56.0 
  9-12 100.0 11.4 1.1 6.7 15.2 24.9 9.4 2.9 28.6 
  13 or more 100.0 73.3 1.6 6.2 5.5 4.8 1.3 0.9 6.4 
Intermediate 
group Total 100.0 3.5 1.0 3.6 10.6 24.6 4.6 7.9 44.3 
  0-8 100.0 0.5 0.6 1.0 8.2 23.6 5.2 7.8 53.2 
  9-12 100.0 6.0 1.3 9.4 19.7 29.4 3.5 8.9 21.7 
  13 or more 100.0 37.2 5.0 15.6 16.0 11.4 4.0 4.1 6.7 
High group Total 100.0 4.1 1.6 4.0 8.0 23.0 3.6 7.5 48.3 
  0-8 100.0 0.2 0.7 0.4 6.0 19.7 3.3 7.9 61.9 
  9-12 100.0 4.2 2.2 6.1 10.9 30.1 5.0 7.4 34.1 
  13 or more 100.0 29.4 3.7 15.2 9.5 18.2 0.9 5.7 17.4 
Total 
countries Total 100.0 4.1 1.4 3.0 8.9 21.9 7.3 6.7 46.9 
  0-8 100.0 0.5 1.0 0.7 6.8 20.4 7.5 7.0 56.1 
  9-12 100.0 7.6 1.4 7.7 16.2 27.9 5.9 6.4 26.8 
  13 or more 100.0 48.4 3.5 12.2 10.9 10.5 2.4 3.3 8.9 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 Simple averages of the country data. 
b
 The countries are grouped according to the gross enrolment ratio for the secondary cycle in the  
mid-1990s, according to figures from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). The low group consists of 
Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Venezuela (only in the part of the table on 
urban areas); the intermediate group includes Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador (urban areas), 
Mexico, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, and the high group consists of Argentina (urban areas), 
Chile, Panama, Peru and Uruguay (urban areas). 
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Table V.6 
LATIN AMERICA (GROUPS OF COUNTRIES): AVERAGE INCOME OF YOUNG PEOPLE 
AGED 20 TO 29 YEARS WHO WORK 20 OR MORE HOURS PER WEEK,  
BY OCCUPATION AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL,  
URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, 1999a 
(Multiples of the per capita poverty line) 
URBAN AREAS 































Low group Total 2.8 4.3 7.4 3.2 2.4 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.8 
  0-8 2.1 2.5 5.4 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.4 1.5 1.7 
  9-12 2.8 2.8 6.3 3.1 2.4 2.8 2.7 1.7 1.5 
  13 or more 4.4 4.7 8.4 3.6 3.1 3.6 3.5 2.6 3.1 
Intermediate 
group Total 3.3 6.7 9.5 3.5 2.9 2.9 3.1 2.0 2.4 
  0-8 2.4 2.7 4.4 2.8 2.4 2.6 2.6 1.7 2.3 
  9-12 3.1 3.9 10.0 3.2 2.8 3.2 3.6 2.5 2.9 
  13 or more 5.5 7.3 10.0 4.1 4.5 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.4 
High group Total 4.0 6.6 10.6 4.3 3.6 3.6 3.6 2.9 2.8 
  0-8 2.9 4.1 5.4 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.2 2.6 2.4 
  9-12 3.7 4.8 7.1 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.2 3.1 
  13 or more 5.9 7.0 12.0 4.9 4.4 4.7 4.1 3.5 5.4 
Total 
countries Total 3.3 5.9 9.1 3.6 2.9 3.0 3.1 2.1 2.3 
  0-8 2.4 2.9 5.1 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.7 1.9 2.1 
  9-12 3.2 3.7 8.0 3.3 2.9 3.2 3.3 2.4 2.5 
  13 or more 5.2 6.4 10.0 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.2 4.0 
RURAL AREAS 































Low group Total 2.1 4.5 4.4 3.8 2.3 2.7 3.2 1.7 1.7 
  0-8 1.8 3.0 3.8 2.9 2.0 2.6 2.9 1.8 1.7 
  9-12 2.7 4.9 6.3 4.0 2.6 3.1 3.4 2.1 1.3 
  13 or more 4.3 4.7 4.1 4.6 2.8 3.6 6.0 3.0 4.5 
Intermediate 
group Total 3.2 6.0 7.0 4.9 3.1 3.5 4.0 2.8 2.6 
  0-8 2.8 3.4 4.5 4.3 2.8 3.3 3.9 2.4 2.5 
  9-12 3.7 5.3 6.9 4.0 3.3 4.0 3.5 4.1 3.4 
  13 or more 6.4 7.5 11.2 6.1 4.2 6.1 5.0 4.9 3.9 
High group Total 3.2 8.4 14.0 4.2 3.2 3.9 3.7 2.4 2.4 
  0-8 2.5 3.0 4.8 5.1 2.6 3.8 3.4 2.1 2.2 
  9-12 3.3 5.3 10.8 4.0 3.7 3.9 3.8 2.7 2.7 
  13 or more 6.8 10.5 31.7 6.1 3.9 4.1 6.4 2.4 3.7 
Total 
countries Total 2.8 6.0 7.3 4.4 2.8 3.3 3.6 2.3 2.2 
  0-8 2.4 3.2 4.3 3.9 2.5 3.2 3.4 2.1 2.2 
  9-12 3.3 5.1 7.4 4.0 3.1 3.7 3.6 3.1 2.5 
  13 or more 5.7 7.1 14.2 5.6 3.8 5.0 5.4 3.9 4.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 Simple averages of the country data. 
b
 The countries are grouped according to the gross enrolment ratio for the secondary cycle in the mid-
1990s, according to figures from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). The low group consists of 
Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Venezuela (only in the part of the table on 
urban areas); the intermediate group includes Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador (urban areas), 
Mexico, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, and the high group consists of Argentina (urban areas), 
Chile, Panama, Peru and Uruguay (urban areas). 
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Opportunities for individuals with an intermediate but inadequate 
level of education between nine and eleven years of schooling are 
usually concentrated in the lower half of the occupational structure. In 
urban areas, just over 40% manage to find work, at best, as administrative 
workers, accountants, salespersons or shop assistants, with an average 
monthly income that is usually equivalent to between 2.5 and 3.5 poverty 
lines. More than 50% (57%, on average, among the countries with higher 
levels of education) work as factory hands, labourers, caretakers, waiters 
or domestic employees, with an average monthly income of between  
1.5 and 3.5 poverty lines. 
In contrast, about 80% of urban workers with eight or less years of 
schooling usually work as labourers, security staff, waiters or domestic 
employees, with a monthly average income of between 2 and 2.5 poverty 
lines, which is insufficient to guarantee the well-being of a family (see 
tables V.5 and V.6). As the coverage of secondary education increases, the 
above percentage also increases, from 75% in the group with the lowest 
secondary coverage to 83% in the highest group, because when there is a 
larger supply of qualified workers, the least qualified workers tend to 
concentrate in occupations of lower status, quality and remuneration. 
Consequently, although there are different situations in the countries 
considered, there is basically a high degree of similarity in terms of the 
link between education, occupation and income which determines the 
socioeconomic stratification prevailing in the region. 
Similarly, in rural areas, more than 90% of those who have eight or 
less years of schooling are employed as agricultural workers, labourers, 
watchmen, waiters or domestic employees, with an average monthly 
income that is usually between less than one and three poverty lines. It 
may be noted that agricultural workers account for approximately 60% of 
all those with this educational level, and their average monthly income is 
2.2 poverty lines. 
Figures V.5 and V.6 show the relationship between educational 
achievements and the probable type of employment and level of income 
corresponding to each educational level. It may be observed that young 
people aged 20 to 29 years with eight or fewer years of schooling are 
mostly employed in occupations that provide an inadequate degree of 
well-being, with an average monthly income of around 2.4 poverty lines. 
These occupations and, in second place, those which provide an 
intermediate level of well-being (with an average monthly wage of 
something over three poverty lines) represent the employment prospects 
for those who have between nine and eleven years of schooling, thus 
confirming the idea that this educational level is insufficient to ensure 
their well-being throughout their life. 
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Figure V.5 
LATIN AMERICA: OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE AND AVERAGE INCOME OF YOUNG 
PEOPLE AGED FROM 20 TO 29 YEARS BY COUNTRY GROUPS,  


























Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 Ordered according to the gross secondary enrolment ratios. 
Low group: Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Venezuela 
Intermediate group: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic 
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Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 Ordered according to the gross secondary enrolment ratios. 
High group: Chile, Panama and Peru 
Low group: Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay and Venezuela 
Intermediate group: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua and Dominican Republic 
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As may be seen from the above figures, young people who have 
completed between 9 and 11 years of schooling mainly have access only 
to occupations that provide an insufficient level of well-being. This fact 
also reflects the process of devaluation of education to which successive 
generations are exposed as secondary education coverage increases. At 
the same time, the significant concentration of individuals with 13 or 
more years of schooling in occupations that provide an adequate degree 
of well-being, with an average monthly income close to 7 poverty lines, 
once more shows the importance of this educational threshold and also 
confirms the significant determinism observed in this area. 
The data also reveal another fact, which further emphasizes the 
importance of the differences deriving from the resources of the 
household of origin and the educational capital inherited. Thus, not only 
are very different possibilities of access to different occupational 
categories transmitted, but also very distinct possibilities of obtaining 
income within each of those categories. For example, salespersons and 
shop assistants with 12 or more years of schooling receive an average 
monthly income equivalent to 4 poverty lines, but that declines to  
2.9 when they have between 9 and 11 years of schooling and to 2.4 when 
they have less than 9 years of schooling. A similar situation occurs in the 
case of administrative employees and accountants, and also in the case of 
industrial, transport and warehouse workers. 
All of this shows more clearly how important it is to orient 
educational reforms towards improving educational equity for children 
and adolescents from the lower-income social strata, since education is 
the only form of capital that they have. Reforms of the school system, 
however, will not benefit those who are already aged 20 or more. As that 
group will represent more than two-thirds of the labour force in all the 
countries of the region in the next two decades, it is essential to define 
policies and programmes for adult training, so that distributional 
inequality does not increase further. This professional training for adults, 
as well as being closely linked to the changing demands of the labour 
market, must offer sideways routes to achieving better working and 
earning opportunities. The proper construction of such routes will 
determine to a large extent the possibility of curbing the trend towards 
distributional inequality, while at the same time raising the level of 
competitiveness. 
4. Influence of family contacts 
As from certain levels of education, the intergenerational 
transmission of opportunities for well-being is influenced by the social 
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contacts associated with the household of origin. Thanks to the extensive 
network of contacts available to some households, their children can 
receive incomes that are, on average, 40% higher than those who do not 
have this advantage, even if they work in the same occupation groups 
and have a similar level of education. 
In order to take this component into account in the set of factors 
that affect intergenerational transmission of opportunities for well-being, 
a brief review is given below of the situation of young people who have 
completed 12 or more years of schooling. An analysis is also made of the 
average monthly income received by young people who, although 
working in the same occupational groups, differ in terms of the scale of 
the resources available to their parents. In this analysis, young people are 
divided into those who have nine or less years of schooling and those 
with ten or more years of schooling, taking the educational capital of the 
parents into account in both cases. 
In Brazil, for example, young people who work as administrative 
employees or accountants and whose parents have 10 or more years of 
schooling, receive an average monthly income of 4.2 poverty lines, but 
this goes down to 3.2 poverty lines for the same work in the case of young 
people whose parents have an educational capital of nine or less years of 
schooling. As there are no significant differences between the two groups 
of young people with regard to the average years of schooling, there 
should not be any differences with regard to average income, and so it 
seems reasonable to attribute the disparity observed to the effect of social 
contacts. 
In Colombia, the gap is even greater in the case of salespersons and 
shop assistants, since although there are no great differences in their 
education, young people from households with little educational capital 
receive a monthly income equivalent to 2.3 poverty lines, in contrast to 
the 4 poverty lines received by young people from households with a 
higher educational level.5 In Costa Rica, within the same occupational 
group, monthly income reaches 5.2 poverty lines in the case of young 
people who come from homes with a higher educational level, and 4.5 in 
the case of their less fortunate colleagues, although both groups have the 
same number of years of schooling (see table V.7 and figure V.7). 
                                                          
5  In other words, the fact that young people from households with a higher level of 
educational capital have about one year more of schooling than those from homes with 
less educational capital is not sufficient to explain the large differences in income that 
are recorded for these groups. 
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Table V.7 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE INCOME AND AVERAGE YEARS OF 
SCHOOLING OF YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 20 TO 29 YEARS WHO WORK FOR 20 OR 
MORE HOURS PER WEEK AND HAVE COMPLETED 12 OR MORE YEARS OF 
SCHOOLING, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THEIR PARENTS,  









Salespersons and shop 
assistants 






















Argentina 1999 Total 4.7 13.8 6.0 15.7 4.2 13.2 4.0 12.6 
  0-9 4.2 13.4 4.9 15.5 4.2 13.0 3.6 12.4 
  10 or more 5.0 14.1 6.5 15.8 4.3 13.3 4.4 12.8 
Bolivia 1999 Total 3.9 14.0 4.8 15.5 4.2 13.3 2.6 13.3 
  0-9 2.5 13.8 2.7 15.3 2.9 13.2 2.0 13.2 
  10 or more 5.3 14.2 6.4 15.6 5.8 13.5 3.4 13.4 
Brazil 1999 Total 3.9 12.2 5.5 13.3 3.5 12.0 2.9 11.4 
  0-9 3.4 11.9 4.4 12.7 3.2 11.8 2.7 11.3 
  10 or more 5.4 13.1 7.2 14.2 4.2 12.4 3.7 12.1 
Chile 2000 Total 4.9 13.6 7.1 15.0 3.9 12.9 3.5 12.6 
  0-9 4.1 12.9 5.8 14.0 3.7 12.8 3.4 12.3 
  10 or more 5.8 14.3 7.8 15.5 4.1 13.2 3.7 12.9 
Colombia 1999 Total 3.5 13.1 5.1 14.9 3.0 12.4 2.6 12.0 
  0-9 2.9 12.5 3.9 14.3 2.7 12.1 2.2 11.7 
  10 or more 4.8 14.1 6.5 15.4 3.4 13.1 4.0 12.8 
Costa Rica 1999 Total 5.9 13.4 7.0 14.7 5.1 12.5 4.8 12.3 
  0-9 5.3 12.9 6.5 14.4 4.8 12.2 4.5 11.9 
  10 or more 6.5 14.1 7.4 15.0 5.7 13.2 5.2 12.9 
Ecuador 1999 Total 2.5 14.0 3.1 15.8 2.4 13.4 2.1 13.2 
  0-9 2.1 13.5 2.6 15.2 2.1 13.1 1.7 12.9 
  10 or more 3.1 14.8 3.5 16.4 2.9 13.9 3.0 13.9 
El Salvador 1999 Total 3.9 13.5 4.9 15.1 4.1 12.9 2.9 12.4 
  0-9 3.7 13.3 5.0 15.0 3.6 12.7 2.9 12.4 
  10 or more 4.5 13.9 4.8 15.2 4.9 13.2 2.7 12.5 
Guatemala 1998 Total 3.0 13.0 3.3 13.2 3.3 12.9 1.1 12.6 
  0-9 2.6 12.8 2.8 12.9 3.3 12.8 0.7 12.4 
  10 or more 3.9 13.6 4.7 14.1 3.3 13.0 1.1 13.4 
Honduras 1999 Total 2.4 13.0 2.6 13.9 2.4 12.4 1.7 12.8 
  0-9 2.0 12.5 2.2 13.1 2.2 12.2 1.1 12.2 
  10 or more 3.5 14.6 3.7 15.9 3.2 13.3 3.6 14.4 
Mexico 2000 Total 3.6 14.3 3.9 15.3 3.4 13.7 3.5 13.7 
  0-9 3.1 13.8 3.3 14.9 2.9 13.5 3.2 12.9 
  10 or more 4.2 14.8 4.4 15.7 4.2 14.0 3.8 14.5 
Nicaragua 1998 Total 3.0 13.2 6.0 15.1 2.3 12.0 2.3 13.0 
  0-9 2.5 13.0 3.5 14.6 1.5 12.0 2.3 13.0 
  10 or more 6.7 14.4 11.8 16.3 2.4 12.1 2.6 13.0 
Panama 1999 Total 6.1 14.6 7.6 15.8 5.5 14.1 5.0 13.7 
  0-9 5.1 14.1 5.5 15.2 5.4 13.8 3.9 13.4 
  10 or more 7.0 15.1 8.8 16.1 5.5 14.5 6.3 14.0 
Paraguay 1999 Total 3.0 13.7 3.6 15.1 2.8 13.3 2.7 12.8 
  0-9 2.8 13.5 3.3 15.0 2.8 13.1 2.4 12.6 
  10 or more 3.3 14.1 4.3 15.6 2.9 13.7 3.7 13.4 
Peru 1999 Total 3.4 13.4 3.4 14.7 4.6 13.2 2.5 11.9 
  0-9 2.9 13.2 3.0 14.5 3.3 13.2 2.0 11.9 
  10 or more 4.2 13.7 3,7 14.9 6.2 13.3 2.6 11.9 
Dominican Rep. 1997 Total 4.7 14.3 7.2 16.0 3.7 13.8 3.8 13.5 
  0-9 4.4 14.1 5.9 15.9 3.1 13.4 3.2 13.5 
  10 or more 5.2 14.7 8.1 16.2 4.5 14.3 5.7 13.5 
Uruguay 1999 Total 3.9 13.5 4.3 14.6 3.8 13.3 3.7 12.6 
  0-9 3.5 13.0 3.8 13.9 3.5 12.8 3.3 12.5 
  10 or more 4.3 13.9 4.7 15.0 4.1 13.6 4.3 12.9 
Venezuela a 1999 Total 3.3 13.5 4.2 15.2 2.9 12.8 2.4 12.4 
  0-9 3.0 13.1 3.5 14.7 2.8 12.5 2.3 12.1 
  10 or more 3.8 14.3 5.1 15.8 3.1 13.4 2.6 13.3 
1999 Total 3.9 13.6 5.0 14.9 3.6 13.0 3.0 12.7 
 0-8 3.3 13.2 4.0 14.5 3.2 12.8 2.6 12.5 
Simple average 
of countries 
 9-12 4.8 14.2 6.1 15.5 4.2 13.4 3.7 13.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 National total. 
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Figure V.7 
LATIN AMERICA: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AND LABOUR INCOME OF YOUNG PEOPLE 
AGED 20 TO 29 YEARS WITH 12 OR MORE YEARS OF SCHOOLING, BY TYPE OF 
OCCUPATION AND YEARS OF SCHOOLING OF PARENTS, URBAN AREAS, 1999 








Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household  surveys of the respective 
countries. 
This trend is systematic. In all the countries there are differences in 
remuneration between young people in the same occupational group 
which cannot be attributed to their educational level alone. On average, 
young people who come from households with less educational capital 
receive around 70% of the income of those who come from households 
with more education. This gap is sustained in the three occupational 
groups analysed. As already noted, this is partly attributable to their 
greater potential for gaining access to better jobs, although it must also be 
taken into account they also have a higher level of cultural capital that can 
help them to perform the relevant tasks more effectively. 
5. The prospects with regard to inequality 
A review of the link between income distribution and the general 
structure of occupations, in terms of remuneration and the capacity to 
provide well-being, shows that approximately 75% of employed persons 
from the 40% of households with the lowest incomes are factory hands, 
labourers, security staff, waiters or domestic employees, receiving an 
average monthly income equivalent to 2.1 poverty lines. In the 10% of 
households with the highest incomes, around half of those employed are 
professionals, technicians or hold upper management posts and receive a 
monthly income of around 17 poverty lines (see table V.8). 
Average years of schooling of parents: 
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Table V.8 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME OF PERSONS AGED 
20 TO 59 YEARS EMPLOYED IN THE MOST FREQUENT OCCUPATIONS IN THE  
FOUR LOWEST DECILES AND IN THE HIGHEST DECILE OF THE HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION, URBAN AREAS, 1999 
(Percentages in each stratum of households) 
Factory hands, labourers, waiters, 
security staff and domestic 
employees from the 40% of 
households with the lowest incomes 
Professionals, technicians and 
managers from the 10% of 




the four lowest 
deciles 
Average income 




the highest decile 
Average income 
in terms of 
poverty lines 
Argentina 1999 75.3 3.2 58.3 21.2 
Bolivia 1999 66.3 1.8 46.4 14.8 
Brazil 1999 75.8 1.8 58.8 20.7 
Chile 2000 75.3 2.8 74.5 33.2 
Colombia 1999 64.8 1.6 55.5 12.6 
Costa Rica 1999 69.9 3.1 60.2 16.7 
Ecuador 1999 65.1 1.3 47.3 12.2 
El Salvador 1999 77.1 2.1 49.8 13.9 
Guatemala 1998 67.6 1.5 62.1 15.0 
Honduras 1999 67.9 1.2 46.0 8.6 
Mexico 2000 68.2 2.0 51.4 19.3 
Nicaragua 1998 73.0 1.3 35.7 18.5 
Panama 1999 74.0 2.7 58.1 19.7 
Paraguay 1999 70.1 1.7 45.4 12.7 
Peru 1999 69.3 1.6 48.8 14.0 
Dominican Republic 1997 69.3 2.4 35.7 16.2 
Uruguay 1999 74.5 3.3 53.2 17.5 
Venezuela a 1999 55.4 1.9 44.1 11.3 
Simple average of 
countries 1999 69.9 2.1 51.8 16.6 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 National total. 
As previously mentioned, there is also the fact that the occupational 
profile of the workforce, which will continue to define the structure of 
remunerations and their relationship to income distribution, is already 
largely fixed. About 80% of the currently employed population, whose 
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characteristics are reflected in the figures mentioned above, will continue 
to be part of the employed population over the next 10 years.6 
The close connection that exists between the profile of the 
occupational structure and the distribution of income a connection that 
explains the rigidity of the latter is apparent from the share in 
employment and income of the most frequent occupations in the different 
strata of the distribution pyramid. For example, employed persons aged 
20 to 59 years whose remuneration brings them an inadequate degree of 
well-being factory hands, labourers, security staff, waiters or domestic 
employees and who belong to the 40% of households with the lowest 
income represent about 25% of total employment and receive about 11% 
of total income. In contrast, those who have an occupational category that 
provides them with a adequate degree of well-being professionals, 
technicians and persons in upper management posts and form part of 
the 10% of households with the highest incomes represent about 5.5% of 
total employment but receive 21% of total income (see table V.9). 
The link between the location of individuals in the occupational 
structure and their situation in terms of household income distribution is 
so strong that in the majority of cases it prevails over the other factors that 
influence this situation, including the size and composition of the 
household and the amount of monetary income that does not come from 
employment. For example, if only heads of household are considered, we 
see that workers whose occupation brings them an inadequate degree of 
well-being and who come from households situated in the four lowest 
income deciles represent around 29% of total employment, but receive 
only a little more than 12% of total income. In contrast, heads 
of household whose occupation offers them a sufficient degree of 
well-being and who come from the highest income decile represent 
around 6% of those employed but receive on average 23% of total income 




                                                          
6  This is because the new members joining the actively employed population and those 
leaving the group only change its composition at an annual rate of 2% to 3%. 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 205 
Table V.9 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME OF INDIVIDUALS AND 
HEADS OF HOUSEHOLD AGED 20 TO 59 YEARS EMPLOYED IN THE MOST 
FREQUENT OCCUPATIONS IN THE FOUR LOWEST DECILES AND IN  
THE HIGHEST DECILE OF THE HOUSEHOLD INCOME  
DISTRIBUTION, URBAN AREAS, 1999 
(Percentages) 
Factory hands, labourers, waiters, security 
staff and domestic employees from the 40% 
of households with the lowest incomes 
Professionals, technicians and managers 
from the 10% of households with the  
highest incomes 









Individuals Heads of 
household 
Individuals Heads of 
household 
Individuals Heads of 
household 
Individuals Heads of 
household 
Argentina 1999 25.8 30.5 12.9 14.2 6.8 7.8 22.2 24.9 
Bolivia 1999 24.2 30.7 11.3 14.0 4.6 5.2 18.0 19.1 
Brazil 1999 27.5 31.7 10.0 11.0 5.9 6.3 25.1 26.6 
Chile 2000 27.4 32.6 10.2 10.5 8.3 9.4 37.1 42.6 
Colombia 1999 21.9 27.3 10.0 11.8 5.2 5.5 18.5 20.2 
Costa Rica 1999 21.7 25.6 10.8 12.3 6.7 6.9 18.0 19.4 
Ecuador 1999 21.2 25.3 8.5 9.2 5.5 6.4 21.2 24.6 
El Salvador 1999 25.8 29.1 12.2 13.2 5.7 6.1 17.6 19.3 
Guatemala 1998 25.1 29.4 10.9 11.6 6.9 7.9 29.1 31.9 
Honduras 1999 27.0 30.0 12.3 12.6 4.0 4.0 12.9 13.8 
Mexico 2000 25.6 29.8 11.5 12.0 4.7 5.3 20.8 23.7 
Nicaragua 1998 22.6 26.2 8.4 8.6 4.1 4.9 21.1 24.9 
Panama 1999 23.5 29.3 10.6 13.0 6.7 7.4 21.9 24.8 
Paraguay 1999 23.6 28.3 11.4 13.7 5.5 5.5 19.3 20.1 
Peru 1999 24.9 30.4 12.1 14.3 4.7 5.4 19.4 22.9 
Dominican 
Republic 1997 20.2 25.5 10.6 12.0 4.4 4.6 15.4 16.5 
Uruguay 1999 31.6 35.5 18.6 20.1 4.8 5.6 15.0 17.0 
Venezuelaa 1999 16.3 20.2 8.6 9.7 5.3 5.2 16.3 17.6 
Simple 
average of 
countries 1999 24.2 28.7 11.2 12.4 5.5 6.1 20.5 22.8 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a





(a) Determination of the minimum educational capital in terms of 
well-being 
An analysis of the earned income of those who join the labour 
market shows that at present, in order to attain well-being, they must 
have completed the secondary cycle as a minimum, which is 11 or  
12 years depending on the country. As may be inferred from the data for 
18 countries in the region, reaching that educational threshold results in 
an income that gives a reasonable probability of escaping poverty, i.e., a 
probability higher than the average for urban employed persons aged  
20 to 29 years in the respective country who work 20 or more hours per 
week (see table V.10). The data on the remuneration for such workers, 
expressed in per capita poverty lines, clearly shows that for those who 
did not reach the educational threshold, even additional years of 
schooling beyond the initial number will not give them much advantage 
in terms of income, since those years have a lower yield, from the 
income point of view, than in the case of persons who did complete the 
secondary cycle. In other words, for a person who enters the labour 
market without having completed secondary school, the fact of 
completing a few additional years (but still not completing the 
secondary cycle) does not have much influence on the remuneration 
received. The result, in most cases, is that such persons receive 
practically the same as employees with six years of schooling and thus 
have little possibility of escaping poverty. In contrast, income increases 
sharply when individuals who have already completed the secondary 
cycle of 11 or 12 years, depending on the country, subsequently add a 
few additional years of schooling (see table V.10). 
(b) Labour income thresholds for attaining well-being 
The first identifiable income threshold with regard to the possibility 
of attaining well-being is an income of 2.5 poverty lines. This minimum 
level allows the person who receives such an income to keep a family of 
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Table V.10 
LATIN AMERICA: NUMBER OF YEARS OF SCHOOLING REQUIRED TO HAVE A 
PROBABILITY OF AVOIDING POVERTY EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN THE  
AVERAGE IN EACH COUNTRY AMONG EMPLOYED PERSONS  
AGED 20 TO 29 YEARS  
(Percentages and multiples of the poverty line) 
Country Average poverty 
level of employed 
persons (%) 
Minimum number of 
years of schooling 
Average labour income 
(poverty lines) 
Argentina, 1999 11.5 11 3.7 
Bolivia, 1999 38.7 13 3.4 
Brazil, 1999 22.5 8 3.0 
Chile, 2000 10.1 12 4.1 
Colombia, 1999 33.8 11 2.7 
Costa Rica, 1999 7.5 10 4.4 
Ecuador, 1999 51.4 12 2.4 
El Salvador, 1999 25.6 10 2.9 
Guatemala, 1998 34.0 9 1.9 
Honduras, 1999 58.9 9 2.7 
Mexico, 2000 22.5 10 3.3 
Nicaragua, 1998 52.8 11 2.9 
Panama, 1999 10.8 11 3.5 
Paraguay, 1999 28.5 12 2.9 
Peru, 1999 22.3 11 2.5 
Dominican Republic, 1997 15.6 11 3.6 
Uruguay, 1999 5.8 9 3.8 
Venezuela, 1999 a 32.8 11 3.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 National total. 
two persons out of poverty. If both the head of household and his/her 
spouse are working, they can keep a family of up to four persons  
(i.e., with two dependants) out of poverty. If there is a third child, 
however, they will be on the verge of poverty or even below the poverty 
line. 
An income equivalent to four poverty lines allows a greater degree 
of well-being. If there is only one breadwinner, a family of three 
dependent members can be kept out of poverty, and if both the head of 
household and his/her spouse work, they can support the costs of up to 
four persons who are not working. 
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(c) Factors which affect the transmission of educational capital: 
the educational climate of the home 
In order to analyse the educational opportunities of young 
people and the way in which they are transmitted from parents to 
children, a variable must be defined that measures the educational 
capital of the household of origin. This variable should reflect all the 
factors that affect the quality of the education and the number of years 
of schooling that individuals manage to accumulate, including the 
availability of economic resources and material infrastructure, the 
support received, the preparation for school, and the importance 
attached in that household to education as such and as a means of 
training. 
There are various variables that make it possible to measure the 
educational capital of the household of origin. In the present study, a 
variable was selected which, in addition to reflecting the economic 
capacity of the household, is a good indicator of the educational climate. 
This was defined as the average number of years of schooling of the head 
of household and his/her spouse. In the case of households where the 
head does not have a spouse, the number of years declared by that person 
was used as the indicator. This indicator has the advantage of remaining 
relatively invariable throughout the period in which the children acquire 
their educational capital. It is also closely linked to the monetary income 
of the household, which makes it possible to take into account both the 
differences in educational assets between households of different social 
strata, as well as their differences in terms of economic resources (see 
table V.11). 
On the basis of the average years of schooling of the parents, in 
households with children aged 20 to 24 years, four types of educational 
climate were distinguished, as shown in table V.11: very low (less than 6 
years), low (from 6 to 10 years), medium (10 to 12) and high (13 or  more 
years of schooling). 
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Table V.11 
LATIN AMERICA: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH CHILDREN AGED 20 TO 24, 
BY AVERAGE YEARS OF SCHOOLING OF THE PARENTS AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
QUARTILES, BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES a 
(Percentages) 
Simple average of urban households in Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Paraguay and Venezuela 
 Income quartiles b Average years of 
schooling of the 
parents 
Total Quartile 1 
(poorest) 
Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
(richest) 
0 to 5 50.6 74.1 62.1 46.8 19.5 
6 to 9 28.6 20.6 28.2 34.2 29.4 
10 to 12 9.3 4.4 5.5 10.7 18.3 
13 or more 11.6 2.9 4.2 8.3 32.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Simple average of urban households in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic 
 Income quartiles b Average years of 
schooling of the 
parents Total Quartile 1 (poorest) 
Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
(richest) 
0 to 5 45.8 65.1 56.3 44.2 18.4 
6 to 9 29.8 29.0 31.3 33.9 24.5 
10 to 12 11.5 4.4 8.8 13.7 18.3 
13 or more 13.0 1.7 3.6 8.2 38.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Simple average of urban households in Argentina, Chile, Panama, Peru and Uruguay 
 Income quartiles b Average years of 
schooling of the 
parents 
Total Quartile 1 
(poorest) 
Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
(richest) 
0 to 5 24.5 41.4 28.8 19.0 7.0 
6 to 9 39.7 46.4 47.2 42.7 17.4 
10 to 12 20.5 9.6 18.8 25.3 29.7 
13 or more 15.3 2.5 5.2 13.0 45.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 The countries are grouped according to the gross enrolment ratio for the secondary cycle in the mid-
1990s. 
b
  Per capita income of households. 
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(d) Household surveys as tools for intergenerational analysis and 
selection of the appropriate age group for study 
In order to examine the ways in which educational capital is 
transmitted from one generation to another, a link must to be established 
between the level of education of the children and that of their parents or 
other characteristics of their household. Household surveys offer this 
possibility, but the population group most appropriate for analysis must 
be selected. As it is a matter of examining the total number of years of 
schooling that young people of the current generation complete in 
relation to their social strata, it is important to select an age group that 
consists mostly of persons who have finished studying and therefore have 
completed the stock of educational capital that they will bring to their 
working life. As the age of the selected cohort increases, however, the 
proportion of young people who no longer live in the paternal home 
increases, and consequently this reduces the number of cases in which the 
education of the children can be compared with that of their parents. Of 
the three age groups in which the population aged 15 to 29 is divided, the 
cohort of 20 to 24 years is the most appropriate for analysis, since it 
includes a high proportion of young people who live in the paternal home 
and a low percentage of young people who are still in the educational 
system. Table V.12 summarizes the information on these three groups in 
the urban areas of 18 countries. 
Young people who stay longer in the paternal home have more 
opportunities to increase their educational capital. In the group aged 20 to 
24 years, the rate of school attendance is higher among young people who 
live with their parents (37%) than among other young people (18%). This 
last group stops studying earlier and, on average, accumulates fewer 
years of education. This circumstance introduces a selection bias in the 
analysis, as, generally speaking, young people who stay longer in the 
paternal home attain a higher level of education than the others, 
amounting to a difference of one to two years. This bias, however, does 
not change the conclusions with regard to the intergenerational 
transmission of inequality of opportunities. Apart from the fact that 
young people who do not live with their parents are a smaller fraction of 
the total cohort (around 41%), leaving the home early is more frequent in 
households with a lower level of education (see table V.13). 
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Table V.12 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): YOUNG PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN THE PATERNAL 
HOME AND YOUNG PEOPLE WHO STUDY, URBAN AREAS 
(Percentages) 
Young people who live in the paternal home  Young people who study 
















Minimum value 51 69 50 25  Minimum value 26 47 14 8 
Average a 59 78 59 36  Average a 37 64 29 13 
Maximum value 67 90 69 45  Maximum value 51 77 43 24 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 Simple average of 18 countries. 
Table V.13 
LATIN AMERICA: YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 20 TO 24 YEARS WHO ARE STUDYING AND 
THEIR AVERAGE NUMBER OF YEARS OF SCHOOLING 
Percentage of young people aged 20 to 24 years who are 
studying 
 Average number of years of schooling of young people 
aged 20 to 24 years 




In the paternal 
home 
Not in the 
paternal home 
  
Total In the paternal 
home 
Not in the 
paternal home 
Minimum value 14 17 9  Minimum value 8.1 8.5 7.2 
Average a 29 37 18  Average a 9.9 10.5 9 
Maximum value 43 54 33  Maximum value 11.7 12 11.1 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of data from household surveys of the respective 
countries. 
a
 Simple average of 18 countries. 
(e) A methodological approach to intergenerational educational 
betterment 
The term "intergenerational educational betterment" refers to the 
situation of young people who surpass the average level of education of 
their parents, taking into account the devaluation of education. The 
average educational level of the parents is calculated on the basis of the 
number of years of schooling completed by the head of household and 
his/her spouse. In single-parent households, the average corresponds to 
the educational level of the head of household. 
The concept of the devaluation of education takes into account the 
fact that as educational coverage increases, more years of schooling are 
needed in order to command the same type of job and the same level of 
income. The devaluation of education over the 25 to 30 years which, on 
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average, separate one generation from another has been calculated on the 
basis of the functions linking occupational categories and the 
corresponding incomes with different levels of education among 
employed persons in 1990  and 1999. It was concluded that the rate of 
devaluation was lower at higher educational levels, so that the higher the 
educational level of the parents, the fewer the years of additional 
schooling required to surpass their income level. 
The foregoing means that there is intergenerational educational 
betterment in the case of young people aged 20 to 24 years who, on 
leaving school, have surpassed the average educational level of their 
parents by: 
(i) 7 or more years when the parents had less than 3 years of 
schooling; 
(ii) 6 or more years when the parents had from 3 to 5 years of 
schooling; 
(iii) 5 or more years when the parents had from 5 to 7 years of 
schooling;  
(iv) 4 or more years when the parents had from 7 to 10 years of 
schooling; 
(v) 3 or more years when the parents had from 10 to 11 years of 
schooling; 
(vi) 2 or more years when the parents had from 11 to 13 years of 
schooling; 
(vii) 1 or more years when the parents had 13 or more years of 
schooling. 
In the case of young people who continued studying, two groups 
were distinguished: young people aged 20 to 22 years and young people 
aged 23 and 24 years. On the basis of the observations made, it was 
estimated for the first group that if the parents had less than 10 years of 
education, their children would complete another year, and if they had 
ten years or more of education, the young people would add another two. 
In the second group it was estimated that young people would add only 
one more year in all cases. 
In short, if the young person was not studying, the years of 
schooling completed were considered, while if the person was studying, 
one or two years would be added according to his age and the education 
of the parents. It was considered that there was no intergenerational 
educational betterment in the case of young people who did not surpass 
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the average educational level of their parents, taking educational 
devaluation into account. 
The situations of educational betterment or non-betterment in 
comparison with the parents were classified in turn according to whether 
the young person did or did not have 12 or more years of schooling, 
which is the basic educational capital required to have a good chance of 
access to well-paid occupations. 
(f) Occupational category and well-being opportunities 
The grouping of occupations into eight categories gives a general 
picture of the occupational structure and a good classification of the 
different levels of well-being associated with that structure. In this case, 
the occupational classification adopted was that used by each country for 
the household surveys, which in general is a variation of the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). Initially, the categories 
corresponding to the two- or three-digit level of ISCO were considered. 
The "professionals and technicians" group includes all university 
and technical professions, whether of higher or intermediate level. The 
"managers" group includes both political posts and entrepreneurs in the 
public and private sector, as well as department heads, area managers 
and others. The "administrative employees and accountants" category also 
covers secretarial activities. "Salespersons and shop assistants" is for all 
occupations related to sales, both in the commercial sector and in services. 
The "industrial, transport and warehouse workers" category includes 
factory hands and labourers in the relevant sectors. Construction workers 
form a special group. The "domestic employees, waiters and security 
staff" category includes all occupations in the services sector that require 
little or no training. "Agricultural workers" includes all occupations that 
depend on the agricultural sector. 
The "occupations that provide an adequate level of well-being" 
category groups together "professionals and technicians" and "managers", 
whose average monthly income, in the majority of the countries analysed, 
is between five and ten poverty lines, in both urban and rural areas. The 
average monthly income of the second group, "occupations that provide 
an intermediate level of well-being", is from 2.5 to 5.5 poverty lines.  
This group includes the categories "administrative employees and 
accountants" and "salespersons and shop assistants". The third group, 
which covers all the remaining categories, is "occupations that provide an 
inadequate level of well-being", as the corresponding average monthly 
income in the majority of the countries studied is between 1.5 and  
4 poverty lines. 
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Chapter VI 
Social expenditure in Latin America 
1. Trends in public social spending during the 1990s 
Social spending rose considerably during the 1990s. In most of the 
countries, the per capita amount of resources allocated to the social 
sectors increased as a result of economic reactivation, increased budgetary 
pressure and the higher fiscal priority assigned to social expenditure 
(percentage of total public spending devoted to the social sectors), which 
in turn raised its macroeconomic priority (percentage of GDP earmarked 
for social sector spending).1 In fact, in the 17 countries of the region as a 
whole, per capita public spending between the 1990-1991 and 1998-1999 
bienniums rose on average by about 50%. Thus, from an average of 
US$ 360 per capita at the start of the decade, social expenditure climbed to 
US$ 540 per capita per annum by the end of it.2  
Social expenditure increased throughout the region, falling in real 
terms in only two countries, Honduras and Venezuela (see table A.16 of 
the statistical annex). The increases were not uniform throughout the 
region, however, and tended to be greater in countries with moderate or 
low levels of per capita social expenditure. Thus it rose by over 100% in 
Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and the Dominican Republic, 
                                                          
1  In the analysis of public expenditure, “social sectors” does not refer to social classes or 
groups but rather to health, welfare, social security, housing, etc. 
2  Refers to the simple average of the figures for all countries. Per capita social expenditure 
is expressed in 1997 dollars. 
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whereas in countries with relatively high levels of spending (Argentina, 
Brazil, Costa Rica and Panama), the increases were somewhat smaller, 
amounting to between 20% and 40% compared with the start of the 
decade. 
In most of the countries, social spending rose more steeply during 
the first half of the decade and, although it continued to climb in the 
second half, it did so more slowly. Between 1990-1991 and 1994-1995, per 
capita expenditure in Latin America as a whole rose by 30%, whereas the 
increase between 1994-1995 and 1998-1999 was only 16%. This trend was 
closely related to economic growth trends in the region during the 1990s, 
since the annual growth rate of Latin America was 4.1% of GDP up to 
1995 but then dropped to 2.5% in the second half of the decade. This 
indicates the existence of a strong linkage between the amount of 
resources that each country is able to allocate to social sectors and the 
level and growth rate of its GDP (see figures VI.1 and VI.2). 
Figure VI.1 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA IN 















Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
a
 First figure corresponds to average for two-year period 1994-1995. 
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Figure VI.2 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURE, AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP), IN THE  














Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
a
 First figure corresponds to average for two-year period 1994-1995. 
b
 Simple average of the countries, excluding Bolivia and El Salvador. 
The increase in social spending in the 1990s was not only due to 
economic growth, however. It was also associated with an increasing 
effort on the part of these countries to raise spending levels by boosting 
government revenues and allocating a larger portion of them to the social 
sectors. The fiscal priority of social spending in the region as a whole thus 
climbed from nearly 42% to almost 48% of total public expenditure. This 
trend was general throughout the region; the share of public spending 
earmarked for social purposes fell only in Honduras and, to a lesser 
extent, in Panama. 
The combined effect of these two factors, i.e., the increased 
budgetary pressure (the percentage of GDP represented by public 
spending) and the decision to assign greater fiscal priority to social 
expenditure (the percentage of total public expenditure allocated to the 
social sectors) was reflected in a substantial increase in the share of GDP 



























































region as a whole, this share rose from 10.4% to 13.1% between 1990-1991 
and 1998-1999 (se table A.17 of the statistical annex). It should be noted 
that between 1996-1997 and 1998-1999, the share of social spending 
continued to climb in most countries of the region, thanks to their efforts 
to keep up their pre-crisis levels of social expenditure. However, that 
trend can also be explained by the delayed effect of budgetary 
adjustments made necessary by declines in the product and, hence, in 
public revenues. 
Although 12 countries substantially increased the macroeconomic 
priority of social expenditure, and several of them had low spending 
levels, the differences between the 17 countries analysed did not diminish 
very much, and the considerable disparities that existed in this respect at 
the start of the decade persisted. These differences are due to two factors: 
On the one hand, the social security component of spending is considered 
a higher good, and its relative weight increases as a country’s per capita 
income rises (see figure VI.3a), owing to the extension of coverage 
provided by social security systems, which is associated with the relative 
size of the older adult population. The other factor is that a very high 
percentage of the meagre revenues received by the State in some countries 
is used for general purposes (government, defence and justice) and to 
meet the country’s basic economic needs. 
As shown in figure VI.3b, there was no significant change in the 
regional situation as regards the countries’ efforts to allocate resources 
to the social sectors as a function of their per capita income levels. Thus, 
one group of countries, which includes those with the highest per capita 
social expenditure levels (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Panama and 
Uruguay), continued to allocate a larger percentage of their GDP to 
social sectors than would be expected from the regional pattern. Only 
Bolivia and Nicaragua spent more than would be expected given their 
income levels. The group of countries with low or very low levels of per 
capita social expenditure tend to devote a much smaller share of their 
GDP to social sectors than the regional average. The exception is 
Colombia, which more than doubled its per capita social expenditure 
between 1992-1993 and 1996-1997, thereby greatly increasing its 
macroeconomic priority and progressing from being one of the 
countries with spending levels far below the regional average to one of 
the countries that exceeds it. 
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Figure VI.3a 
LATIN AMERICA: SOCIAL EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL SECURITY,a (AS A PERCENTAGE 












Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
a
 Corresponds to fiscal contribution to this sector and not to the total resources administered by the public 
social security system. 
Figure VI.3b 
LATIN AMERICA: SOCIAL EXPENDITURE (AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC 
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Even though social expenditure rose considerably during the 
decade, the per capita levels of resources earmarked for social spending 
are still very low compared with international levels, so most countries 
therefore still have a great deal of room for expanding their public 
revenue base and redirecting expenditure to social purposes Around the 
mid-1990s, public spending as a share of GDP in the Latin American 
countries was around nine percentage points below the level 
corresponding to their GDP level, thus limiting the ability of States to 
promote redistributive policies through social expenditure.3 It appears 
that for all the countries in the region there is room to raise expenditure 
from 3.5 to 4.5 percentage points of GDP simply by increasing public 
resources, since social expenditure typically represents between 40% and 
50% of total public spending. 
Bearing in mind the factors that account for the growth of per 
capita social expenditure (GDP growth, increased budgetary pressure and 
greater priority assigned to social sectors in the fiscal budget), it may be 
concluded that during the decade there was an increase in the 
macroeconomic priority of social expenditure with respect to GDP growth 
(see figure VI.4). Of the total increase in per capita social spending of 
around US$ 196 between 1990 and 1999, US$ 81 was attributable to 
economic growth, US$ 42 to higher budgetary pressure and US$ 73 to 
increased fiscal priority. 
In order to overcome poverty and inequality in the region, the 
countries will need to give high priority to social expenditure, which must 
be viewed in all its complexity as an important component of public 
spending to which explicit criteria aimed at achieving greater equity must 
be applied. Thus, priority areas of social investment must be identified 
with a view to breaking the cycles that perpetuate inequality. 
 
                                                          
3  See IDB, 1998, p. 200. The low level of public spending in relation to GDP is in turn 
associated with the fact that the taxation levels of several countries in the region are also 
below international standards and even well below those applying to the English-
speaking Caribbean. According to estimates by ECLAC (1998b), which concur with 
those of other organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), tax 
revenue as a percentage of GDP is some 6 percentage points below the level that should 
apply according to the countries’ standard of development. 
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Figure VI.4 
LATIN AMERICA: FACTORS IN GROWTH OF PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURE  













Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
a
 SEPC: social expenditure per capita. 
2. Impact of the crisis on social expenditure 
When economic growth was strong, most of the Latin American 
countries managed to increase social expenditure, both as a share of the 
public budget and as a percentage of GDP. Likewise, thanks to the 
measures taken by a number of countries to protect it, social expenditure 
did not decline as a result of the economic slowdown of the late 1990s or 
the subsequent period of reduced flexibility of the public budget.   
Analyses of trends in the allocation of resources to the social sectors 
have often focused on variations in social expenditure with respect to 
fluctuations in the government budget. Since the total amount of public 
resources tends to vary in line with countries’ GDP levels, social 
expenditure in the Latin American countries has usually followed trends 
in the macroeconomic cycle, falling during slowdowns and rising during 
upturns in economic growth. This behaviour is termed procyclical, as 
opposed to countercyclical behaviour, when social expenditure is 
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in order to counter the decline in the living conditions of the population, 
especially its most vulnerable sectors. 
(a) Patterns of public social spending in situations of highly 
unstable growth 
The increasingly unstable nature of economic growth makes it even 
more important to ensure the financing of social protection networks 
(ECLAC, 1998b). The region was indeed marked by macroeconomic 
vulnerability during the 1990s as sizeable current-account deficits were 
often financed with volatile capital. This was reflected in short cycles of 
growth and of adjustment, in line with the behaviour of that capital.4 In 
addition, there was the impact of the various international crises on the 
economies, and especially on the public finances. 
Figures VI.5a to VI.5d show the sequence of episodes of variation in 
the social expenditure, public spending and gross domestic product of 17 
Latin American countries during the 1990s. 
Figure VI.5a shows how public spending tended to co-vary closely 
with GDP: the vast majority of the episodes of economic growth were 
accompanied by an increase in budgetary resources, and those increases 
were usually greater than the increases in the product. Nevertheless, 
during the decade there were also episodes of moderate increases in the 
product which were accompanied by absolute reductions in public sector 
financial resources, and in some cases, those reductions were greater than 
the relevant increases in GDP. At the same time, there were also situations 
where moderate drops in the product were not accompanied by a decline 
in public spending. 
The question arises as to whether, in cases where total public 
resources rose, the situations that tended to predominate were those in 
which social expenditure was maintained or increased, i.e., whether or 
not there was a propensity to give higher priority to the social 
components. As shown in figure VI.5b, not only did social expenditure 
rise when the government budget increased, but also, in a very high 
percentage of cases, the resources allocated to social components rose at a 
higher rate. This indicates that there was indeed a tendency to prioritize 
social expenditure. In many countries, justification by the government of 
the need to raise social expenditure was enough to gain acceptance for 
increased budgetary pressure. It is interesting to note that this also occurs 
even when social security is excluded from social expenditure; thus, the 
                                                          
4  One indication of the increasing volatility of economic growth in the region may be seen from 
a comparison of the variability coefficients of annual GDP growth rates: this coefficient was 
0.71 during the 1990-1997 period but 1.1 between 1990 and 1999 (ECLAC, 2000c). 
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higher priority given to social expenditure seems to have worked more to 
the benefit of the middle- and low-income sectors, even though social 
security was the spending component that grew most during the past 
decade, as we shall see in section 3 below. 
Figure VI.5a 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE VARIATIONS IN TOTAL  
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT  











Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
Figure VI.5b 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE VARIATIONS IN PUBLIC  
SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AND TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE  
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Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
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Figure VI.5c 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE VARIATIONS IN PUBLIC  
SOCIAL EXPENDITURE (EXCLUDING SOCIAL SECURITY) AND TOTAL  










Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
Figure VI.5d 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE VARIATIONS IN PUBLIC  
SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AND THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT  










Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
In short, in a decade when episodes of economic growth prevailed, 
social expenditure rose, and it usually did so faster than GDP (see figure 
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sufficient in itself, however, to give a full idea of the redistributive effect 
of social expenditure. 
(b) Patterns of social expenditure during the recession of the late 
1990s 
In order to analyse the behaviour of social expenditure in relation 
to trends in total public spending during the late-1990s recession, six 
countries in which GDP contracted in 1999 were selected, namely, 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Honduras, Uruguay and Venezuela. In all 
these countries, the fall in the product followed a period of growth, 
making them suitable subjects for an analysis of the behaviour and 
vulnerability of social expenditure. 
Analysis of the trends in total public spending and public social 
expenditure in a context of declining GDP in those countries shows that 
allocations to social sectors were shielded, partly because of the inertia of 
many of the current expenditure items within social expenditure, such as 
fiscal contributions to social security, which had been increasing,. This 
offset the procyclical tendency of expenditure items which were more 
dependent on the volume of budgetary resources (see figure VI.6). In all 
of these countries except Venezuela, total public spending rose in  
1998-1999 despite the decrease in GDP. 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay clearly decided to reallocate 
resources to benefit the social sectors, albeit with some important 
differences in each case. In Argentina, although more resources were 
allocated to social sectors, this measure worked more to the benefit of the 
poorest strata in the 1998-1999 biennium, whereas in the following period 
(1999-2000), the greatest increase was in the social security component, 
which is the largest element in social spending in the country. In 
consolidated national expenditure (including the national public 
administration, Buenos Aires and provincial governments, and local 
governments), the increased priority assigned to the social components 
prevented the decline in GDP from being reflected in a fall in per capita 
social expenditure. In Chile, both total social expenditure and social 
expenditure excluding social security rose at similar rates, although the 
rates of increase were slightly lower during the budget year 2000 
compared with the previous year. In Uruguay, up to 1999 there was clear 
protection of social expenditure, both including and excluding social 
security, since both aggregates showed similar levels of increase in the 
1998-1999 biennium, despite a context of zero growth in public spending. 
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Figure VI.6 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, TOTAL  
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE, PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURE, AND PUBLIC  
SOCIAL EXPENDITURE EXCLUDING SOCIAL SECURITY  
OVER THE 1996-2000 PERIOD 






















Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
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The case of Colombia is a special one, since the fall in expenditure 
(excluding social security) nevertheless did not mean that fewer resources 
were allocated to the components that mostly benefit the middle- and 
low-income strata, which usually suffer the most during periods of slower 
growth. This was due to the extension of social security coverage and of 
the health and welfare benefits included in it, which are areas that mainly 
benefit poor strata. Social security spending was the component that grew 
the most in real terms between 1998 and 1999, so that social expenditure 
overall rose at a much higher rate than that of total public spending, 
despite the fall in GDP in those two years. 
Honduras is an example of spending patterns in countries that 
allocate a relatively small share of their resources to the social sectors. In 
this country, social expenditure —which does not have a significant social 
security component there —and public spending rose at relatively high 
rates before and during the 1999 recession. However, that inertia was due 
not so much to an explicit policy of protection as to the impact of 
resources from international aid that are channeled through the 
government budget.  
Finally, what stands out in the case of Venezuela is the instability of 
its growth and hence of the volume of public resources, including those 
that are allocated to social sectors. The substantial rise in public spending 
and social expenditure in 1996 and 1997, both including and excluding 
social security, stems from the reactivation brought about by the growth 
of the product following the sharp downturn of 1996. Nevertheless, the 
pattern of social expenditure in 1998-1999 indicates that an effort was 
definitely made to protect the resources earmarked for social purposes, 
since during that same period, total budgetary resources fell as a result of 
the contraction of GDP. In 1999 and 2000, however, all the components of 
public spending began to rise again at virtually the same rate (around 
15%). 
3. Sectoral trends in social expenditure and their 
impact on income distribution 
During the 1990s, increases in social expenditure had a relatively 
greater redistributive effect in countries with lower per capita income 
levels, because of the relatively greater increase in public spending on 
education and health. In contrast, the redistributive effect was less 
pronounced in countries with higher per capita income levels, because 
approximately 50% of the increase in public social expenditure went to 
social security: its least progressive component in terms of redistribution. 
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This section provides some background on the impact that public 
social expenditure has had on the distribution of income of Latin 
American households. For that purpose, a summary is first given of the 
results of a series of studies on eight countries in order to assess the 
impact of public spending on the social sectors on different population 
strata. Secondly, sectoral trends during the decade are analysed in order 
to determine whether or not the increase in public social spending has 
had a leveling-out effect on income distribution. 
(a) The redistributive effect of the various social expenditure 
components 
The available data show marked differences in the distributive 
progressiveness of the different components of public social expenditure. 
The data on the share of expenditure received by households in each 
income distribution quintile are summarized in table A.18 of the statistical 
annex.5 As may be seen from the table, the most progressive types of 
expenditure —those that provide relatively greater benefits to the poorest 
households— are spending on primary and secondary education, 
followed by spending on health care and nutrition and then by spending 
on housing and basic services (water and sanitation). These data confirm 
that expenditure on primary education continues to be the most 
progressive item and has the greatest levelling-out effect on income 
distribution (see figure VI.7). It should be noted that, in contrast to the 
findings of similar studies conducted in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
expenditure on secondary education seems to have a fairly strong 
progressive impact, similar to that of spending on health and nutrition. 
This difference may be accounted for by the notable expansion in the 
coverage of secondary education since that time (ECLAC, 2000d, Chapter 
V), especially over the last twenty years. That led to very significant 
increases in secondary-school enrolment ratios, which have been of 
proportionally more benefit to young people from middle- and low-
income strata. 
Expenditures on social security and university education are the 
least progressive components of public spending, especially the latter. 
This reflects the fact that medium- and low-income strata still have 
difficulty in gaining access to this level of education. 
 
                                                          
5  Two indices of the progressiveness of this expenditure are also shown: the Gini 
coefficient and an index comparing the share of total expenditure on each item that goes 
to households in the 40% lowest-income bracket with the share of primary income they 
obtain (see section (c) of the methodological annex). 
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Figure VI.7 
LATIN AMERICA: DISTRIBUTION OF PRIMARY INCOME AND OF EXPENDITURE ON 
PRIMARY, SECONDARY AND TERTIARY EDUCATION,  











Source: ECLAC, on the basis of country studies. 
a
 Simple average of the data for eight countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and Uruguay. 
Expenditures on housing, which show an intermediate degree of 
progressiveness, follow a rather uneven pattern in the countries 
examined. This is due to the marked differences among programmes and 
in the extent to which households in the 40% lowest-income category 
have access to them. 
Taken as a whole, social expenditure was highly redistributive in 
all the countries and even more so if spending on social security is 
excluded from the figures (see figure VI.8). If social security is excluded, 
then the 20% of households having the lowest incomes receive 28% of 
total public revenues, while the richest 20% of households only receive 
12% of those resources. These differences are evident when these figures 
are compared with those relating to the distribution of households’ 
primary income, i.e., income not including monetary transfers from the 
State and social expenditure benefits. This means that not counting 
expenditure on social security— the poorest 20% of households receive, 
on average, a portion of the funds devoted to social expenditure that is six 
times greater than their share of primary income (28.2% of funds devoted 
to social expenditure, versus 4.8% of total primary income). For the richest 
20% of households, this ratio is inverted, with the percentage of social 
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total income (12.4% of social expenditure versus 50.7% of total primary 
income). 
Figure VI.8 
LATIN AMERICA: DISTRIBUTION OF PRIMARY INCOME, TOTAL INCOME AND  










Source: ECLAC, on the basis of country studies. 
a
 Simple average of the data for eight countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador and Uruguay. 
The same pattern in terms of the progressiveness of spending may 
be observed from the Gini coefficient values. With few exceptions, the 
Gini coefficient for spending on tertiary education and social security, 
unlike the other spending components, shows positive values in all the 
countries, albeit lower than the coefficient for primary income 
distribution (see table A.18 of the statistical annex). The fact that the Gini 
coefficient for certain specific items of expenditure is greater than zero 
does not mean that the expenditure has a net regressive impact on the 
final distribution of household income, however. For its effect to be 
progressive, the value of the Gini coefficient must be lower than that for 
the distribution of autonomous income. As shown in figure VI.8, all the 
components of social expenditure are progressive in relation to primary 
income distribution, albeit to different degrees. 
The countries analysed differ considerably in terms of their 
targeting of social expenditure (other than social security). Chile and 
Colombia have been making efforts to concentrate the benefits of social 
programmes in the lower-income strata. Both countries show the highest 
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comparison with the share of income they receive, the indices being 4.9 
for Chile and 4.2 for Colombia (see table A.18 of the statistical annex). 
Costa Rica and Uruguay have the lowest levels of relative targeting, with 
indices of 2.6 and 2.9 respectively. Policies in both countries have been 
focused on greater distribution of primary income and the 
implementation of social programmes that benefit a high percentage of all 
households to similar degrees. Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador show 
intermediate levels of progressiveness of social expenditure, with 
targeting indices for the poorest 40% of 3.7, 3.8 and 3.5, respectively. 
The net redistributive effect of public social expenditure is shown 
in figure VI.9, where estimates of the sectoral distribution of subsidies are 
combined with data on the size of the subsidies to determine how much 
of total household income in each stratum corresponds to monetary 
transfers and the transfer of goods and services free of charge or at 
subsidized prices. Figure VI.9 shows that this percentage is much higher 
in the lower-income strata, where it amounts to 43%, whereas in the 
upper-income sectors (the fourth and fifth quintiles) the figures are 13% 
and 7% respectively. If social security (mainly retirement and other 
pensions) is deducted, the reduction in the effect of social expenditure is 
much smaller in the case of the poorest strata; in the highest stratum, 
more than 60% of the transfers correspond to social security, whereas in 
the poorest quintile they represent only about 25% of the total. It should 
be noted that, despite the low impact of social expenditure on the incomes 
of the richest stratum, the actual sums that those households receive are 
quite high. In fact, in several of the countries analysed, these transfers are 
close to or even greater than the amount that goes to the poorest 
households. This is due to the substantial size of social security transfers. 
It should be emphasized that the aforementioned figures do not represent 
the net redistributive action of the State, since they do not take into 
account the funding of social expenditure from tax revenues. 
The significant redistributive effect of all items of social 
expenditure, excluding social security, is clearly shown in figure VI.8, in 
which the Lorenz curves for spending, with and without social security, 
are compared with the curve for primary income distribution and the 
curve for total household income. In all of the eight countries on which 
information is available, the expenditure and income-distribution curves 
follow the same pattern. 
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Figure VI.9 
LATIN AMERICA (8 COUNTRIES): REDISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT OF SOCIAL 
EXPENDITURE (EXCLUDING SOCIAL SECURITY) AND OF SOCIAL  
SECURITY ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME 









Source: ECLAC, on the basis of country studies. 
(b) Sectoral trends in social expenditure between 1990 and 1999 
In considering the different redistributive effects of individual 
components of public social expenditure in the countries, it is important 
to ascertain whether or not the substantial increase in per capita social 
expenditure during the 1990s was directed towards its more progressive 
components. For the region as a whole, approximately 44% of the growth 
in spending went to education and health (28% and 16% respectively); 
51% to social security, mainly retirement and other pensions; and the 
remaining 9% to other expenditures, such as housing, drinking water and 
sanitation. These variations seem to indicate that, in the region as a whole, 
the increase in spending was accounted for to similar degrees by the most 
and the least progressive social sectors. 
The effect on equity was not uniform in all the countries. In 
countries with lower per capita income levels, spending increases were 
relatively greater in the more progressive components (education and 
health), which accounted for 56% of the total, while social security 
represented only 20%. In countries where expenditure was highest, in 
contrast, social security accounted for around half of the total increase. 
The substantial increase in spending on education was linked to the 
implementation of reform programmes, especially at the primary and 
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These reforms included teacher training and salary increases, the cost of 
which had a significant impact on the sector’s budget. The rise in current 
and capital expenditure items also contributed to this increase, especially 
in those countries which decided to improve their physical and 
technological infrastructure, update teaching methods and materials and 
establish systems for measuring educational output.  
As regards trends in expenditure on health, the greatest progress 
was registered in Argentina, Chile and Colombia, where the increase was 
between US$ 76 and US$ 109 per capita: i.e., much higher than the US$ 28 
by which the regional average rose. 
Finally, the biggest increases in spending on social security 
occurred precisely in those countries where that component already 
receives a higher share of public resources (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay). In Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the increase ranged between 
US$ 150 and US$ 200 per capita, while in Uruguay it was just over 
US$ 500. These increases stem from adjustments in retirement and other 
pensions, especially in Uruguay, where four-monthly adjustments were 
introduced in accordance with a constitutional amendment adopted in 
1989. Other factors involved in these increases were the 
acknowledgement and amortization of liabilities accumulated by the 
system and increases in the coverage and amount of benefits provided. 
The trends discussed above indicate that the increased efforts of the 
countries which allocate a lower share of GDP to the social sectors had a 
positive effect on the distribution of well-being, which was more marked 
in these countries than in those with the highest per capita social 
expenditure levels, in which social security, which mostly benefits the 
middle- and high-income strata, accounts for a much larger share of 
public resources. 
In conclusion: bearing in mind the importance of the distributive 
effect of social expenditure, there is a need to: (i) intensify efforts to 
increase social expenditure, given that its level is quite low in the majority 
of the countries of the region; (ii) stabilize its financing, in order to 
forestall the serious adverse effects of spending cuts during economic 
downturns, and (iii) target public social expenditure more accurately, 
especially in the case of programmes aimed at vulnerable or poor groups, 
by reallocating the available funds to those components which have the 
most impact. In short, efforts should be made to maintain or increase 
resources, manage them more efficiently, and ensure that the 
programmes they finance have the desired effect on the population they 
are intended to benefit. 
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Methodological annex 
(a) Sources of statistics on total public spending and social 
expenditure 
The methodologies used, and especially the coverage of statistical 
series on total public spending and on social expenditure, vary 
throughout the region. The main differences in methodology have to do 
with how expenditure is recorded in the accounts and how social 
expenditure is defined. As regards coverage, the disparities have to do 
with the different characteristics of public institutions and whether or not 
spending by local governments is included. 
Public spending can be broken down into different levels according 
to the different entities that implement it. A first distinction is between 
public spending by the financial public sector (FPS), i.e. the Central Bank 
and other State-owned financial institutions, and public expenditure by 
the non-financial public sector (NFPS), which is made up of the central 
government (CG), public enterprises (PE) and local government (LG). 
In 11 of the 17 countries analysed, the series refer to central 
government expenditure. Within this category, a distinction may be made 
between entities that manage their own budgets (autonomous entities 
(AE)) and entities that are funded directly by the Treasury (central 
government budget (CGB)). In one country, coverage relates to general 
government expenditure (GG), which comprises CG and LG. 
The following is a classification of countries according to the 
institutions covered by social expenditure series: 
 
Institutions covered Countries 
NFPS = CG + PE + LG Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,  
Costa Rica, Panama 
GG = CG + LG Bolivia 
CG = CGB + AE Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Peru, Dominican 
Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela 
CGB Mexico, Nicaragua and Paraguay 
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Bearing in mind the accounting definitions applied to the series for 
these 17 countries and the way in which social expenditure is funded and 
executed in each of them, the figures can be regarded as reasonably 
comparable for 16 of the countries. In the case of Mexico, however, the 
fact that social expenditure at the local level is not included and that there 
is a degree of decentralization in its funding leads to some degree of 
underestimation of public social spending, and this limits the 
comparability of the figures with those for the other countries. 
The indicators of priority (social expenditure/GDP and social 
expenditure/total public spending) are ratios calculated using the 
current-price figures for each year. Per capita social expenditure in 1997 
dollars was estimated on the basis of total social expenditure at current 
prices. To express it in constant 1997 dollars, the implicit GDP deflator 
and the average exchange rate for that year were used. 
The data in current prices on total public spending and social 
expenditure, as well as the sectoral breakdown of social expenditure, are 
official figures provided by the relevant public institutions of each 
country. GDP at current prices and the implicit GDP deflator are also 
official figures obtained from the ECLAC Annual Statistics Data Bank 
(BADEANU). The exchange rate used corresponds to the 1997 average of 
the “rf” series, taken from International Financial Statistics, published by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The population figures are 
derived from projections prepared by the Population Division of the Latin 
American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE) and published 
in its Demographic Bulletin. 
(b) A model for analysing the behaviour of public social spending 
One way of summarizing the behaviour of social expenditure in 
different macroeconomic scenarios is to estimate the elasticity of social 
expenditure in relation to GDP, i.e., the extent to which social expenditure 
increases or decreases with a rise or fall in GDP. This parameter ( ) can be 
estimated by taking as reference points the different episodes shown as 
dots on figure VI.10 below, which represent variations, in consecutive 
years, in the total government budget and total social expenditure for 
each of the 17 countries and for bienniums for which data were available.  






where SEt+1 and SEt represent social 
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With logarithms, the following equation is obtained: 
 
 
where I is the logarithm of ,   is the elasticity of social 
expenditure in relation to GDP, and e is the estimation error.6   
Estimation of   for the 141 episodes observed between 1990 and 
2000 produced a value of   = 1.147, a highly significant parameter  
(t = 6.16), with a value of adjusted R2 = 0.206 and I = 0.0175 (with an 
antilogarithm of 1.018). The estimation of this elasticity for the episodes in 
which public spending rose —the most frequent situation during the 
decade (121 out of 141 episodes)— gives a social expenditure/gross 
domestic product elasticity value closer to one (  = 1.1189, with a value of 
t = 4.38, R2 = 0.137 and  = 1.020). This demonstrates the procyclical nature 
of social expenditure, since its growth was in most instances similar to the 
rate of increase of GDP. This tallies with the fact that throughout the 
decade, the macroeconomic priority of social expenditure rose for all the 
countries of the region (see figure VI.2). 
This is the case both for total social expenditure and for social 
expenditure excluding the amounts allocated by the countries to social 
security. In this latter case, the average elasticity for all the episodes in 
question (139) shows a value of   = 1.313 (t = 6.709) and α = 1.002, i.e., an 
elasticity higher than that estimated for overall spending on the social 
sectors. This shows, by counterposition, that the main inertial component 
of public social expenditure is social security. 
An alternative application of this model is to consider that patterns 
of variation in public social expenditure are due to variations in GDP, but 





For the purposes of this study, various regressions were applied in 
which the lag was taken into account, but no proof of a significant 
relationship was found: for the 126 episodes observed between 1999 and 
2000,   was estimated at a non-significant 0.285, with t = 1.204 and 
adjusted R2 = 0.0035. 
                                                          
6  For an extended application of the model in the case of Argentina, see Ravallion (2000). 
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Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. 
a
 Corresponds to the differences, in consecutive years, between the logarithms for public social 
expenditure and GDP. 
(c) Progressiveness of social expenditure by sector 
In order to analyse the degree of distributive progressiveness of 
social expenditure in each sector (education, health, housing and social 
security), a synthetic index based on the share of expenditure received by 
households in each income-distribution quintile was used. 





where N represents the number of segments into which the 
population was divided (5 segments) and Qi represents the cumulative 
percentage of expenditure received by the population in each of the 
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Depending on how progressive expenditure is, this index can take 
the following values: 
If -1 < IG < 0  then the distribution of expenditure is progressive, 
i.e., low-income households receive a proportionally 
higher share of the expenditure than middle- and 
high-income households. 
If 0 < IG < 1  then the distribution of expenditure is regressive, i.e., 
low-income households receive a proportionally 
lower share of the expenditure than middle- and 
high-income households. 
(d) Decentralization and public social expenditure 
It should be noted that is difficult to carry out analyses of this type 
in countries where the financing of public expenditure and public social 
expenditure is decentralized to a considerable degree. In such cases, 
consolidated national totals must be used when making a comparative 
regional analysis of total public spending and social expenditure over 
time. This makes it possible to avoid the considerable underestimation of 
expenditure levels that occurs when only central government spending is 
recorded. 
The case of Brazil —where a high percentage of public revenues 
and social expenditure is obtained and administered on a decentralized 
basis— illustrates this problem, as well as the differences that occur in the 
various social expenditure indicators when all levels of public 
administration are taken into consideration. In Brazil, for example, if only 
federal expenditure is analysed, the per capita social expenditure figure 
for 1998 comes to US$ 613 (in 1997 dollars), and the real increase for the 
period 1990-1998 comes to 20.7%. However, if the source of the resources 
is taken into account, and total spending by the three spheres of 
government (federal, state and municipal) is consolidated, per capita 
social expenditure in 1998 rises to US$ 1,011, which is about 65% higher 
than the federal expenditure figure, with the variation being 21.5% over 
the same period. 
The decentralization of social expenditure in Brazil displays major 
differences between sectors (health, education, social security and others), 
and this means that the differences in spending levels and the 
corresponding variations from year to year become more significant. 
Thus, for example, the gradual marked decentralization of educational 
funding caused federal government spending in this area to fall from 34% 
of expenditure in 1989 to 26.1% in 1996. 
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No systematic compilation of consolidated data for expenditure 
levels in the three spheres of government is available, however. The 
consolidated information therefore had to be estimated on the basis of 
three studies, thanks to which it was possible to calculate federal 
expenditure growth coefficients by sector in order to estimate spending in 
each of the three spheres of government.7 This made it possible to obtain 
the data on consolidated social expenditure between 1990 and 1998 that 
are used in this chapter. This structure of coefficients was extrapolated to 
the nearest years, on the assumption that the coefficients remained 
constant.  
That assumption is based on the studies in question, which show 
that the coefficients do not vary significantly from year to year and 
indicate a gradual process of decentralization of social expenditure in 
Brazil, as evidenced by the coefficients of the growth of federal 
expenditure calculated to estimate consolidated expenditure: in the early 
1980s, the coefficients were around 1.50; between 1984 and 1989, they 
varied between 1.60 and 1.65, and during the 1990s, they ranged around 
1.70. 
                                                          
7  The sources of information used were: 1990-1993, Médici (1994); 1994-1996, IPEA (1995), 
and for 1997-1998, IPEA (1996). 
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Chapter VII 
Concluding observations 
Social development in the 1990s can be seen from two different 
viewpoints: an objective one involving the analysis of data, estimates and 
indicators (obtained basically from household surveys), as exemplified by 
the foregoing chapters of this book, and another which seeks to sound out 
people’s subjective reactions to and perceptions of economic and social 
changes, together with their assessment of the social system as a whole, 
the prevailing economic model and the central actors in these processes. 
This information is derived from public opinion polls.  
The issues included on Latin America’s new social development 
agenda emerged both from the challenges posed by those objective factors 
and from the population’s ambivalent response to the changes that have 
taken place.  
In the first few years of the decade the primary concern of many 
Latin Americans was to stop the inflationary processes that were eroding 
their income. To achieve this, they voted for governments that had been 
successful in the stabilization process (Mora and Araujo, 1992), staking 
their future on the hope that, in time, some of the fruits of growth would 
filter down to them.  
Only a few sectors reacted negatively —in particular, public 
employees affected by the privatization of State-owned companies or 
public spending cuts—, as indicated in the Social Panorama of Latin 
America, 1995 (ECLAC, 1996).  
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By contrast, towards the end of the 1990s, amid the uncertainty 
created by international financial crises and economic stagnation, a 
malaise emerged and became widespread, as shown by public opinion 
polls. Of the individuals surveyed in 16 countries of the region, 67% felt 
that the distribution of wealth was unfair, while 61% said that their 
country was not developing.  
Clearly, such opinions were strongly influenced by the survey 
respondents’ personal experiences with the changes that had occurred.  
The answers were also strongly marked by generational 
differences. Members of the present generation feel that they have fewer 
opportunities than the preceding generation and the one that will follow 
(Latinobarómetro, 2000). Young people commonly express dissatisfaction 
at the difficulties they face in finding a job that meets their expectations.  
Even in Chile —where economic reforms have matured more than 
in other countries and where high levels of growth have been achieved 
over a long period— inequality has become a growing cause of concern 
and has taken precedence over poverty, defined as a lack of resources. 
It seems that the country’s very success in meeting a priority need 
—poverty reduction— has brought new concerns to the fore: as Manzi-
Catalán (1998) points out, the population is now focusing on the different 
speeds with which the benefits of economic progress reach different 
sectors of society. Low- and middle-income respondents say that current 
levels of poverty and inequality are not consistent with the level of 
growth achieved. They think that this inconsistency arises from the 
dynamics of the system itself and from the policies of social decision-
makers, whom they criticize as insensitive. They also complain about 
what they regard as the State’s failure to change this state of affairs 
(Manzi-Catalán, 1998). 
In processes of economic and social change, even those involving 
growth and major social advances, signs of dissatisfaction usually emerge, 
in part because the process of change itself triggers new aspirations. 
Maslow (1954) showed that once certain primary needs are met, they are 
immediately replaced by new ones that are strongly felt and are usually 
hard to satisfy in the short term. 
This discrepancy between aspirations and achievements usually 
prompts people to criticize politics and distance themselves from political 
activity. The survey respondents’ tendency to belittle politics may be due 
to a number of factors. Certainly, the decisive changes observed in 
political life have had an impact. Today the communications media, 
especially television, play a central role in election campaigns. At the 
same time, rallies and face-to-face rapport between candidates and their 
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constituents are on the decline. This also reduces the role of the political 
volunteers and organizers who were once the lifeblood of political parties. 
On the other hand, the media, which are, as López Pintor (1999) puts it, 
among the institutions that are undermining traditional forms of 
authority throughout the world, have taken on tasks such as reporting 
instances of arbitrariness, corruption and abuse of power and are also 
helping to solve the problems of individuals and communities that have 
no other way of making themselves heard, thereby replacing politicians 
and parties. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the media are 
sometimes used to wage campaigns designed to discredit public figures 
and that this is another way in which they erode the prestige of politicians 
and politics. 
The citizenry’s estrangement from politics may also reflect the 
transition from a period of intense popular participation, generated by the 
weight that the State apparatus had at that time, to a stage where strong 
political involvement is no longer necessary (Huneeus, 1997). This may 
also reflect the fact that extreme positions have disappeared from the 
ideological spectrum and have been replaced by a focus on political 
consensus-building, which enables citizens to devote more time to other 
aspects of life.  
Surveys show that there is even an increasing loss of enthusiasm 
for democracy, which is supported by only 37% of the respondents 
(Latinobarómetro, 2000). An optimistic interpretation is that this critical 
view is related to the performance of specific administrations, especially 
in the economic sphere, and not to political institutions themselves; this 
assessment is confirmed by the respondents’ general tendency to strongly 
reject authoritarianism (Huneeus, 1997). They also express an interest in 
staying informed and in discussing politics. In addition, in most of the 
countries voter turnout in presidential and legislative elections has not 
declined, which may be interpreted as a sign of support for the 
democratic system. Most of the respondents affirm their faith that 
elections can bring change, except in those countries where no reasonable 
person could believe such a thing.  
Nevertheless, it is clear that the State’s legitimacy is based not only 
on how its authorities came to power, but also on economic efficiency and 
the capacity to do things well and solve problems. On average, 64% of the 
survey respondents were somewhat or completely dissatisfied in this 
regard. In addition, in seven countries 60% of the respondents said they 
did not trust State institutions, while a slightly smaller proportion did not 
trust civil-society institutions. The least distrusted institutions are the 
armed forces (46%) and the Catholic Church (27%), while the most 
242 ECLAC 
distrusted are political parties (72%), trade unions (65%) and business 
associations (63%). 
In view of these findings, the fundamental challenge facing the 
Latin American agenda, in addition to that of further reducing poverty 
and indigence, is to take these perceptions into account, since they affect 
the basic pillars of social organization and of the State’s functioning. 
Citizens must understand that they have a vital role to play in making 
democracy and democratic political systems work and that it is important 
for them to participate in public life, not only to defend their own 
interests but also to help create a healthy society.  
To advance towards the achievement of these aims, the countries 
must carry out economic and social reforms simultaneously and must 
intensify political reforms, on the understanding that these different kinds 
of reform are mutually reinforcing. The main tasks in this regard are the 
following: 
• To begin with, the countries must improve the functioning of 
democracy by consolidating the rule of law and equality 
before the law. This involves moving beyond outdated ways 
of practising politics, such as patronage and corporatism, 
which are closely tied to the gaping inequalities found in the 
region; these, in turn, are perpetuated by the persistence of 
social structures left over from the days of colonialism and 
slavery. While most of the region’s countries have undergone 
transformations that have helped to dilute —although without 
eradicating completely— these traditional forms of social 
control, especially those prevailing in rural areas, and have 
thus paved the way for the development of modern 
democracies, much remains to be done in this regard. 
• In addition, the reduction of poverty and indigence must be 
accompanied by an increase in the population’s incorporation 
into the consumer society. In an atmosphere that stresses the 
problems of consumerism, little attention has been paid to the 
weakness of consumer society in Latin America. Most 
households do not have sufficient income to enjoy a minimum 
level of mass consumption. This is a matter not only of 
material well-being, but also of social prestige and integration, 
on which society increasingly places a premium. In general, 
only two to three out of every 10 urban households currently 
have enough per capita income to take part in consumer 
society at a level consistent with the degree of development 
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attained in Latin America.1 Uruguay is an exception, since 
about half of the country’s households had already reached 
this level by the 1990s; in other countries this proportion 
amounts to only a third, and very few of the countries in this 
second group can expect that as many as half of their 
households will attain that level of consumption in the next 
few years (Gerstenfeld, 1998).  
• Social mobility plays a crucial role in an open, modern society 
that seeks to enhance social equity. One way to ensure that 
people perform well in their social roles is to give them 
opportunities and incentives to move up to better-paid or 
more socially prestigious positions. In traditional societies, on 
the other hand, people generally acquire their positions by 
assignment rather than merit.  
In the early stages of development, a type of “structural” 
mobility takes place in which new and better positions are 
rapidly created and are filled without regard to people’s 
qualifications to carry out the functions concerned. In more 
advanced stages, mobility becomes “circular” in the sense that 
fewer positions are created and changes can be made only 
through rotation; that is, through vacancies that arise —owing 
to retirement, death or dismissal— in higher positions, 
enabling duly qualified candidates to be promoted to fill them 
(Pastore and Silva, 2000).  
Studies have shown that, in the region, only two out of every 
four young people in urban areas, and one out of every four in 
rural areas, have access to educational mobility. As a result, 
the likelihood of social mobility has remained virtually 
unchanged since 1980 (ECLAC, 1998a). The educational 
system is the key to changing this pattern. 
A meritocracy —that is, a society in which positions are filled 
by individuals possessing certain capacities— can only 
function if there is social mobility and if non-merit-based 
criteria for assigning social positions become less and less 
important. However, it should also be stressed that, in a 
                                                          
1  To be considered part of consumer society, a household must have per capita income  
higher than three times the poverty line. At that income level, the distribution shows a 
clear jump in the level of expenditure. It should be recalled that the poverty line is, 
precisely, the income level at which people are considered to be poor; incomes of less 
than twice the poverty line are a sign of vulnerability and of an increased risk of 
becoming poor at some point in life. 
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society of this type, individuals who do not meet the 
requirements for occupying well-paid, more socially 
prestigious positions can be plunged into poverty. Therefore, 
a concern for equity is vital in a modern society, and calls for 
the incorporation of elements that make up for these 
shortcomings and ensure that the whole population has a 
decent minimum standard of living.  
• Undoubtedly, the key instrument for addressing many of the 
aforementioned issues on the regional agenda is public policy. 
It should be borne in mind that a sound economic policy has 
positive effects on social development by generating 
conditions conducive to job creation and high wages. Even if 
the only employment created is in low-productivity, low-
paying jobs, as has tended to be the case in recent years, this 
enables more members of poor households to obtain 
employment, thereby increasing the employment density and, 
consequently, the per capita income of households. Economic 
growth also makes it possible to increase public spending and 
to finance programmes that can help to enhance equity and 
reduce poverty. 
• It should be understood from the outset that social policies 
cannot single-handedly bring about social equity. 
Responsibility for social development is not the exclusive 
preserve of social policy; rather, it is shared with economic 
policy. That being said, social policies do have a direct and 
indirect impact on poverty reduction and the improvement of 
living conditions, through their three basic functions: 
investment in human capital, provision of social protection 
and enhancement of social integration or cohesiveness. 
• Investment in human capital is made fundamentally through 
education, which must break the mechanism whereby 
opportunities for achieving well-being are determined by 
intergenerational transmission (ECLAC, 1998a); that is, the 
characteristics of individuals’ households of origin determine 
the quantity and quality of their education, and hence the type 
of work they will perform and, ultimately, the degree of well-
being they can achieve in the course of their lifetime. In this 
situation, the future of new generations is decided at an early 
stage, and a distinction is made between those who are 
excluded (those with too little education to obtain well-paid 
jobs) and those who are socially integrated.  
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Every individual should have access to education and the 
opportunity to reach the education threshold, defined as the 
number of years of schooling which, at any given time, affords 
people access to jobs that will give them a good chance of 
staying above the poverty line for the rest of their lives. In 
Latin America the education threshold is now about 12 years 
of formal schooling (ECLAC, 1999b), and it is reached by only 
a third of young people in urban areas and a tenth in rural 
areas.  
Hence, it is important to reduce repetition and drop-out rates 
and to improve the quality of education. These efforts are not 
sufficient in themselves, however, considering that school 
performance is strongly influenced by factors external to the 
educational system. It is also necessary to offset the differences 
stemming from the different characteristics of students’ 
households of origin.  
• To combat poverty and indigence, policies to build human 
capital must be complemented by social safety nets, or sets of 
compensatory measures for increasing income and other 
assets through targeted transfers designed to sustain or 
increase the well-being of poor or vulnerable groups in times 
of crisis, economic transition or disaster (Graham, 1994). Such 
safety nets must be stable and permanent and must have 
specialized staff, clearly defined eligibility mechanisms, 
project portfolios and established practices for evaluating 
them, among other elements. Otherwise they will not be able 
to respond promptly to the needs that arise in times of crisis 
(Cornia, 1999).  
Since the 1980s the protection of poor groups in times of crisis 
has been based on emergency job programmes, anti-poverty 
programmes and social emergency or social investment funds, 
which are intended to complement traditional social 
assistance programmes. Also useful in this regard are 
measures to keep people employed, such as bringing forward 
scheduled investments in infrastructure or promoting public 
works in communities hit by natural disasters or adverse 
economic conditions (Iglesias, 2001). The basic approach of 
these programmes should be countercyclical; that is, their 
coverage and benefits should expand as the economy 
contracts. It is important, therefore, to identify items of 
expenditure that should be maintained or expanded during 
crisis periods.  
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• An integrated society is one in which the population follows 
socially accepted patterns of conduct and there is a good 
match between cultural goals, the structure of opportunities 
for achieving them and the acquisition of individual skills for 
seizing such opportunities. Of course, there are always 
instances of deviant behaviour, which can either enhance or 
break down social cohesiveness and which are usually linked 
to various forms of exclusion, or circumstances in which 
society does not give people appropriate means 
(opportunities) of achieving the goals imposed by their culture 
(ECLAC, 1997). 
Cohesiveness does not mean homogenization, inasmuch as 
modern societies value diversity and the creative 
contributions that each cultural group can make. Rather, it 
refers to a set of common overall goals and rules that leave 
room for aims specific to certain individuals and groups. This 
is especially important in multi-ethnic, multicultural societies.  
• The region’s long-standing problems of poor social integration 
(poverty, ethnic discrimination, social segmentation, 
residential segregation) have been compounded by more 
recent phenomena such as violence in various forms, an 
erosion of public safety, drug trafficking and corruption.  
Feelings of insecurity increase faster than the violence or 
criminal behaviour that engenders them. Violence has an 
intimidating effect that grows as it spreads and as it receives 
high-profile coverage in the media. This effect is also 
intensified by the public perception that many of the culprits 
go unpunished. This creates a climate of fear and gives the 
population a strong sense of vulnerability. 
Acts of violence and perceptions such as these alter the way 
people live. They tend to spend less time in public places, take 
refuge indoors and seek recreation in private places. There is 
accordingly less interaction between people of different social 
backgrounds, and spontaneous socializing is discouraged. 
People isolate themselves with their peers, and feelings of 
suspicion emerge towards others or towards those who are 
“different”. Urban design also changes as gated communities 
and condominiums proliferate and many people opt to live in 
apartments instead of houses. Higher amounts are spent on 
theft insurance, private security services and self-defence 
items.  
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• In summary, strengthening social integration involves 
rebuilding channels for social mobility that reflect the 
transformations under way, implementing a development 
model whose fruits reach all members of society, creating a 
public sphere that recognizes and values diversity and fosters 
the strengthening of civil society and consolidating a political 
system in which the demands and interests of all stakeholders 
are represented and negotiated. 
The region’s future agenda will reflect the aspiration to build more 
inclusive, egalitarian societies in which disadvantaged population groups 
are increasingly incorporated into consumer society and processes of 
upward social mobility.  
It is also necessary to stress the importance of democracy and its 
quality, as a basic ingredient of a healthy society. Exclusionary societies 
can easily lead to patronage and populism, breed violence and insecurity 
and end up impairing the functioning of democracy. 
An issue currently being debated in Europe is the emergence of 
“two-thirds societies”, or societies in which only two out of every three 
people are socially integrated. Most of the Latin American countries now 
have “one-third societies”. The challenge before them, then, is to expand 
the means of inclusion. Societies cannot become genuinely competitive 
unless they achieve human development at the same time. 
As Dahrendorf (1996) has noted, achieving growth, social 
cohesiveness and freedom all at the same time is difficult and may even 
be tantamount to squaring the circle. It is never possible to do this 
perfectly, of course, but it is always possible to come close.  
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Table A.1 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): POVERTY INDICATORS, 1990-1999 
(Percentages) 
Households and population below the poverty line a 
Country total Urban areas Rural areas Country Year 
Households Population Households Population Households Population 
Argentina b 1990 - - 16.2 21.2 - - 
 1994 - - 10.2 13.2 - - 
 1997 - - 13.1 17.8 - - 
 1999 - - 13.1 19.7 - - 
Bolivia 1989 c - - 49.4 53.1 - - 
 1994 c - - 45.6 51.6 - - 
 1997 56.7 62.1 46.8 52.3 72.0 78.5 
 1999 54.7 60.6 42.3 48.7 75.6 80.7 
Brazil 1990 41.4 48.0 35.6 41.2 63.9 70.6 
 1993 37.1 45.3 33.3 40.3 52.9 63.0 
 1996 28.6 35.8 24.6 30.6 45.6 55.6 
 1999 29.9 37.5 26.4 32.9 45.2 55.3 
Chile 1990 33.3 38.6 33.3 38.4 33.5 39.5 
 1994 23.2 27.5 22.8 26.9 25.5 30.9 
 1998 17.8 21.7 17.0 20.7 22.7 27.6 
 2000 16.6 20.6 16.2 20.1 19.2 23.8 
Colombia 1991 50.5 56.1 47.1 52.7 55.4 60.7 
 1994 47.3 52.5 40.6 45.4 57.4 62.4 
 1997 44.9 50.9 39.5 45.0 54.0 60.1 
 1999 48.7 54.9 44.6 50.6 55.8 61.8 
Costa Rica 1990 23.7 26.2 22.2 24.8 24.9 27.3 
 1994 20.8 23.1 18.1 20.7 23.1 25.0 
 1997 20.3 22.5 17.1 19.3 22.9 24.8 
 1999 18.2 20.3 15.7 18.1 20.5 22.3 
Ecuador 1990 - - 55.8 62.1 - - 
 1994 - - 52.3 57.9 - - 
 1997 - - 49.8 56.2 - - 
 1999 - - 58.0 63.6 - - 
El Salvador 1995 47.6 54.2 40.0 45.8 58.2 64.4 
 1997 48.0 55.5 38.6 44.4 61.6 69.2 
 1999 43.5 49.8 34.0 38.7 59.0 65.1 
Guatemala 1989 63.0 69.1 48.2 53.1 72.1 77.7 
 1998 53.5 60.5 38.8 46.0 64.7 70.0 
Honduras 1990 75.2 80.5 64.5 69.8 83.5 88.0 
 1994 73.1 77.9 69.6 74.5 76.1 80.5 
 1997 73.8 79.1 67.0 72.6 79.9 84.2 
 1999 74.3 79.7 65.6 71.7 82.3 86.3 
Mexico 1989 39.0 47.8 33.9 42.1 48.4 57.0 
 1994 35.8 45.1 29.0 36.8 46.5 56.5 
 1996 43.4 52.1 37.5 45.1 53.4 62.5 
 1998 38.0 46.9 31.1 38.9 49.3 58.5 
 2000 33.3 41.1 26.5 32.3 45.1 54.7 
Nicaragua 1993 68.1 73.6 60.3 66.3 78.7 82.7 




Table A.1 (concluded) 
Households and population below the poverty line a 
Country total Urban areas Rural areas Country Year 
Households Population Households Population Households Population 
Panama 1991 36.3 42.8 33.6 40.9 42.5 50.6 
 1994 29.7 36.1 25.2 30.8 40.6 49.2 
 1997 27.3 33.2 24.6 29.7 33.5 41.9 
 1999 24.2 30.2 20.8 25.7 32.6 41.5 
Paraguay 1990 d - - 36.8 42.2 - - 
 1994 - - 42.4 49.9 - - 
 1996 - - 39.6 46.3 - - 
 1999 51.7 60.6 41.4 49.0 65.2 73.9 
Peru 1997 40.5 47.6 28.0 33.7 65.6 72.7 
 1999 42.3 48.6 30.9 36.1 66.8 72.5 
Dominican Republic 1997 32.4 37.2 31.6 35.6 33.6 39.4 
 1998 25.7 30.2 21.2 25.4 33.6 38.4 
Uruguay 1990 - - 11.8 17.8 - - 
 1994 - - 5.8 9.7 - - 
 1997 - - 5.7 9.5 - - 
 1999 - - 5.6 9.4 - - 
Venezuela 1990 34.2 40.0 33.4 38.8 38.4 46.5 
 1994 42.1 48.7 40.9 47.1 47.7 55.6 
 1997 42.3 48.1 - - - - 
 1999 44.0 49.4 - - - - 
Latin America e 1990 41.0 48.3 35.0 41.4 58.2 65.4 
 1994 37.5 45.7 31.8 38.7 56.1 65.1 
 1997 35.5 43.5 29.7 36.5 54.0 63.0 
 1999 35.3 43.8 29.8 37.1 54.3 63.7 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned. 
For definitions of the indicators, see ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2000-2001 (LC/G.2138-
P), Santiago, Chile, March 2002. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.II.G.141, box I.2. 
a
 Includes households (persons) living in indigence or extreme poverty. 
b
 Greater Buenos Aires. 
c
 Eight departmental capitals plus the city of El Alto. 
d
 Metropolitan area of Asunción. 
e
 Estimate for 18 countries of the region. 
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Table A.2 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INDIGENCE INDICATORS, 1990-1999 
(Percentages) 
Households and population below the indigence line 
Country total Urban areas Rural areas Country Year 
Households Population Households Population Households Population 
Argentina a 1990 - - 3.5 5.2 - - 
 1994 - - 1.5 2.6 - - 
 1997 - - 3.3 4.8 - - 
 1999 - - 3.1 4.8 - - 
Bolivia 1989 b - - 22.1 23.3 - - 
 1994 b - - 16.8 19.8 - - 
 1997 32.7 37.2 19.2 22.6 53.8 61.5 
 1999 32.6 36.5 16.4 19.8 59.6 64.7 
Brazil 1990 18.3 23.4 13.3 16.7 37.9 46.1 
 1993 15.3 20.2 11.6 15.0 30.2 38.8 
 1996 10.5 13.9 7.6 9.6 23.1 30.2 
 1999 9.6 12.9 7.1 9.3 20.5 27.1 
Chile 1990 10.6 12.9 10.2 12.4 12.1 15.2 
 1994 6.2 7.6 5.9 7.1 7.9 9.8 
 1998 4.7 5.6 4.3 5.1 6.9 8.7 
 2000 4.6 5.7 4.2 5.3 6.7 8.3 
Colombia 1991 22.6 26.1 17.2 20.0 30.6 34.3 
 1994 25.0 28.5 16.2 18.6 38.2 42.5 
 1997 20.1 23.5 14.6 17.2 29.3 33.4 
 1999 23.2 26.8 18.7 21.9 31.1 34.6 
Costa Rica 1990 9.8 9.8 6.9 6.4 12.3 12.5 
 1994 7.7 8.0 5.6 5.7 9.5 9.7 
 1997 7.4 7.8 5.2 5.5 9.1 9.6 
 1999 7.5 7.8 5.4 5.4 9.4 9.8 
Ecuador 1990 - - 22.6 26.2 - - 
 1994 - - 22.4 25.5 - - 
 1997 - - 18.6 22.2 - - 
 1999 - - 27.2 31.3 - - 
El Salvador 1995 18.2 21.7 12.4 14.9 26.5 29.9 
 1997 18.5 23.3 12.0 14.8 27.9 33.7 
 1999 18.3 21.9 11.1 13.0 29.3 34.3 
Guatemala 1989 36.7 41.8 22.9 26.2 45.2 50.1 
 1998 28.0 34.1 12.9 17.2 39.6 45.2 
Honduras 1990 
      
 1994 54.0 60.6 38.0 43.2 66.4 72.8 
 1997 48.5 53.9 40.8 46.0 54.9 59.8 
 1999 48.3 54.4 36.8 41.5 58.7 64.0 
Mexico 1989 50.6 56.8 37.1 42.9 63.2 68.0 
 1994 14.0 18.8 9.3 13.1 22.4 27.9 
 1996 11.8 16.8 6.2 9.0 20.4 27.5 
 1998 15.6 21.3 10.0 13.8 25.0 32.4 
 2000 13.2 18.5 6.9 9.7 23.5 31.1 
Nicaragua 1993 10.7 15.2 4.7 6.6 21.2 28.5 




Table A.2 (concluded) 
Households and population below the indigence line a 
Country total Urban areas Rural areas Country Year 
Households Population Households Population Households Population 
Panama 1991 16.0 19.2 13.9 16.0 21.1 26.7 
 1994 12.0 15.7 8.7 11.4 19.8 26.2 
 1997 10.2 13.0 8.6 10.7 14.1 18.8 
 1999 8.3 10.7 6.6 8.1 12.6 17.2 
Paraguay 1990 c - - 10.4 12.7 - - 
 1994 - - 14.8 18.8 - - 
 1996 - - 13.0 16.3 - - 
 1999 26.0 33.9 13.9 17.4 42.0 52.8 
Peru 1997 20.4 25.1 7.9 9.9 45.5 52.7 
 1999 18.7 22.4 7.6 9.3 42.6 47.3 
Dominican Republic 1997 12.8 14.4 11.0 11.8 15.2 17.9 
 1998 5.8 6.8 3.7 4.4 9.4 10.9 
Uruguay 1990 - - 2.0 3.4 - - 
 1994 - - 1.1 1.9 - - 
 1997 - - 0.9 1.7 - - 
 1999 - - 0.9 1.8 - - 
Venezuela 1990 11.8 14.6 10.9 13.3 16.5 21.7 
 1994 15.1 19.2 13.5 17.1 22.9 28.3 
 1997 17.1 20.5 - - - - 
 1999 19.4 21.7 - - - - 
Latin America d 1990 17.7 22.5 12.0 15.3 34.1 40.4 
 1994 15.9 20.8 10.5 13.6 33.5 40.8 
 1997 14.4 19.0 9.5 12.3 30.2 37.6 
 1999 13.9 18.5 9.1 11.9 30.7 38.3 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned. 
For definitions of the indicators, see ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2000-2001 (LC/G.2138-
P), Santiago, Chile, March 2002. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.II.G.141, box I.1. 
a
 Greater Buenos Aires. 
b
 Eight departmental capitals plus the city of El Alto. 
c
 Metropolitan area of Asunción. 
d
 Estimate for 18 countries of the region. 
 
A decade of social development in Latin America, 1990-1999 261 
Table A.3 
LATIN AMERICA (16 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF THE EMPLOYED 
 ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION, BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY, 




workers and unpaid 




sector a Total Agriculture 
Bolivia 1997 100.0 3.3 8.9 2.4 6.5 87.8 79.9 
 1999 100.0 1.2 9.2 2.3 6.9 89.6 82.1 
 2000 100.0 0.5 8.6 2.8 5.8 90.9 83.0 
Brazil 1990 100.0 3.0 44.3 … 44.3 52.7 44.3 
 1993 100.0 1.9 33.6 5.1 28.5 64.5 58.4 
 1996 100.0 1.8 34.3 4.4 29.9 63.8 57.2 
 1999 100.0 2.0 34.3 5.2 29.1 63.7 56.4 
Chile b 1990 100.0 2.8 64.9 … 64.9 32.3 25.0 
 1994 100.0 2.6 66.6 … 66.6 30.8 21.5 
 1996 100.0 2.4 64.2 3.6 60.6 33.3 26.6 
 1998 100.0 2.8 64.5 … 64.5 32.7 24.4 
 2000 100.0 2.5 65.1 4.9 60.2 32.5 24.3 
Colombia 1991 100.0 6.3 48.6 … 48.6 45.0 25.5 
 1994 100.0 4.5 54.2 … 54.2 41.3 22.4 
 1997 100.0 4.2 50.6 … 50.6 45.1 25.0 
 1999 100.0 3.7 47.2 3.7 43.5 49.2 27.9 
Costa Rica 1990 100.0 5.1 66.2 10.5 55.7 28.7 16.8 
 1994 100.0 6.8 69.0 9.6 59.4 24.2 11.1 
 1997 100.0 7.1 67.8 9.0 58.8 25.2 11.3 
 1999 100.0 8.2 69.2 8.9 60.3 22.7 9.5 
 2000 99.9 5.8 66.9 9.6 57.3 27.3 12.3 
Ecuador 2000 100.0 3.2 42.4 3.9 38.5 54.3 40.7 
El Salvador 1995 100.0 6.0 49.6 3.2 46.4 44.3 26.8 
 1997 100.0 4.0 50.9 3.1 47.8 45.1 28.1 
 1999 100.0 4.1 50.8 3.9 46.9 45.2 26.3 
 2000 100.0 4.6 47.2 3.9 43.3 48.1 26.7 
Guatemala 1989 100.0 0.6 38.7 2.9 35.8 60.7 47.5 
 1998 100.0 2.0 42.9 1.7 41.2 55.1 34.8 
Honduras 1990 100.0 0.6 34.9 4.0 30.9 64.6 47.6 
 1994 100.0 1.7 37.0 4.8 32.2 61.4 43.5 
 1997 100.0 2.6 34.8 3.4 31.4 62.6 41.6 
 1999 100.0 3.1 33.4 3.7 29.7 63.5 41.3 
Mexico c 1989 100.0 2.5 50.2 … 50.2 47.3 34.6 
 1994 100.0 4.0 48.6 5.5 43.1 47.4 30.8 
 1996 100.0 5.1 48.1 6.4 41.7 46.7 28.6 
 1998 100.0 4.5 45.6 6.0 39.6 49.9 29.2 
 2000 100.0 5.0 51.0 6.6 44.4 44.0 25.1 
Nicaragua 1993 100.0 0.2 38.4 6.6 31.8 61.3 45.8 




Table A.3 (concluded) 
Wage earners 
Own-account 
workers and unpaid 




sector a Total Agriculture 
Panama 1991 100.0 2.9 39.1 12.5 26.6 58.0 45.5 
 1994 100.0 3.3 47.0 11.8 35.2 49.7 34.4 
 1997 100.0 2.2 46.1 10.1 36.0 51.6 33.4 
 1999 100.0 3.2 44.9 10.1 34.8 51.9 31.6 
Paraguay 1997 100.0 2.3 24.8 3.2 21.6 72.8 57.3 
 1999 100.0 3.4 27.0 3.4 23.6 69.7 54.0 
Peru 1997 100.0 5.3 19.8 3.6 16.2 74.8 61.0 
 1999 100.0 6.3 19.9 2.3 17.6 73.9 61.9 
Dominican Republic 1992 100.0 4.0 52.4 13.2 39.2 43.7 21.6 
 1995 100.0 2.1 56.1 11.5 44.6 41.9 15.7 
 1997 100.0 3.4 45.6 10.3 35.3 51.0 28.5 
 2000 100.0 1.8 40.3 8.1 32.2 57.8 32.6 
Venezuela 1990 100.0 6.9 46.6 8.3 38.3 46.5 33.3 
 1994 100.0 7.6 47.6 7.4 40.2 44.8 29.7 
 1997 100.0 5.4 49.6 5.4 44.2 44.9 33.1 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned. 
a
 Includes domestic employees. For Brazil (1990), Chile (1990, 1994 and 1998), Mexico (1989) and 
Nicaragua (1998), public-sector wage earners are included. 
b
 Information from national socio-economic surveys (CASEN). 
c
 Information from National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure (ENIGH). 
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Table A.4 
LATIN AMERICA: COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING-AGE POPULATION, 
BY SEX, URBAN AND RURAL AREAS,a 1990-1999 
(Millions of persons and percentages) 
Description National total Urban areas Rural areas 
 1990 1994 1997 1999 1990 1994 1997 1999 1990 1994 1997 1999 
 (Millions of persons) 
Working-age 
population 274.6 302.9 324.7 339.7 202.5 228.4 248.5 262.4 72.2 74.5 76.2 77.3 
Males 134.9 148.5 159.0 166.3 97.1 109.5 119.2 125.9 37.8 38.9 39.8 40.4 
Females 139.7 154.4 165.7 173.4 105.3 118.8 129.3 136.5 34.4 35.6 36.4 36.9 
Economically 
active population 167.5 186.4 201.4 211.8 120.7 138.1 152.0 161.6 46.8 48.3 49.4 50.2 
Males 114.5 125.1 133.3 139.0 79.1 89.0 96.7 102.0 35.4 36.1 36.7 37.0 
Females 53.0 61.3 68.1 72.8 41.6 49.1 55.3 59.6 11.4 12.2 12.8 13.2 
Employed 159.8 175.6 187.8 193.7 114.1 128.0 139.1 144.2 45.8 47.6 48.7 49.5 
Males 109.5 118.7 125.7 129.0 74.8 83.1 89.5 92.5 34.7 35.5 36.1 36.5 
Females 50.3 57.0 62.2 64.7 39.3 44.8 49.6 51.7 11.1 12.1 12.6 13.0 
Unemployed 7.6 10.8 13.6 18.1 6.6 10.1 12.9 17.5 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Males 4.9 6.4 7.7 10.0 4.2 5.8 7.2 9.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Females 2.7 4.4 5.9 8.1 2.4 4.3 5.7 7.9 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 
 (Percentages) 
Participation rate b 61.0 61.6 62.0 62.4 59.6 60.5 61.2 61.6 64.8 64.9 64.9 64.9 
Males 84.9 84.3 83.8 83.6 81.4 81.2 81.1 81.0 93.7 92.8 92.0 91.5 
Females 37.9 39.7 41.1 42.0 39.5 41.4 42.8 43.7 33.1 34.3 35.2 35.8 
Employment rate c 58.2 58.0 57.8 57.0 56.4 56.0 56.0 55.0 63.4 64.0 63.9 64.0 
Males 81.2 79.9 79.0 77.6 77.1 75.9 75.1 73.5 91.8 91.3 90.7 90.4 
Females 36.0 36.9 37.5 37.3 37.3 37.7 38.3 37.9 32.2 34.1 34.6 35.2 
Unemployment rate 4.6 5.8 6.7 8.6 5.5 7.3 8.5 10.8 2.2 1.5 1.5 1.3 
Males 4.3 5.1 5.7 7.2 5.4 6.5 7.4 9.4 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.2 
Females 5.1 7.2 8.7 11.2 5.7 8.7 10.3 13.3 2.9 0.8 1.6 1.6 
Source: ECLAC, based on estimates by the Population Division-Latin American and Caribbean 
Demographic Centre (CELADE) and special tabulations of household survey data from the countries 
concerned. 
a
 Aged 15 years and over. 
b
 Economically active population as a percentage of the working-age population. 
c




LATIN AMERICA: SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
EMPLOYED POPULATION,a 1990-1999 
(Thousands of persons and percentages) 
  
Persons (thousands) Percentage breakdown 
 Description 1990 1994 1997 1999 1990 1994 1997 1999 
Employed persons            
Age (in years) 159 841 175 632 187 824 193 714 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
15 to 24 42 741 44 706 45 450 45 275 26.7 25.5 24.2 23.4 
25 to 44 79 612 87 609 94 515 96 042 49.8 49.9 50.3 49.6 
45 to 59 27 724 31 051 34 712 38 216 17.3 17.7 18.5 19.7 
60 and over 9 764 12 266 13 147 14 181 6.1 7.0 7.0 7.3 
Years of schooling 159 841 175 632 187 824 193 714 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
0 to 5 73 387 75 771 74 746 72 505 45.9 43.1 39.8 37.4 
6 to 9 41 366 47 910 56 557 59 066 25.9 27.3 30.1 30.5 
10 to 12 22 046 26 314 34 095 37 783 13.8 15.0 18.2 19.5 
13 and over 23 043 25 636 22 426 24 361 14.4 14.6 11.9 12.6 
Branch of activity 159 841 175 632 187 824 193 714 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Agriculture 37 227 39 540 39 424 39 789 23.3 22.5 21.0 20.5 
Industry 26 911 28 738 29 564 29 065 16.8 16.4 15.7 15.0 
Construction 9 499 12 119 12 057 12 284 5.9 6.9 6.4 6.3 
Transport and communications 7 159 8 129 9 337 9 839 4.5 4.6 5.0 5.1 
Commerce 27 747 31 211 34 824 36 968 17.4 17.8 18.5 19.1 
Finance 4 581 7 359 8 273 8 932 2.9 4.2 4.4 4.6 
Social Services 30 325 31 042 35 084 36 695 19.0 17.7 18.7 18.9 
Personal services 8 131 8 546 9 572 9 960 5.1 4.9 5.1 5.1 
Domestic service 7 886 8 552 9 273 9 754 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 
Unclassified 374 395 418 429 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Size of establishment b 
(employers and employees) 100 116 104 779 110 889 113 051 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1 to 5 26 538 27 849 33 495 34 621 30.7 30.2 31.9 32.3 
6 to 10 9 242 9 163 11 479 11 687 10.7 9.9 10.9 10.9 
11 to 49 28 267 29 972 31 121 31 572 32.7 32.5 29.6 29.4 
50 and over 22 514 25 321 29 029 29 352 26.0 27.4 27.6 27.4 
Unclassified 13 554 12 474 5 764 5 818 - - - - 
Secondary employed persons c 71 404 75 031 80 626 82 393 44.7 42.7 42.9 42.5 
Source: ECLAC, based on estimates by the ECLAC Population Division-Latin American and Caribbean 
Demographic Centre (CELADE) and special tabulations of household survey data from the countries 
concerned. 
a
 Aged 15 years and over. 
b
 By number of persons employed. Percentage breakdown does not include unclassified workers. 
c
 Refers to employed persons whose incomes are lower than that of their households’ main breadwinner. 
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Table A.8 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): INTERGENERATIONAL EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE AGED BETWEEN 20 AND 24 YEARS, BY SEX, 
URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, 2000 
(Percentages) 
Geographical area 
 Urban areas Rural areas 
Educational attainment Educational attainment 
Young people surpassing  
their parents' educational 
level 
Young people failing to 
surpass their parents' 
educational level 
Young people surpassing 
their parents' educational 
level 
Young people failing to 
surpass their parents' 










And failing to 
obtain a  









































Argentina Both sexes 100 40 4 21 34 … … … … … 
 Males 100 31 4 21 44 … … … … … 
 Females 100 50 4 22 25 … … … … … 
Bolivia Both sexes 100 56 10 16 18 100 18 13 … 68 
 Males 100 55 12 14 19 100 23 17 … 60 
 Females 100 57 9 18 16 100 12 8 … 80 
Brazil Both sexes 100 30 12 14 44 100 12 11 3 74 
 Males 100 23 12 13 52 100 9 9 2 80 
 Females 100 38 12 16 34 100 18 16 4 62 
Chile Both sexes 100 49 5 27 19 100 36 13 5 47 
 Males 100 48 6 26 21 100 29 14 4 53 
 Females 100 50 5 28 17 100 45 12 5 38 
Colombia Both sexes 100 52 4 20 24 100 28 10 6 56 
 Males 100 46 5 20 29 100 22 10 5 63 
 Females 100 59 4 20 18 100 38 12 8 42 
Costa Rica Both sexes 100 34 4 20 41 100 23 4 4 69 
 Males 100 32 4 18 46 100 19 3 4 74 
 Females 100 37 4 23 36 100 28 6 4 62 
Ecuador Both sexes 100 48 8 16 28 100 21 8 2 70 
 Males 100 44 7 18 32 100 19 7 2 72 
 Females 100 52 10 14 23 100 23 10 1 67 
El Salvador Both sexes 100 48 13 13 27 100 18 19 … 63 
 Males 100 44 12 15 28 100 17 20 1 63 
 Females 100 53 13 10 25 100 19 18 … 63 
Guatemala Both sexes 100 33 12 6 48 100 5 6 … 89 
 Males 100 32 13 6 50 100 6 6 … 88 
 Females 100 34 12 7 47 100 4 6 … 90 
Honduras Both sexes 100 30 7 13 50 100 8 4 1 87 
 Males 100 25 7 10 57 100 6 3 1 90 
 Females 100 35 8 15 42 100 13 5 … 83 
Mexico Both sexes 100 43 13 12 33 100 18 18 3 61 
 Males 100 36 15 11 38 100 17 19 4 60 
 Females 100 50 10 13 27 100 19 17 2 62 
Nicaragua Both sexes 100 29 12 7 52 100 11 17 1 72 
 Males 100 24 11 6 60 100 7 13 1 79 
 Females 100 34 14 9 44 100 16 22 1 61 
Panama Both sexes 100 44 4 20 32 100 30 8 4 59 
 Males 100 35 4 21 40 100 22 8 4 66 
 Females 100 55 4 19 22 100 42 9 3 45 
Paraguay Both sexes 100 44 7 11 38 100 14 10 … 75 
 Males 100 38 5 13 44 100 12 10 … 77 
 Females 100 54 11 8 29 100 18 10 1 71 
Peru Both sexes 100 37 18 11 34 100 13 30 … 57 
 Males 100 30 20 12 38 100 9 35 1 56 
 Females 100 43 16 10 31 100 18 24 … 58 
Both sexes 100 46 12 9 34 100 22 22 2 55 
Males 100 35 12 8 46 100 19 19 2 60 
Dominican 
Republic 
Females 100 59 12 10 20 100 27 26 3 44 
Uruguay Both sexes 100 29 8 10 53 … … … … … 
 Males 100 19 7 10 64 … … … … … 
 Females 100 40 8 11 41 … … … … … 
Venezuelaa Both sexes 100 35 7 15 44 … … … … … 
 Males 100 25 6 14 54 … … … … … 
 Females 100 47 7 16 30 … … … … … 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned. 
a
 National total. 
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Table A.9 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): YOUNG PEOPLE BETWEEN 20 AND 24  
YEARS OF AGE WHO DO NOT SURPASS THEIR PARENTS' EDUCATIONAL LEVEL 
 AND COMPLETED LESS THAN 12 YEARS OF SCHOOLING, 
 BY SEX AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THEIR PARENTS, 
URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, 2000 
(Percentages) 
Geographical areas 
 Urban areas Rural areas 






















Argentina Both sexes 34 59 64 42 18 12 … … … … … … 
 
Males 44 65 75 52 24 19 … … … … … … 
 
Females 25 52 51 31 13 6 … … … … … … 
Bolivia Both sexes 18 20 27 15 17 8 68 76 55 58 … … 
 
Males 19 22 23 16 23 10 60 72 37 56 … … 
 
Females 16 19 30 14 9 7 80 82 78 62 … … 
Brazil Both sexes 44 56 50 39 24 13 74 82 66 45 26 8 
 
Males 52 63 59 47 28 17 80 86 73 57 20 7 
 
Females 34 46 38 30 18 7 62 72 52 26 33 9 
Chile Both sexes 19 31 32 27 15 4 47 53 54 39 22 2 
 
Males 21 35 36 30 15 5 53 58 61 45 26 3 
 
Females 17 26 28 24 15 3 38 45 44 30 18 1 
Colombia Both sexes 24 44 33 18 8 5 56 70 51 31 12 6 
 
Males 29 49 38 24 12 5 63 76 57 41 27 … 
 
Females 18 38 27 11 5 5 42 58 39 14 … 38 
Costa Rica Both sexes 41 66 66 46 32 14 69 85 78 60 26 10 
 
Males 46 61 67 53 31 11 74 87 82 66 35 15 
 
Females 36 74 64 37 35 17 62 82 71 54 15 3 
Ecuador Both sexes 28 50 42 30 13 4 70 80 72 60 19 15 
 
Males 32 60 46 36 12 3 72 82 76 61 22 31 
 
Females 23 40 38 23 14 6 67 77 66 58 15 … 
El Salvador Both sexes 27 42 34 24 14 2 63 66 61 43 27 … 
 
Males 28 44 37 27 15 … 63 65 61 48 … … 
 
Females 25 39 30 21 13 5 63 66 60 36 50 … 
Guatemala Both sexes 48 67 49 29 31 10 89 90 84 62 … … 
 
Males 50 67 61 24 37 18 88 89 86 74 … … 
 
Females 47 68 40 37 26 3 90 94 80 57 … … 
Honduras Both sexes 50 69 58 48 34 16 87 92 84 59 … 82 
 
Males 57 73 69 50 43 19 90 94 89 72 … 63 
 
Females 42 65 44 45 17 14 83 90 77 41 … 90 
Mexico Both sexes 33 45 45 39 16 4 61 70 55 57 29 … 
 
Males 38 47 51 42 26 6 60 67 53 73 28 … 
 
Females 27 41 38 37 5 3 62 74 60 34 31 … 
Nicaragua Both sexes 52 65 57 42 55 6 72 79 60 43 … … 
 
Males 60 75 56 49 70 … 79 85 69 52 … … 
 
Females 44 53 58 33 40 9 61 69 45 33 … … 
Panama Both sexes 32 53 49 41 18 6 59 77 66 49 25 27 
 
Males 40 64 65 50 28 8 66 83 77 54 31 21 
 
Females 22 35 26 31 8 4 45 65 47 42 17 30 
Paraguay Both sexes 38 69 63 25 6 13 75 83 75 65 40 … 
 
Males 44 76 70 30 4 14 77 80 80 67 56 … 
 
Females 29 50 52 17 8 11 71 89 66 63 … … 
Peru Both sexes 34 27 34 48 32 22 57 60 50 51 55 85 
 
Males 38 32 38 59 25 14 56 56 55 47 87 90 
 
Females 31 21 29 37 37 29 58 65 43 55 … 80 
Both sexes 34 39 43 34 20 31 55 64 54 44 25 23 
Males 46 59 50 47 30 46 60 69 62 44 11 50 
Dominican 
Republic 
Females 20 15 31 22 11 21 44 51 39 44 48 … 
Uruguay Both sexes 53 56 68 62 37 25 … … … … … … 
 
Males 64 62 78 72 48 40 … … … … … … 
 
Females 41 46 56 50 25 12 … … … … … … 
Venezuela a Both sexes 44 65 60 43 26 11 … … … … … … 
 
Males 54 75 70 54 31 18 … … … … … … 
 
Females 30 48 46 29 20 4 … … … … … … 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned. 
a
 National total. 
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Table A.10 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE BETWEEN 20 
AND 24 YEARS OF AGE, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THEIR PARENTS, 
URBAN AND RURAL AREAS 
(Percentages) 
Urban areas Rural areas 
Educational level of parents Educational level of parents  Country Year Total 
0-5 6-9 10-12 13 and 
over 
Total 
0-5 6-9 10-12 13 and 
over 
Argentina 2000 100.0 16.4 43.5 21.3 18.9 … … … … … 
Bolivia 2000 100.0 38.8 21.5 22.4 17.2 100.0 91.8 7.0 0.7 0.5 
Brazil 1999 100.0 63.3 19.1 8.0 9.6 100.0 92.6 4.4 1.9 1.2 
Chile 2000 100.0 16.8 32.5 33.0 17.6 100.0 63.0 28.9 6.5 1.5 
Colombia 1999 100.0 48.8 23.6 14.3 13.4 100.0 85.4 9.0 3.7 1.8 
Costa Rica 2000 100.0 23.4 43.1 11.9 21.6 100.0 57.6 34.5 4.0 3.9 
Ecuador 2000 100.0 27.0 42.5 14.1 16.4 100.0 68.1 28.6 2.7 0.5 
El Salvador 2000 100.0 46.9 26.8 13.9 12.4 100.0 93.8 5.9 0.3 0.1 
Guatemala 1998 100.0 65.5 19.4 8.8 6.3 100.0 97.3 2.6 0.0 0.1 
Honduras 1999 100.0 53.6 28.1 2.9 15.3 100.0 90.2 8.6 0.0 1.2 
Mexico 2000 100.0 37.1 33.6 12.9 16.4 100.0 78.8 16.3 2.3 2.5 
Nicaragua 1998 100.0 61.7 25.5 5.2 7.6 100.0 94.1 5.4 0.2 0.3 
Panama 1999 100.0 17.8 44.9 19.9 17.4 100.0 55.4 34.7 6.5 3.5 
Paraguay 1999 100.0 41.6 39.6 9.7 9.1 100.0 79.1 19.4 0.8 0.6 
Peru 1997 100.0 45.3 25.6 14.5 14.6 100.0 92.8 5.2 1.2 0.8 
Dominican 
Republic 2000 100.0 47.1 30.0 14.0 8.9 100.0 80.0 14.6 3.9 1.5 
Uruguay 2000 100.0 18.6 51.3 18.2 11.9 … … … … … 
Venezuela a 2000 100.0 35.3 42.9 9.8 12.0 … … … … … 
Simple average 
for the countries 2000 100.0 39.2 33.0 14.2 13.7 100.0 81.3 15.0 2.3 1.3 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned. 
a
 National total. 
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Table A.11 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE 
BETWEEN 20 AND 24 YEARS OF AGE WHO COMPLETED AT LEAST 12 YEARS OF 
SCHOOLING, BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THEIR PARENTS, URBAN AREAS 
(13 years and over = 100) 
Educational level of parents 
Country Year Total 0-5 6-9 10-12 13 and over 
1990 53 18 55 79 100 Argentina  
(Greater Buenos Aires) 2000 69 27 61 87 100 
Bolivia 1989 73 58 76 93 100 
 2000 78 62 81 85 100 
Brazil 1990 38 27 66 80 100 
 1999 49 33 62 84 100 
Chile 1990 69 48 67 88 100 
 2000 77 53 69 85 100 
Colombia 1991 55 42 68 94 100 
 1999 75 58 84 95 100 
Costa Rica 1990 56 33 62 93 100 
 2000 61 28 55 74 100 
Ecuador 1990 63 43 65 91 100 
 2000 69 39 67 94 100 
El Salvador 1995 54 36 70 96 100 
 2000 63 41 70 88 100 
Guatemala 1989 41 27 67 80 100 
 1998 46 27 75 79 100 
Honduras 1990 42 26 59 92 100 
 1999 49 30 53 72 100 
Mexico 1989 40 27 52 75 100 
 2000 57 28 57 88 100 
Nicaragua 1993 33 25 46 79 100 
 1998 39 24 56 50 100 
Panama 1991 62 34 64 82 100 
 1999 67 38 59 85 100 
Paraguay 1994 54 33 61 95 100 
 1999 62 27 79 105 100 
Peru 1997 61 42 61 81 100 
Dominican Republic 1997 49 36 55 71 100 
Uruguay 1990 45 18 41 74 100 
 2000 50 25 38 78 100 
Venezuela 1990 32 13 33 69 100 
 2000 54 27 57 79 100 
1990 51 32 60 85 100 Simple average for the 
countries 2000 59 35 63 84 100 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned. 
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Table A.12 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE 
BETWEEN 20 AND 29 YEARS OF AGE WHO WORK 20 OR MORE HOURS PER WEEK, 
BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, URBAN AREAS 
Occupation 























Argentina 1999 Total 100.0 12.8 2.6 17.4 15.5 25.9 7.9 17.4 0.4 
  0 - 8 100.0 ... 0.5 1.9 14.3 37.8 21.3 23.2 1.0 
  9 - 12 100.0 ... 2.7 21.2 20.2 30.4 4.8 20.4 0.3 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 46.5 4.4 25.9 8.9 7.3 0.3 6.7 0.1 
Bolivia 1999 Total 100.0 9.1 2.4 9.0 21.1 37.1 9.8 8.4 3.1 
  0 - 8 100.0 ... 0.7 1.0 22.3 39.7 15.4 15.1 5.7 
  9 - 12 100.0 1.1 0.9 9.7 21.9 48.6 10.4 4.5 2.9 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 33.0 6.9 17.1 18.4 15.0 2.1 6.9 0.5 
Brazil 1999 Total 100.0 9.6 5.4 13.1 16.3 29.9 0.3 19.8 5.5 
  0 - 8 100.0 1.1 2.8 3.9 14.7 41.0 0.1 26.4 10.0 
  9 - 11 100.0 10.5 6.6 21.7 21.0 22.8 0.5 15.7 1.2 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 41.1 12.4 25.3 9.5 6.1 0.5 5.0 0.2 
Chile 2000 Total 100.0 18.6 2.2 15.5 15.5 25.3 6.7 10.3 5.8 
  0 - 8 100.0 1.1 0.9 2.0 9.2 30.9 14.8 20.6 20.5 
  9 - 12 100.0 7.3 1.6 16.4 19.8 31.0 7.7 11.0 5.4 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 46.8 3.7 19.4 10.1 12.5 1.6 4.9 0.9 
Colombia 1999 Total 100.0 11.7 1.2 17.5 22.1 26.1 4.7 13.9 2.9 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.7 0.1 4.0 20.7 35.8 9.5 22.9 6.2 
  9 - 11 100.0 4.2 0.4 21.7 27.5 28.5 3.3 12.9 1.6 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 41.7 4.2 29.6 14.0 7.3 0.1 2.7 0.4 
Costa Rica 1999 Total 100.0 14.1 5.1 16.4 17.5 31.5 4.6 7.6 3.1 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.8 1.6 4.3 19.5 45.3 11.0 11.3 6.2 
  9 - 11 100.0 4.6 3.3 23.1 22.4 35.4 1.4 7.5 2.3 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 39.4 11.2 24.8 10.4 10.8 ... 3.3 0.1 
Ecuador 1999 Total 100.0 11.0 2.1 14.6 22.6 27.2 6.3 10.1 6.0 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.7 0.3 3.3 19.6 34.5 11.8 17.8 12.1 
  9 - 12 100.0 4.9 1.1 16.5 27.4 31.2 5.3 9.1 4.6 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 37.4 6.5 25.9 16.8 9.3 1.1 2.0 0.9 
El Salvador 1999 Total 100.0 10.5 1.6 12.1 21.4 39.9 5.2 6.0 3.2 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.2 ... 1.9 15.4 53.8 8.9 12.3 7.5 
  9 - 12 100.0 1.1 1.0 16.2 30.2 42.1 4.3 3.7 1.3 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 52.5 6.1 19.7 10.1 9.5 0.8 0.8 0.5 
Guatemala 1998 Total 100.0 18.1 8.2 12.6 13.9 28.4 9.6 6.8 2.3 
  0 - 8 100.0 4.2 6.9 3.7 12.4 39.4 17.7 11.9 3.8 
  9 - 12 100.0 27.7 8.0 21.5 17.9 19.5 2.3 2.4 0.6 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 44.4 14.6 20.0 6.7 11.5 0.1 0.4 2.2 
Honduras 1999 Total 100.0 10.5 4.1 11.6 15.6 39.4 5.5 8.3 5.0 
  0 - 8 100.0 1.8 1.1 2.0 15.0 52.5 8.7 12.2 6.7 
  9 - 11 100.0 8.6 3.3 12.5 22.7 38.0 3.1 8.6 3.3 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 27.1 10.1 28.9 13.9 15.9 0.6 0.9 2.6 
Mexico 2000 Total 100.0 14.6 1.8 21.7 14.8 31.9 6.2 7.7 1.2 
  0 - 8 100.0 1.5 ... 6.8 11.3 47.0 15.5 15.3 2.5 
  9 - 12 100.0 8.6 0.8 23.7 17.7 36.6 4.7 6.9 1.0 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 42.5 6.1 32.6 11.4 5.4 0.1 1.7 0.2 
Nicaragua 1998 Total 100.0 3.3 1.9 5.7 23.4 37.0 7.6 12.9 8.4 
  0 - 8 100.0 ... 0.8 2.2 16.4 43.3 9.6 14.8 12.9 
  9 - 11 100.0 ... 2.3 10.4 31.2 34.0 6.8 12.4 2.9 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 24.6 5.8 11.4 37.6 15.1 ... 5.6 ... 
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Table A.12 (concluded) 
Occupation 























Panama 1999 Total 100.0 12.9 5.1 18.8 13.9 35.2 3.7 7.7 2.7 
  0 - 8 100.0 1.6 2.4 4.2 11.4 50.1 5.3 15.8 9.2 
  9 - 12 100.0 4.3 2.8 18.2 16.4 43.9 4.7 8.3 1.4 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 34.7 10.8 30.1 11.7 10.6 1.1 1.0 0.1 
Paraguay 1999 Total 100.0 10.0 3.1 19.4 17.0 27.5 4.5 16.2 2.3 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.4 0.2 4.1 15.3 41.1 7.1 27.4 4.3 
  9 - 12 100.0 4.4 2.5 23.6 21.7 27.9 4.3 14.1 1.7 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 36.8 9.2 35.9 10.2 4.7 0.7 2.2 0.3 
Peru 1999 Total 100.0 15.7 0.5 9.0 21.9 35.0 3.2 11.3 3.4 
  0 - 8 100.0 ... ... 1.7 15.0 45.1 4.2 27.0 7.0 
  9 - 11 100.0 1.7 ... 7.3 27.2 43.4 4.0 12.7 3.8 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 42.9 1.5 14.8 17.0 18.5 1.5 2.6 1.4 
Total 100.0 7.6 0.3 12.7 19.6 42.6 4.1 8.7 4.3 
0 - 8 100.0 0.4 ... 2.6 17.1 52.6 6.8 13.7 6.8 





over 100.0 35.4 1.3 29.7 16.9 14.1 0.9 0.5 1.3 
Uruguay 1999 Total 100.0 9.3 2.2 20.1 15.1 33.0 5.4 11.2 3.8 
  0 - 8 100.0 1.0 1.0 6.3 12.1 46.2 9.3 17.4 6.7 
  9 - 12 100.0 5.8 2.2 23.4 18.9 32.8 4.3 9.9 2.7 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 36.8 4.8 37.9 9.6 7.1 0.3 2.5 0.9 
Venezuela a 1999 Total 100.0 9.3 2.6 30.6 10.1 29.5 8.1 9.7 0.1 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.8 0.4 17.9 20.8 35.5 12.3 12.2 0.2 
  9 - 11 100.0 4.9 2.0 39.3 2.8 33.5 6.8 10.7 0.1 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 34.6 8.3 41.0 1.3 10.3 1.6 2.8 ... 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned. 
a
 National total. 
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Table A.13 
LATIN AMERICA (14 COUNTRIES): PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE  
BETWEEN 20 AND 29 YEARS OF AGE WHO WORK 20 OR MORE HOURS PER WEEK, 
BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, RURAL AREAS 
Occupation 
























Bolivia 1999 Total 100.0 5.3 ... 0.5 4.9 8.5 4.2 1.2 75.6 
  0 - 8 100.0 ... ... 0.2 3.6 5.6 2.4 1.2 87.0 
  9 - 12 100.0 4.9 ... ... 10.3 21.0 11.7 1.6 50.5 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 86.0 ... 5.8 2.2 3.4 ... ... 2.6 
Brazil 1999 Total 100.0 3.9 2.2 2.1 4.8 13.6 0.1 8.9 64.4 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.8 1.7 0.5 3.8 13.2 ... 9.1 70.9 
  9 - 11 100.0 17.8 4.2 9.4 10.9 18.2 0.4 8.6 30.4 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 38.9 10.9 22.2 7.0 4.0 1.2 6.2 9.6 
Chile 2000 Total 100.0 4.1 2.3 4.8 4.9 19.2 5.5 9.8 49.4 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.2 1.6 0.4 2.6 15.4 6.0 9.0 64.9 
  9 - 12 100.0 3.4 2.7 7.8 7.2 24.6 5.4 10.9 38.0 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 32.8 3.9 16.0 7.0 15.5 2.6 9.3 12.9 
Colombia 1999 Total 100.0 4.2 0.3 4.3 11.3 11.3 3.2 8.7 56.7 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.2 0.1 1.2 7.7 11.7 3.5 7.7 67.8 
  9 - 11 100.0 8.0 0.3 12.5 22.3 11.7 2.6 12.9 29.7 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 52.8 3.3 13.8 15.4 3.3 ... 2.8 8.6 
Costa Rica 1999 Total 100.0 5.4 1.7 6.7 9.4 34.9 6.6 7.1 28.1 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.5 0.8 2.0 7.1 36.8 8.3 8.1 36.4 
  9 - 11 100.0 3.9 1.6 17.9 18.9 40.3 3.4 5.6 8.3 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 40.1 8.0 20.0 9.1 13.7 0.7 3.5 5.0 
El Salvador 1999 Total 100.0 2.1 0.2 1.9 11.5 31.5 6.7 8.3 37.8 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.3 ... 0.5 7.3 28.5 7.4 10.6 45.3 
  9 - 12 100.0 0.3 0.4 5.5 23.9 43.9 4.7 2.3 19.0 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 56.0 2.8 5.5 14.0 7.3 5.7 ... 8.8 
Guatemala 1998 Total 100.0 3.3 7.6 1.9 4.1 17.7 43.4 2.5 19.4 
  0 - 8 100.0 1.3 8.1 0.6 4.0 17.3 45.5 2.8 20.5 
  9 - 12 100.0 18.5 2.5 17.6 6.5 23.6 23.0 0.2 8.1 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 100.0 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Honduras 1999 Total 100.0 6.3 0.7 1.3 8.3 17.0 4.5 4.0 57.8 
  0 - 8 100.0 1.1 0.3 0.6 7.9 17.6 5.0 4.3 63.1 
  9 - 11 100.0 18.8 1.5 1.6 17.1 15.7 0.9 3.1 41.4 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 55.6 5.1 8.7 7.7 10.8 1.0 1.2 10.0 
Mexico 2000 Total 100.0 4.3 0.4 5.5 11.7 25.4 10.9 8.0 33.8 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.4 ... 1.7 10.6 18.7 12.8 8.2 47.6 
  9 - 12 100.0 4.9 0.7 8.9 12.8 35.9 9.1 8.7 19.1 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 41.3 2.8 18.1 13.1 6.8 5.1 0.3 12.6 
Nicaragua 1998 Total 100.0 0.9 0.9 0.4 13.0 13.5 3.6 9.2 58.6 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.3 1.0 0.3 7.9 13.0 2.7 9.3 65.5 
  9 - 11 100.0 0.7 0.9 0.8 33.5 16.5 3.5 9.4 34.7 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 10.6 ... ... 45.9 15.1 17.1 6.6 4.6 
Panama 1999 Total 100.0 6.2 2.5 7.0 12.4 35.1 2.4 10.5 23.9 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.5 0.5 0.7 10.3 33.5 1.9 13.1 39.5 
  9 - 12 100.0 8.5 4.0 9.2 16.7 42.1 4.0 7.9 7.7 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 26.1 7.3 29.5 9.1 20.7 ... 6.1 1.1 
Paraguay 1999 Total 100.0 6.4 0.4 2.5 7.9 16.1 4.5 7.6 54.7 
  0 - 8 100.0 0.4 0.3 0.6 6.0 16.1 4.3 8.0 64.3 
  9 - 12 100.0 14.4 1.1 8.6 18.1 20.1 6.6 7.2 24.0 
 
 13 and 
over 100.0 68.9 ... 11.1 3.7 2.5 ... 3.1 10.8 
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Table A.13 (concluded) 
Occupation 
























Peru 1999 Total 100.0 2.0 ... 0.3 6.6 14.6 2.9 2.1 71.5 
  0 - 8 100.0 ... ... ... 5.0 10.3 1.9 1.5 81.3 
  9 - 11 100.0 0.7 ... 1.2 8.8 23.5 5.7 3.5 56.6 
 
 12 and 
over 100.0 29.3 ... ... 12.5 18.5 ... 1.6 38.1 
Total 100.0 2.5 0.2 2.7 13.3 48.6 3.2 5.3 24.2 
0 - 8 100.0 0.6 ... 0.3 11.8 48.4 3.7 4.4 30.8 





over 100.0 39.7 4.9 19.6 5.2 25.6 ... 4.9 ... 
Total 100.0 4.1 1.4 3.0 8.9 21.9 7.3 6.7 46.9 
0 - 8 100.0 0.5 1.0 0.7 6.8 20.4 7.5 7.0 56.1 






over 100.0 48.4 3.5 12.2 10.9 10.5 2.4 3.3 8.9 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned. 
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Table A.14 
LATIN AMERICA (18 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE INCOME OF YOUNG PEOPLE BETWEEN 
20 AND 29 YEARS OF AGE WHO WORK 20 OR MORE HOURS PER WEEK, BY 
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, URBAN AREAS 
(Multiples of the per capita poverty line) 
Occupation 
























Argentina 1999 Total 4.5 7.1 9.2 4.4 4.0 4.1 3.8 3.4 3.2 
 
 0 - 8 3.4 … 4.5 3.5 3.2 3.6 3.6 2.9 2.6 
 
 9 - 12 4.3 … 7.0 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.1 3.7 4.1 
 
 13 and 
over 
5.9 7.1 12.1 4.6 4.0 4.1 3.7 3.5 3.8 
Bolivia 1999 Total 2.9 4.8 6.0 3.7 2.6 2.3 3.7 1.5 2.2 
 
 0 - 8 2.3 … 5.8 1.5 2.0 2.1 3.8 1.4 2.2 
 
 9 - 12 2.5 2.2 6.0 3.9 2.3 2.1 3.8 1.7 2.0 
 
 13 and 
over 
4.1 4.9 6.1 3.7 4.1 3.7 1.7 1.6 2.7 
Brazil 1999 Total 3.4 5.9 7.7 3.6 2.9 2.9 5.5 2.3 1.6 
 
 0 - 8 2.4 2.9 5.9 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.9 1.8 1.5 
 
 9 - 11 3.4 3.3 6.8 3.2 3.1 3.3 5.7 3.0 2.3 
 
 12 and 
over 
7.2 8.1 10.8 5.2 5.1 5.2 7.2 7.3 5.5 
Chile 2000 Total 4.9 9.2 10.8 4.1 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.0 3.0 
 
 0 - 8 2.9 4.4 8.2 3.1 2.7 3.0 3.4 2.5 2.6 
 
 9 - 12 3.9 5.8 8.6 3.9 3.7 3.8 4.0 3.0 3.0 
 
 13 and 
over 
7.5 10.2 12.9 4.6 4.2 5.1 5.4 3.8 6.8 
Colombia 1999 Total 2.8 4.9 6.3 3.0 2.4 2.4 1.8 2.3 2.8 
 
 0 - 8 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.3 1.7 2.1 1.8 1.9 2.7 
 
 9 - 11 2.5 3.2 4.7 2.6 2.3 2.5 1.9 2.8 2.5 
 
 12 and 
over 
4.6 5.3 6.7 3.7 4.3 3.6 2.1 4.4 4.7 
Costa Rica 1999 Total 5.1 7.5 9.5 5.0 4.6 4.5 4.4 2.7 4.3 
 
 0 - 8 3.9 3.8 9.4 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.3 2.1 3.7 
 
 9 - 11 4.7 5.3 6.1 4.5 4.2 5.0 5.6 3.5 6.5 
 
 12 and 
over 
7.1 7.8 10.4 5.6 7.2 5.8 … 3.6 … 
Ecuador 1999 Total 2.3 3.6 5.4 3.2 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.5 
  0 - 8 1.5 1.5 2.6 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.5 
  9 - 12 2.1 2.0 2.8 2.6 1.9 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.4 
 
 13 and 
over 
3.9 4.0 6.4 4.3 3.0 2.5 2.0 2.4 1.0 
El Salvador 1999 Total 3.6 5.9 12.4 4.2 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.1 1.6 
  0 - 8 2.5 4.1 8.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.0 1.8 
  9 - 12 3.5 3.1 10.9 4.0 3.4 3.4 3.4 2.2 1.1 
 
 13 and 
over 
5.7 6.1 13.0 4.8 3.0 4.0 2.9 2.4 … 
Guatemala 1998 Total 2.5 3.5 4.7 2.8 2.0 2.1 1.6 0.6 1.8 
  0 - 8 1.9 2.3 3.9 1.8 2.3 1.9 1.6 0.6 1.5 
  9 - 12 2.6 3.0 4.0 2.8 1.9 2.3 0.8 0.5 1.1 
 
 13 and 
over 
4.6 4.9 7.3 3.5 1.6 4.2 3.4 2.3 4.6 
Honduras 1999 Total 2.1 2.9 4.5 2.5 1.9 1.9 1.9 0.9 1.2 
  0 - 8 1.5 1.6 2.2 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.8 0.8 0.9 
  9 - 11 2.4 2.9 5.4 2.1 2.2 2.8 2.4 0.9 0.5 
 
 12 and 
over 
3.0 3.1 4.8 2.7 2.6 2.6 5.5 2.6 2.9 
Mexico 2000 Total 3.0 4.0 14.1 3.3 2.9 2.3 2.4 1.8 2.0 
  0 - 8 2.0 2.4 … 2.5 2.2 1.9 2.4 1.5 1.6 
  9 - 12 2.7 3.6 26.5 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.5 1.9 2.7 
 
 13 and 
over 
4.7 4.2 10.5 4.5 5.4 2.9 … 3.1 … 
Nicaragua 1998 Total 2.8 14.3 8.0 2.6 2.2 2.6 2.3 1.7 1.6 
  0 - 8 2.1 … 2.0 2.4 1.9 2.4 2.2 1.6 1.5 
  9 - 11 2.7 … 12.5 3.0 2.1 2.8 2.5 2.1 2.4 
 
 12 and 
over 
5.9 14.3 7.8 2.1 2.8 3.7 … 1.8 … 
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Table A.14 (concluded) 
Occupation 























Panama 1999 Total 4.7 7.4 8.2 4.9 4.2 4.0 4.0 3.0 2.7 
  0 - 8 3.0 4.9 4.2 3.5 3.0 3.3 3.1 2.1 2.5 
  9 - 12 4.1 5.0 5.0 4.0 3.7 4.2 4.4 3.8 2.9 
 
 13 and 
over 
7.0 7.9 10.1 5.9 6.2 5.5 5.1 2.7 9.2 
Paraguay 1999 Total 2.9 4.3 9.4 3.0 2.7 2.6 1.9 2.0 1.1 
  0 - 8 2.0 2.0 3.5 2.4 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.9 1.3 
  9 - 12 2.7 3.2 4.1 2.7 2.8 3.1 2.0 2.2 0.9 
 
 13 and 
over 
4.8 4.6 12.5 3.6 3.8 3.8 2.3 2.7 0.0 
Peru 1999 Total 2.0 4.0 17.8 4.2 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.5 1.7 
  0 - 8 2.0 … … 0.9 2.2 1.8 2.5 2.9 1.4 
  9 - 11 2.0 3.9 … 2.9 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.2 1.9 
 
 12 and 
over 
4.0 4.1 17.8 5.4 2.9 3.7 1.8 2.7 1.4 
Total 3.7 7.0 15.6 3.5 3.3 3.5 3.7 2.1 3.2 
0 - 8 3.0 2.8 … 3.8 3.0 3.3 3.2 1.8 3.4 






5.1 7.3 17.3 3.5 3.8 3.8 4.8 … 2.3 
Uruguay 1999 Total 3.9 5.2 7.0 4.1 3.6 3.7 3.8 2.8 3.3 
  0 - 8 3.2 3.1 4.5 3.6 2.9 3.5 3.6 2.5 3.0 
  9 - 12 4.0 4.3 7.7 4.1 3.8 3.9 4.3 3.1 3.5 
 
 13 and 
over 
5.0 5.8 7.0 4.2 4.5 4.9 4.4 4.6 5.7 
Venezuela a 1999 Total 3.0 4.2 7.1 2.9 1.8 2.8 3.2 2.4 2.8 
  0 - 8 2.4 2.3 8.2 2.6 1.7 2.5 2.9 2.1 2.6 
  9 - 11 3.0 2.6 7.4 2.9 2.0 2.9 3.5 2.5 3.1 
 
 12 and 
over 
4.1 4.7 6.9 3.3 3.5 3.4 5.4 3.7 5.2 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned. 
a
 National total. 
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Table A.15 
LATIN AMERICA (14 COUNTRIES): AVERAGE INCOME OF YOUNG PEOPLE BETWEEN 
20 AND 29 YEARS OF AGE WHO WORK 20 OR MORE HOURS PER WEEK, BY 
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL, RURAL AREAS, 1999 
(Multiples of the per capita poverty line) 
Occupation 























Bolivia 1999 Total 1.2 3.5 … 3.1 1.9 2.6 4.0 1.8 0.7 
 
 0 - 8 0.9 … … 4.6 1.9 2.9 2.8 2.1 0.6 
 
 9 - 12 1.8 2.1 … … 2.2 2.3 5.0 1.0 0.8 
 
 13 and 
over 
3.7 3.8 … 2.3 0.4 … … … 8.3 
Brazil 1999 Total 1.9 4.0 7.7 3.3 2.5 3.1 4.3 2.0 1.2 
 
 0 - 8 1.6 2.5 5.1 2.8 2.4 3.0 3.7 1.7 1.2 
 
 9 - 11 2.7 2.8 8.5 3.1 2.5 3.4 2.4 2.7 1.5 
 
 12 and 
over 
7.8 8.3 21.0 4.1 4.2 7.7 8.0 8.3 1.2 
Chile 2000 Total 4.4 10.9 13.3 5.1 4.2 4.7 4.6 3.3 3.5 
 
 0 - 8 3.5 4.0 4.8 3.8 3.6 4.4 4.4 2.9 3.2 
 
 9 - 12 4.5 5.1 13.8 4.7 4.2 4.6 4.6 3.4 3.9 
 
 13 and 
over 
10.0 14.3 33.5 6.2 5.8 6.7 6.4 4.6 7.2 
Colombia 1999 Total 2.7 5.0 5.6 3.7 2.1 2.2 2.4 3.4 2.7 
 
 0 - 8 2.4 2.1 1.8 3.1 1.9 2.0 2.6 1.8 2.6 
 
 9 - 11 3.4 4.1 10.4 3.5 2.1 2.8 1.5 6.7 2.9 
 
 12 and 
over 
4.9 5.8 6.2 5.3 3.0 2.9 … 2.9 3.0 
Costa Rica 1999 Total 5.7 9.9 10.5 6.5 5.3 5.8 5.7 3.7 4.8 
 
 0 - 8 5.0 6.0 9.0 6.0 4.8 5.5 5.6 3.4 4.8 
 
 9 - 11 6.3 7.4 7.3 6.1 5.6 7.0 7.3 4.2 4.7 
 
 12 and 
over 
9.1 10.7 12.6 7.6 7.3 6.9 7.0 6.8 8.3 
El Salvador 1999 Total 3.3 7.7 5.2 4.6 4.5 3.7 3.6 2.9 2.3 
 
 0 - 8 2.9 2.4 … 4.5 3.3 3.3 3.6 2.9 2.4 
 
 9 - 12 4.2 11.2 5.3 4.3 5.5 4.4 3.8 3.0 2.0 
 
 13 and 
over 
6.4 8.1 5.0 6.4 5.0 5.4 1.8 … 1.5 
Guatemala 1998 Total 2.2 3.8 3.9 3.9 1.9 2.1 1.5 0.8 3.0 
  0 - 8 2.1 3.5 3.8 1.0 1.8 1.9 1.5 0.8 3.1 
  9 - 12 3.2 4.2 6.3 5.0 2.7 3.6 1.0 3.9 1.8 
 
 13 and 
over 
3.2 3.2 … … … … … … … 
Honduras 1999 Total 1.8 3.4 3.6 3.0 1.5 2.4 3.3 1.1 1.3 
  0 - 8 1.6 2.4 3.0 2.5 1.4 2.3 3.2 1.1 1.3 
  9 - 11 1.8 3.0 8.7 2.2 0.9 1.6 3.6 0.6 1.6 
 
 12 and 
over 
3.5 3.7 3.2 3.5 3.0 4.5 10.1 2.0 1.7 
Mexico 2000 Total 2.4 4.6 4.6 3.7 2.7 2.8 3.0 2.0 1.5 
  0 - 8 1.9 2.2 … 2.3 2.1 2.3 3.2 1.7 1.4 
  9 - 12 2.7 3.1 4.2 3.2 2.9 3.0 2.8 2.3 1.9 
 
 13 and 
over 
5.7 6.4 5.2 7.0 6.0 6.4 1.0 5.0 3.2 
Nicaragua 1998 Total 2.2 3.2 2.3 6.7 2.5 3.1 3.0 3.3 1.7 
  0 - 8 2.1 2.3 2.1 8.1 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.8 1.8 
  9 - 11 2.4 2.6 4.1 2.6 1.7 3.5 3.3 6.2 1.4 
 
 12 and 
over 
3.7 3.6 … … 2.8 7.6 3.8 3.3 … 
Panama 1999 Total 4.1 8.9 14.7 5.7 3.3 4.1 3.9 1.8 2.7 
  0 - 8 3.0 1.9 4.7 6.3 2.5 4.0 3.3 1.6 2.7 
  9 - 12 4.4 7.0 7.7 5.4 3.8 4.4 4.4 2.3 2.9 
 
 13 and 
over 
8.3 11.5 29.9 6.0 4.3 3.8 … 2.1 3.2 
Paraguay 1999 Total 1.9 4.3 4.7 4.5 1.5 2.9 3.5 2.1 1.1 
  0 - 8 1.6 3.6 4.6 2.0 1.6 2.7 3.4 2.1 1.1 
  9 - 12 2.5 4.0 4.8 4.5 1.6 3.6 3.7 1.9 0.5 
 
 13 and 
over 
4.7 4.6 … 6.3 … 0.8 … 4.0 6.3 
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Table A.15 (concluded) 
Occupation 























Peru 1999 Total 1.0 5.5 … 1.8 2.1 2.8 2.5 2.0 0.9 
  0 - 8 1.0 … … … 1.6 3.0 2.5 1.8 0.8 
  9 - 11 1.0 3.7 … 1.8 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.3 1.2 
 
 12 and 
over 





4.1 9.2 11.1 5.6 3.6 4.1 5.3 2.6 3.8 
  0 - 8 3.8 5.1 … 3.2 2.9 4.1 5.5 2.8 3.4 
  9 - 12 4.6 11.7 … 5.4 5.0 4.2 3.9 2.2 7.9 
  13 and 
over 
7.3 9.9 11.1 6.5 2.1 5.0 … 3.1 … 
Total 2.8 6.0 7.3 4.4 2.8 3.3 3.6 2.3 2.2 
0 - 8 2.4 3.2 4.3 3.9 2.5 3.2 3.4 2.1 2.2 








5.7 7.1 14.2 5.6 3.8 5.0 5.4 3.9 4.1 
Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of household survey data from the countries concerned. 
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Table A.16 
LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PER CAPITA PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURE, 
1990-1999 
(1997 dollars) 
Country 1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 
Latin America a 360 419 466 499 540 
Argentina 1 211 1 447 1 583 1 576 1 687 
Bolivia ... ... 121 147 168 
Brazil b 786 765 932 952 1 011 
Chile 440 538 597 719 827 
Colombia 158 195 297 403 381 
Costa Rica 476 495 536 568 622 
El Salvador ... ... 60 70 82 
Guatemala 52 65 66 69 107 
Honduras 60 67 59 56 57 
Mexico 259 333 358 352 402 
Nicaragua 48 44 52 47 57 
Panama 497 582 606 653 642 
Paraguay 56 114 131 149 132 
Peru 69 100 140 158 192 
Dominican Republic 64 92 100 108 135 
Uruguay 888 1 095 1 248 1 358 1 539 
Venezuela 337 355 287 318 313 
Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. With regard to the estimate 
of consolidated social expenditure for Brazil, see ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2000-2001 
(LC/G.2138-P), Santiago, Chile, March 2002. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.II.G.141, 
box IV.1. 
a
 Simple average for the countries, excluding Bolivia and El Salvador. If these two countries are included, 
the average for Latin America is US$ 422 for the biennium 1994-1995, US$ 453 for 1996-1997 and 
US$ 491 for 1998-1999. 
b




LATIN AMERICA (17 COUNTRIES): PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP), 1990-1999 
Country 1990-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997 1998-1999 
Latin America a 10.4 11.4 12.1 12.5 13.1 
Argentina 17.7 19.2 21.0 19.8 20.5 
Bolivia ... ... 12.4 14.6 16.1 
Brazil b 18.1 17.7 20.0 19.7 21.0 
Chile 13.0 13.6 13.6 14.4 16.0 
Colombia c 8.0 9.4 11.5 15.3 15.0 
Costa Rica 15.7 15.3 16.0 17.0 16.8 
El Salvador ... ... 3.3 3.8 4.3 
Guatemala 3.4 4.1 4.1 4.2 6.2 
Honduras 7.9 8.5 7.7 7.2 7.4 
Mexico 6.5 8.1 8.8 8.5 9.1 
Nicaragua 10.8 10.6 12.6 11.0 12.7 
Panama 18.6 19.5 19.8 20.9 19.4 
Paraguay 3.1 6.2 7.0 8.0 7.4 
Peru 3.3 4.8 5.8 6.1 6.8 
Dominican Republic 4.3 5.9 6.1 6.0 6.6 
Uruguay 16.8 18.9 20.3 20.9 22.8 
Venezuela 9.0 8.9 7.6 8.3 8.6 
Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social expenditure database. With regard to the estimate 
of consolidated social expenditure for Brazil, see ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 2000-2001 
(LC/G.2138-P), Santiago, Chile, March 2002. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.II.G.141, 
box IV.1. 
a
 Simple average for the countries, excluding Bolivia and El Salvador. If these two countries are included, 
the average for Latin America is 11.6% for the biennium 1994-1995, 12.1% for 1996-1997 and 12.7% for 
1998-1999. 
b
 Estimate of consolidated social expenditure. 
c
 As of 1994, the figures were calculated using the new gross domestic product series at current prices. 
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Table A.18 
LATIN AMERICA (8 COUNTRIES): DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURE BY 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME QUINTILES a 
Distribution of social expenditure by quintile  
I 
(poorest) 








ARGENTINA 1991 d        
Education 32.5 18.7 21.1 15.4 12.4 -0.17 3.69 
 Primary 42.7 21.0 19.9 11.9 4.5 -0.34 4.60 
 Secondary 28.7 19.0 26.0 15.6 10.7 -0.16 3.45 
 Tertiary 8.3 11.1 16.0 25.8 38.8 0.30 1.40 
Health and nutrition 38.7 16.6 25.5 14.8 4.5 -0.28 3.99 
Housing and other 20.5 18.0 25.8 19.0 16.7 -0.03 2.77 
Social security 11.0 17.2 20.9 22.5 28.4 0.16 2.04 
Social expenditure excluding social security 33.1 17.9 23.0 15.6 10.3 -0.19 3.68 
Social expenditure including social security 21.1 17.5 21.9 19.3 20.1 -0.001 2.79 
Income distribution e 5.3 8.6 14.1 21.4 50.6 0.41  
BOLIVIA 1990        
Education 32.0 24.3 20.0 14.8 8.9 -0.22 4.66 
 Primary and secondary 36.6 26.3 19.3 12.3 5.5 -0.30 5.21 
 Tertiary 12.4 15.5 22.9 25.8 23.4 0.13 2.31 
Health and nutrition 15.2 14.7 24.4 24.4 21.3 0.09 2.48 
Housing and other 7.8 11.1 14.7 20.6 45.8 0.34 1.56 
Social security 13.5 19.9 22.4 19.0 25.2 0.09 2.76 
Social expenditure excluding social security 25.8 20.5 19.6 16.9 17.2 -0.08 3.83 
Social expenditure including social security 23.5 20.4 20.2 17.3 18.7 -0.05 3.63 
Income distribution e 3.4 8.7 13.1 20.5 54.3 0.45  
BRAZIL 1994 f        
Primary education 30.1 27.3 21.6 14.3 6.8 -0.24 4.34 
Health and nutrition 31.5 26.5 19.5 14.2 8.3 -0.23 4.38 
Housing and other 30.8 26.9 20.6 14.2 7.5 -0.24 4.36 
Social security 42.0 10.1 13.5 15.1 19.4 -0.16 3.94 
Social expenditure including social security 33.8 22.1 18.1 14.8 11.3 -0.21 4.22 
Income distribution e 4.5 8.8 11.8 19.5 55.4 0.45  
CHILE 1996        
Education 34.0 26.1 19.4 14.0 6.5 -0.27 5.05 
 Primary 38.2 26.3 17.6 12.5 5.3 -0.32 5.42 
 Secondary 26.5 24.7 22.2 17.6 9.1 -0.17 4.30 
 Tertiary 6.3 16.3 37.9 20.5 19.0 0.12 1.90 
Health and nutrition 30.9 23.2 22.2 16.5 7.2 -0.22 4.55 
Housing and other 37.3 27.5 20.3 11.2 3.8 -0.33 5.45 
Social security 4.0 9.0 15.0 25.0 47.0 0.41 1.09 
Social expenditure excluding social security 33.3 25.0 20.5 14.4 6.8 -0.25 4.90 
Social expenditure including social security 16.0 16.0 17.0 21.0 30.0 0.13 2.69 
Income distribution e 3.9 8.0 11.8 19.2 57.1 0.47  
COLOMBIA 1997        
Education 21.4 21.2 21.5 18.1 17.6 -0.04 3.40 
 Primary 35.9 28.7 21.2 10.2 4.1 -0.33 5.15 
 Secondary 24.9 26.8 24.4 16.6 7.3 -0.18 4.12 
 Tertiary 3.4 8.0 19.1 27.6 41.6 0.39 0.91 
Health and nutrition 17.5 19.7 22.2 20.7 19.7 0.02 2.97 
Social expenditure excluding social security 27.0 25.0 21.0 17.0 10.0 -0.17 4.15 
Social expenditure including social security 23.0 23.0 20.0 18.0 15.0 -0.07 3.67 
Income distribution e 3.9 8.7 12.9 19.7 54.9 0.45  
        
(Continued) 
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Table A.18 (concluded) 
Distribution of social expenditure by quintile  
I 
(poorest) 








COSTA RICA 1986        
Education 15.7 18.4 19.6 23.8 22.5 0.08 2.04 
 Primary 30.0 27.0 22.0 13.0 8.0 -0.23 3.40 
 Secondary 17.8 21.4 23.1 21.2 16.5 -0.01 2.34 
 Tertiary 1.7 9.1 15.5 35.0 38.7 0.40 0.65 
Health and nutrition 27.7 23.6 24.1 13.9 10.7 -0.17 3.06 
Social security 7.1 13.2 12.0 23.1 44.6 0.34 1.21 
Social expenditure excluding social security 22.1 21.2 22.0 18.5 16.2 -0.06 2.58 
Social expenditure including social security 17.6 18.8 19.0 19.9 24.8 0.06 2.17 
Income distribution e 5.1 11.6 16.7 24.5 42.0 0.35  
ECUADOR 1994        
Education 26.5 31.8 18.5 12.8 10.4 -0.20 3.74 
 Primary 37.5 25.6 18.2 10.8 7.9 -0.30 4.04 
 Secondary 26.7 34.5 17.3 15.6 5.9 -0.24 3.92 
 Tertiary 22.3 32.8 18.8 12.1 14.0 -0.15 3.53 
Health and nutrition 18.8 41.9 16.0 16.3 7.0 -0.20 3.89 
Social expenditure excluding social security 24.5 30.3 18.5 14.4 12.2 -0.16 3.51 
Income distribution e 5.0 10.6 15.9 22.2 46.3 0.38  
URUGUAY 1993        
Total education 33.2 21.3 16.5 14.7 14.3 -0.18 3.03 
 Primary 51.6 22.2 12.7 9.9 3.7 -0.43 4.10 
 Secondary 30.3 28.9 17.6 14.2 9.0 -0.23 3.30 
 Tertiary 5.4 7.2 21.4 24.3 41.7 0.36 0.70 
Health and nutrition 34.9 19.9 22.1 13.2 10.0 -0.23 3.05 
Housing and other 14.1 17.2 13.6 25.3 29.8 0.16 1.74 
Social security 12.4 16.2 20.5 20.1 30.8 0.16 1.59 
Social expenditure excluding social security 31.8 20.1 19.1 15.2 13.9 -0.16 2.88 
Social expenditure including social security 19.6 17.6 20.0 18.3 24.5 0.04 2.07 
Income distribution e 7.3 10.7 13.3 23.8 44.9 0.35  
Unweighted average        
Total education      -0.14 3.66 
 Primary      -0.31 4.44 
 Secondary      -0.17 3.57 
 Tertiary      0.22 1.63 
Health and nutrition      -0.15 3.54 
Housing and other      -0.02 3.18 
Social security      0.17 2.11 
Social expenditure excluding social security      -0.15 3.65 
Social expenditure including social security      -0.01 3.03 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of national studies. With regard to social expenditure including social security in Chile, and to 
social expenditure including and excluding social security in Colombia, see ECLAC, Social Panorama of Latin America, 
1994 (LC/G.1844), Santiago, Chile, November 1994, p. 65. 
a
 Refers to quintiles of households ranked according to their per capita income. 
b
 Special calculation based on five categories of expenditure. 
c
 Refers to the quotient between the proportion of social expenditure items earmarked for households in the poorest 40% of 
the population and their share of primary income distribution. 
d
 Greater Buenos Aires. 
e
 Refers to the distribution of households ranked according to their autonomous per capita income. Autonomous income is 
the sum of income received by individuals after deduction of social security contributions, income tax and monetary 
subsidies provided by the State. For purposes of comparison, the Gini coefficient of autonomous income distribution was 
calculated on the basis of household quintiles. 
f
 Refers to São Paulo. In Brazil, social security expenditure includes pensions only. 
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